NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Literal Translation of
Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*
&
Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*
along with a free and abridged translation of the Elucidation by
MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA PHAṆIBHŪṢAṆA TARKAVĀGĪŚA

[PART I : FIRST ADHYĀYA]

DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA
MRINALKANTI GANGOPADHYAYA

INDIAN STUDIES
PAST & PRESENT

Printed by R. Maitra in R. D. Press, 11/B, Chowringhee Terrace, Calcutta-20 and published by him on behalf of *Indian Studies : Past & Present*, 3, Sambhunath Pandit Street, Calcutta-20

Price Rs. 20.00 (Foreign : Twentyfive Shillings)

First Published
10th April, 1967

PREFACE

Nyāyadarśana by Mm. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa (1282-1348, Bengali years) is a monumental work on Indian philosophy, originally published in Bengali by the Vaṅgīya Sāhitya Pariṣad Mandir, Calcutta, during the Bengali years 1324-1326. The work is in five volumes and covers a total of 2,258 pages of Royal Octavo size. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa gives the *Nyāya-sūtra* and Vātsyāyana's commentary on it, along with their translations in Bengali, and adds to these his own elaborate Elucidation. This Elucidation has all the merits of a masterly commentary on the Nyāya philosophy and it would have been widely recognised to be so but for the circumstance of it being accessible so far only to those that read Bengali.

While preparing the present English version of the work, we have tried to make the translation of the *sūtra* and *bhāṣya* as literal as we could and have added to these an abridged and free translation of Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's Elucidation, taking utmost care not to overlook any point of philosophical or historical interest raised by him.

We take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Professor Gopinath Bhattacharyya, Justice Arun Kumar Mukhopadhyaya and Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharyya for active encouragement and help in various ways. We are also grateful to Principal Ahibhusan Bhattacharyya and Dr. Sudhibhusan Bhattacharyya, sons of Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, for the kind interest they have taken in this work.

Calcutta,
April 10, 1967

DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA
MRINALKANTI GANGOPADHYAYA

CONTENTS

NYĀYADARŚANA

Literal Translation of

Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtra*

&

Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*

along with a free and abridged translation of the elucidation by

Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya

Vātsyāyana's Introduction to the Commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra

Bhāṣya

Successful activity (*samartha-pravṛtti*) results when the object (*artha*) is cognised by the 'instrument of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*). Hence the instrument of valid knowledge is invariably connected with the object (*arthavat*).

There is no cognition (*pratipatti*) of object (*artha*) without the instrument of valid knowledge ; without cognition of object there is no successful activity. On being aware of the object with the help of the instrument of knowledge, the knower wants either to get it or avoid it. His specific effort (*samīhā*), prompted by the desire of either getting or avoiding (the object), is called activity (*pravṛtti*), whose success (*sāmarthya*), again, lies in its invariable connection with the result (*phala*). One who thus exerts (*samīhamāna*), being desirous of getting or avoiding the object, either gets it or avoids it. By object is meant pleasure (*sukha*) and its cause as well as suffering (*duḥkha*) and its cause. Those objects of *pramāṇa* are innumerable (*aparisaṃkhyeya*), because the species of living beings are innumerable.

Elucidation

In the opening aphorism (*sūtra*) of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Gotama or Gautama dectares that the right knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) of the sixteen categories (*padārtha*-s) like *pramāṇa* etc. leads to the ultimate good, i.e. liberation (*niḥśreyasa*). Vātsyāyana apprehends and answers a possible objection to it.

The objection : Right knowledge of the categories is impossible. For, the categories, if rightly known at all, can only be known with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s. Such a right knowledge of the categories presupposes the right knowledge of *pramāṇa* itself. But the right knowledge of *pramāṇa*-s is impossible, because there is no way to ascertain their validity. It cannot obviously be claimed that whatever yields awareness (*anubhūti*, i.e. knowledge other than memory) is an instrument of valid knowledge, since in that case the sources of error also will have to be considered as *pramāṇa*, error too being a form of awareness. It will perhaps be argued that whatever leads to right awareness (*yathārtha anubhūti*) is to be called a *pramāṇa*. But there is no way to ascertain whether an awareness is right or not. Hence any right knowledge of *pramāṇa* is impossible.

Vātsyāyana's answer : It is possible to establish the validity of *pramāṇa*, inference (*anumāna*) being capable of it. The inference is as follows :

pramāṇam arthavat, pravṛttisāmarthyāt.

That is, *pramāṇa* is invariably connected with the object it indicates, since it gives rise to successful activity.

But what is meant by *pramāṇa* being invariably connected with the object it indicates? It means, an object as well as its nature as indicated by the *pramāṇa*, are really so and never otherwise. If the object and its nature, as indicated by an instrument of awareness, are different from what these really are then that instrument is only a pseudo-*pramāṇa* (*pramāṇābhāsa*) and not a *pramāṇa*. A pseudo-*pramāṇa* cannot be invariably related to the object it indicates. For, the object or its nature as indicated by a pseudo-*pramāṇa* is not really so. Thus, e.g., a pseudo-*pramāṇa* indicates a snake where there is only a rope. By contrast, *pramāṇa* is invariably related to the object it points to. The validity of *pramāṇa* is nothing but this invariable relation to the object it indicates. The inference of such an invariable relation is the inference of the validity of *pramāṇa*. This is what Vātsyāyana means when he says, *pramāṇam arthavat*.

The proban (*hetu*) of the inference is *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*, which means the capability of producing successful activity. If *pramāṇa* is not invariably related to the object it indicates, it can never produce successful activity—just as a pseudo-*pramāṇa*, being not invariably connected with the object indicated, cannot produce a successful activity. Thus, e.g., the pseudo-perception of water in a mirage cannot lead to the quenching of the thirst.

Though the word *artha* stands for any object, only those objects that are either sought (*grāhya*) or shunned (*tyājya*), and not 'those to which one is indifferent' (*upekṣya*), are meant here.

But, it will be asked, since the validity of *pramāṇa* is sought to be established with the help of an inference (*anumāna*), how are we to establish the validity of this inference itself? It can possibly be done with the help of another inference; but then to establish the validity of this other inference a further inference will be necessary, and so on for each subsequent inference without any rest anywhere.

The Nyāya answer to this is that it is not necessary to establish the validity of any and every inference. The need of ascertaining the validity of an inference is felt only where there is doubt as to its validity (*prāmāṇya-saṃśaya*). But there are many well-known cases where such a doubt does not arise at all. Thus, e.g., coming across an unsigned letter we infer, without the least tinge of doubt, a writer thereof. Even the sceptic has to argue for—i.e. inferentially defend—the validity of his own position and, therefore, to admit that his inference is not in need of any further validation.

Of course, *pramāṇa* does not directly lead to successful activity. It gives us only the knowledge of an object as desirable or undesirable. According to the desirability or otherwise of the object, arises next the wish to seek or shun it. This leads to the activity aimed at attaining or avoiding the object, which, again, results in the actual attainment or avoidance of the object. In this way, *pramāṇa* leads to successful activity. A pseudo-*pramāṇa* cannot lead to successful activity. It points to an object which is not there and therefore there is no question of attaining or avoiding such an object.

Only right knowledge (*yathārtha jñāna*) of an object can lead to successful activity and *pramāṇa* alone gives right knowledge. *Pramāṇa,* therefore, leads to successful activity only through the mediation of right knowledge.

Another objection may be raised here. Pending the production of successful activity, the validity of a *pramāṇa* is not ascertained. In default of the establishment of the validity of the *pramāṇa*, it cannot give us the right knowledge of the object. In that case, again, there cannot be any activity to get or avoid the object. And if there is no such activity at all, the question of its being successful or not does not arise. Thus, it is useless to speak of *pramāṇa* leading to successful activity.

But such an objection is a flimsy one. The right knowledge of the object is not an indispensable precondition for activity, there being activity in spite of doubt as to the nature of the object. Besides, there can be knowledge of the object even before the ascertainment of the validity of the instrument thereof.

To sum up: Thus is discarded the objection that the validity of *pramāṇa* being unascertainable there is no question of right knowledge of the categories. As such the main subject-matter of Nyāya (i.e., liberation through the right knowledge of the categories) cannot be considered useless.

Bhāṣya

Since *pramāṇa* is invariably related to the object, *pramātā, prameya* and *pramiti,* too, become invariably related to the object. How is it so? Because, in the absence of the foremost (*anyatama*) of these (viz. *pramāṇa*), the right knowledge of the object is not possible. Of these, *pramātā* means one who, being guided by the desire to seek or shun the object, is led to activity. *Pramāṇa* is the instrument by which the knower (*pramātā*) rightly knows the object. *Prameya* is the object rightly known. *Pramiti* is the right knowledge of the object. With these four, *tattva* reaches its fulfilment.

What, then, is *tattva?* (It means) the positivity of the positive (*sat* or *bhāva*) and the negativity of the negative (*asat* or *abhāva*). When a positive object is known as positive, i.e. as it actually is rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *tattva* (of *sat* or *bhāva*). Again, when a negative object is known as negative, i.e. in its actual nature rather than as its contradictory, it becomes the *tattva* (of *asat* or *abhāva*).

But how can the latter (i.e., the negative or *asat*) be known by a *pramāṇa*? Because, when with the help of a lamp the object which exists there is known, so also the object which is not there is not known (i.e. is known as not existing or *nāsti*). Just as with the help of a lamp the visible object is seen by the observer, similarly that which is not perceived is (known as) not existent; it would have been known like that (i.e. the visible object) if it were there; it is (known as) not existent

because there is no perception of it Thus, when a positive object is known by a *pramāṇa*, that which at that time is not known is (known as) not existent. If it were there, it would have been known just like that (i.e. the positive object or *sat*). It is (known as) not existent because it is not perceived.

Therefore, in this way the *pramāṇa* which reveals the existent reveals also the not existent.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana opens with the statement that *pramāṇa* is invariably related to the object. But why does he not mention *pramātā*, *prameya* and *pramiti*, which too are so related? The answer is that *pramāṇa* is the foremost (*anyatama*) of these and *pramātā*, *prameya* and *pramiti* become invariably related to the object only by virtue of *pramāṇa* being so related. For, without *pramāṇa* there is no right knowledge (*pramiti*) and without it there is no question of the knower (*pramātā*) and the object known (*prameya*).

Of course, the word *anyatama* in the commentary, rendered above as "forem ost", may literally also mean "any one" of these four. But Uddyotakara argues that the word is to be taken here in the sense of the "foremost" and this as indicating *pramāṇa* For, in the present context Vātsyāyana is not only discussing but also defending the primacy fo *pramāṇa*

All these four, namely *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, etc, are necessary for a full appreciation of 'the intrinsic nature of the object' (*tattva*) The objects, according to their intrinsic nature, are divided into two classes—positive (*sat* or *bhāva*) and negative (*asat* or *abhāva*).

Objects other than the positive are called negative. Such objects are called negative (*asat*) because these are apprehended as not existing. The negative (*asat*) does not mean here the absolutely non-existent (*alīka*). An absolutely non existent or *alīka* cannot ever be an object. Only that which can be known by a *pramāṇa* is an object. Such objects are classified under two heads, positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*). Of these, the positive (*bhāva padārtha*) are those that are determined by *pramāṇa* as existing; the negative (*abhāva padārtha*) are those that are determined by *pramāṇa* as not existing. Being determined by *pramāṇa* as existing constitutes the intrinsic nature of the positive object or its positivity. Being determined by *pramāṇa* as not existing constitutes the intrinsic nature of the negative object or its negativity.

That which is not ascertained by *pramāṇa* cannot be called an object (*padārtha*). When, therefore, Vātsyāyana claims that negative object, too, is a type of object, he has got to show that it can be ascertained by *pramāṇa*. But how can the negative object be known by *pramāṇa*? Vātsyāyana himself raises this question and answers it as follows. The same or similar *pramāṇa* that reveals the positive objects reveals also the negative objects. No special *pramāṇa* is needed for ascertaining the negative object. Vātsyāyana explains this with the familiar example of the lamp. With a lamp even the common man

ascertains the negative object exactly in the way in which he ascertains the positive object. After the escape of the thief a mere boy can, with a lamp, find out what *is* in the room as well as what *is not* there. What exists is seen, what exists not is not seen; thus the latter is known as not existent. Such awareness of the not existent is common to all. Being an awareness, it necessarily points to an object. The object pointed to by it (i.e., by the awareness of the not existent) is the negative object. In short, the awareness of something as not existing is the awareness of the negative object.

Vātsyāyana classifies the object under two heads, the positive and the negative. But in the list of the sixteen categories of Gautama's first *sūtra*, the negative object does not occur. The later commentators, therefore, found themselves obliged to offer some explanation of Gautama's silence over the negative objects. Two alternative explanations are generally offered. First, the awareness of the negative object necessarily presupposes some reference to its positive counterpart and as such Gautama is primarily concerned with the latter. Secondly, Gautama discusses only those objects the knowledge of which is directly conducive to the *summum bonum* (*nihśreyasa*). There are many other positive objects the knowledge of which does not lead to the *summum bonum* and, therefore, Gautama does not find it necessary to include them in his *sūtra*. On the same ground he does not mention the negative objects.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, subscribes to the view that Gautama in fact mentions the negative object, though by implication. In the list of his 16 categories occurs *prameya* (object of knowledge), which includes *apavarga*. *Apavarga* means the absolute non-existence of suffering and as such is a negative object.

Bhāṣya

The existents are going to be briefly stated in sixteen forms. Of the positive objects—

Adhyāya i, Āhnika 1

Sūtra 1

The true knowledge of

Instrument of Valid Knowledge (*pramāṇa*),
Object of Valid Knowledge (*prameya*),
Doubt (*saṃśaya*),
Incentive (*prayojana*),
Corroborative Instance (*dṛṣṭānta*),
Proved Doctrine (*siddhānta*),

Inference-components (*avayava*),
Hypothetical Argument (*tarka*),
Final Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*),
Discussion for the Final Ascertainment (*vāda*),
Debating Maneuver (*jalpa*),
Destructive Criticism (*vitaṇḍā*),
Pseudo-proban (*hetvābhāsa*),
Purposive Distortion of the Opponent (*chala*),
Futile Rejoinder Based on Mere Similarity or Dissimilarity (*jāti*), and
Point of Defeat (*nigrahasthāna*)

leads to the attainment of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*). // i. 1. 1. //

Bhāṣya

[Vātsyāyana begins with the explanation of the grammatical structure of the *sūtra*, which we skip over. He next adds :] Now, these are the 16 positive objects (the knowledge of which is conducive to the *summum bonum*). The present *śāstra* aims at their exact knowledge (*a-viparīta-jñāna*). In this *sūtra*, the objects to be discussed in the *Nyāya-śāstra* (*tantra*) are exhaustively enumerated, each by name.

The *summum bonum* is obtained (primarily) through the right knowledge of the (twelve) objects of knowledge, viz. *ātman*, etc. This is explained later, in the next *sūtra*. One attains the *summum bonum* after rightly understanding the four human concerns (*arthapada*, lit. 'the basis of the human end'), viz.

suffering (*heya*, lit. 'that which is to be avoided') and its causes,
right knowledge (*ātyantika hāna*, lit. 'the cause of the absolute cessation of suffering'),
the means of attaining that right knowledge (i. e. the present *śāstra*), and
liberation (*adhigantavya*, lit. 'the ultimate goal').

Elucidation

The question will inevitably arise : Is the knowledge of each of the 16 categories mentioned by Gautama directly conducive to the *summum bonum* ? But how can that be possible ? How, e.g., the right knowledge of *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā* or *chala* be directly responsible for the *summum bonum* ? In answer to this, Vātsyāyana explains the real meaning intended by Gautama, which is as follows.

Of these sixteen categories, the knowledge of what Gautama technically calls *prameya* is directly conducive to the *summum bonum*. (*Prameya* literally means any object of right

knowledge. But Gautama restricts its use to only twelve such objects). The knowledge of the other categories being greatly helpful for the knowledge of the *prameya*-s, is also an indirect cause of liberation. In other words, the knowledge of only one of the above categories (i.e. *prameya*) is the direct cause of liberation while that of the other categories is indirectly so.

However, since the *sūtra* itself does not say this in so many words, how are we to know that this is the meaning intended by Gautama ? Vātsyāyana answers that this becomes clear from what is explained in the next *sūtra*, which further shows how the knowledge of *prameya* actually leads to liberation.

Bhāṣya

(Objection :) The separate mention of 'doubt' etc. among them (i.e. the 16 categories of the *sūtra*) is useless, because being appropriately included under *pramāṇa* and *prameya* these are not completely different from them.

(Answer :) This is true. Nevertheless, for the benefit of mankind four branches of study (*vidyā*)—each having its unique subject-matter—are prescribed, of which this study of logic (*ānvīkṣikī-vidyā*) is the fourth and its unique subject-matter (*prasthāna*) consists of these categories, namely *saṃśaya* (doubt) etc. Without the separate mention of these, it (logic) would have been mere 'study of the self' (*adhyātma-vidyā*), like Upaniṣad. Therefore, by mentioning the categories like *saṃśaya* etc., it is shown to have its unique subject-matter.

Elucidation

Though, strictly speaking, *pramāṇa* is included in *prameya*, the objector does not take exception to the separate mention of *pramāṇa* because he realises that without the specific knowledge of *pramāṇa* as *pramāṇa* there cannot be any knowledge of *prameya* as *prameya*. What the objector takes exception to is the mention of the last fourteen categories of the *sūtra*, i.e. from Doubt to Point of Defeat. According to the objector, the mention of all these is redundant, because these are already included in the categories of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

In answer, Vātsyāyana admits, of course, that these fourteen categories are not in fact excluded from *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Still, according to him, there is definite justification for the separate mention of doubt, etc., in the *sūtra*. In the interest of human welfare, four branches of learning are recommended. These are : Veda (*trayī*), State-craft (*daṇḍanīti*), Agro-economy (*vārtā*) and Logic (*ānvīkṣikī*). Each of these has

its unique subject-matter (*prasthāna*). The unique subject-matter of Veda consists of the Agnihotra sacrifice etc.; of State-craft, the king, minister, etc.; of Agro-economy, the plough, etc.. Logic, too, must have its unique subject-matter and that includes the fourteen categories,—doubt and the rest. The specific mention of the topics coming under the subject-matter of Logic is necessary so that Logic is not confused with some other branch of learning. Thus, e.g., the real nature of *ātman* is discussed in Logic, but it really forms the unique subject-matter of Upaniṣad (included in Veda). Therefore, without the mention of doubt, etc., as forming the unique subject-matter of Logic, we run the risk of identifying it with Upaniṣad. Besides, the unique subject-matter of a branch of study should be exhaustively enumerated and as such doubt, etc., are in need of separate mention.

Bhāṣya

Among these, *nyāya* has no relevance (*pravartate*) for objects that are unknown, nor for those that are known for certain. What, then, has it relevance for ? It has relevance only for those objects about which there is doubt. As it is said (by Gautama), "Final ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) is the ascertainment of an object through (consideration of) thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) which result from doubt (*vimarśa*)". [*Nyāya-sūtra*, i.1.41]. Here *vimarśa* means doubt ; (consideration of) thesis and anti-thesis means the application of *nyāya* ; ascertainment of the object means *nirṇaya* or right knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*). This doubt (*saṃśaya*) is the general acquaintance with an object which is short of definite knowledge, e.g., 'What (exactly) is it ?' Though included in the category of *prameya*, it is separately mentioned for this special consideration (viz. being the basic condition for the employment of *nyāya*).

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana now proceeds to mention separately all the fourteen categories like doubt (*saṃśaya*) etc. and, in order to show the justification of their separate mention in the *sūtra*, briefly explains most of them. Doubt being the foremost of them comes first.

Nyāya has no relevance for either the totally unknown or the fully known. This means that *nyāya* has relevance only for that the nature of which is known in general but not known specifically or definitely. Thus, e g., the hill may be known in general but there may be doubt whether it contains fire or not. In this way, a thing may be known in general but its specific nature may remain undetermined. In so far as it remains undetermined, it becomes an object of doubt. And in so far as it is an object of doubt, it becomes an object of the application of *nyāya*. Without there being any doubt, there-

fore, there is no scope for the application of *nyāya*. Thus doubt forms a part of *nyāya*. That Gautama himself means to say this is shown by Vātsyāyana by way of quoting the *sūtra* that defines *nirṇaya*. In this *sūtra*, the word *vimṛśya* is indicative of doubt because Gautama clearly says, "*vimarśa* is *saṃśaya*". Besides, the words thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) used in that *sūtra* are to be taken in the sense of the employment of *nyāya*. In short, the *sūtra* defining *nirṇaya*, too, indicates that doubt is the basis of the employment of *nyāya*.

Bhāṣya

Next (is separately mentioned) incentive (*prayojana*). Incentive is that which induces one to activity—that is, the object for the desire of attaining or avoiding which one is led to activity. All living beings, all their activities and all the branches of knowledge (*vidyā*) are pervaded by incentive. *Nyāya*, too, is employed only on its basis.

What, then, is this *nyāya* ? *Nyāya* is the examination of an object with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*-s). The inference (*anumāṇa*) which is not contradicted by perception and scripture is called *anvīkṣā*, that is the knowing over again (*anu*, literally "after") of that which is already known (*īkṣita*) by perception and scripture. [*anvīkṣā*=*anu* (after) + *īkṣā* (knowledge)]. This branch of knowledge is called *ānvīkṣikī* or *nyāya-vidyā* or *nyāya-śāstra*, because it is propagated for the discussion of that (i.e. of *anvīkṣā*). The inference which is contradicted by either perception or scripture is pseudo-*nyāya*.

Elucidation

In the first *sūtra*, incentive (*prayojana*) is mentioned immediately after doubt (*saṃśaya*). Hence Vātsyāyana, in continuation of his discussion of the need of separate mention of the categories, says, "Next is separately mentioned incentive". Incentive means that by which one is induced. [*prayojana*=*prayujyate anena*].

It is incentive that leads living beings to activity. In a living being a specific knowledge leads to a specific desire ; that specific desire leads to motivation, which again results in the final activity. Traditionally, four incentives are mentioned, namely *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. Uddyotakara, however, critically shows that the main incentives of the living beings are the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, because these alone are the basic causes of their activities. According to Vātsyāyana, incentives include also the undesirable objects, i.e. the objects shunned. For, being of the nature of pain or the cause thereof, the undesirable objects too induce the action of avoiding them.

Vātsyāyana shows the need of the separate mention of incentive in the *sūtra* and

discusses its special relevance for *nyāya*. Without the incentive of the removal of doubt, there is no scope for *nyāya*. Hence incentive is mentioned in the *sūtra* immediately after doubt. Doubt and incentive are thus the two pre-requisites for the application of *nyāya*.

What, then, is this *nyāya* ? Vātsyāyana himself answers it by saying, "*nyāya* is the examination of an object with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge"—*pramāṇaiḥ arthaparīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ*. This is in need of some explanation. According to some, the word *nyāya* means inference-for-others (*parārtha-anumāna*), while according to others it means the five components (*avayava*) of such an inference. By using the word *pramāṇaiḥ*, i.e. in the plural, Vātsyāyana here subscribes to the second of these views. But, then, why does he use the word *pramāṇaiḥ* when the components of an inference are not actually the instruments of valid knowledge ? The answer is that the four *pramāṇa*-s mentioned by Gautama underlie the different components, i.e. the inference-components like *pratijñā*, *hetu*, etc., are based on the *pramāṇa*-s like *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc. Vātsyāyana himself will presently show this. Thus, the word *pramāṇaiḥ*, literally "by the instruments of valid knowledge", is used here by Vātsyāyana to mean "by the components of inference-for-others", each of these being based on any of the four *pramāṇa*-s.

In his *Tātparyaṭīkā*, Vācaspati Miśra takes the word *artha* (literally, 'object') in *artha-parīkṣaṇa* (literally, 'examination of the object') of the commentary as meaning the proban (*liṅga* or *hetu*). Thus, 'examination of the object', according to him, here means 'the examination of the proban'. *Nyāya*, in other words, means the examination of the proban with the help of the five inference-components. But why does Vācaspati say this when the proban is itself one of these five components ? When somebody employs an inference for proving his thesis with the help of a proban, his inference is in fact only an examination of the proban. For, it is determined thereby whether the said proban is capable of proving the said thesis or not. Thus the result of the examination of the proban is the proving of the intended probandum (*sādhya*). If the word *artha* in the commentary is taken to mean the probandum (*sādhya*), then *nyāya* would mean the examination of the probandum by the five inference-components, i.e., the establishment of the probandum (*sādhya-siddhi*). But *nyāya* cannot be synonymous with the establishment of the probandum, which is really the result of the application of *nyāya*. Thus, according to Vācaspati, the word *artha* here means the proban.

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa does not accept this interpretation and says it is for the learned to determine how far Vācaspati is right. For, in the commentary on the third *sūtra* (i.1.3), Vātsyāyana takes the word *artha* in the sense of *liṅgī* or *sādhya* (probandum). Therefore, his real implication may be that *nyāya* means the inference (with its five components) which determines the *sādhya*.

In further elucidation of the nature of *nyāya*, Vātsyāyana adds that it is inference (*anumāna*) which is based on (*āśrita*) perception (*pratyakṣa*) and scripture (*āgama*). Uddyotakara says that the words "based on" (*āśrita*) here imply "not contradicted by" (*avirodhī*). As a matter of fact, by later characterising as pseudo-*nyāya* an inference contradicted by perception or scripture, Vātsyāyana makes it clear that the word *nyāya* is previously used

to mean inference not contradicted by perception or scripture. Thus, a genuine inference or *nyāya* is not contradicted by perception or scripture while an inference thus contradicted is only a pseudo-*nyāya*. That a genuine inference cannot be contradicted by perception or scripture follows from the fact that its five components are already based on the *pramāṇa*-s, of which perception and scripture are the strongest. This is the real significance of Vātsyāyana's statement that *nyāya* is the examination of the object with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s. But that does not mean that in case of every *nyāya* all the five inference-components are essential. As we shall see later, in 'discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda-vicāra*) between the preceptor and the disciple, all these five components are not essential.

In short, by *nyāya* Vātsyāyana means the inference which is not contradicted by any other powerful instrument of valid knowledge. The same is also called *anvīkṣā*. *Anu* literally means 'after' and the root *īkṣ* implies 'to know'. Thus *anvīkṣā* literally means 'that by which is obtained an after-knowledge' and, in this sense, it means inference. But this is the mere etymological meaning of the word *anvikṣā*, in explaining which Vātsyāyana says, *anvīkṣā* stands for that by which an after-knowledge is obtained of what is already known by perception or scripture (*āgama*). Just as the knowledge of an object previously known by inference becomes sounder if known over again by perception or scripture, similarly the knowledge already obtained by perception or scripture becomes sounder when proved anew by inference. [However, the main emphasis here seems to be that inference *must not be contradicted by perception or scripture* rather than that inference is inevitably the knowledge of an object already known by perception or scripture. That Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, too, intends to emphasise this is clear from the circumstance that he proceeds next to illustrate the pseudo-*nyāya*-s or fallacious inferences, which are rejected because of being contradicted by perception or scripture.]

Illustration of pseudo-nyāya *contradicted by perception*: "Fire is cold, because it is an effect, as for example water". This inference is fallacious because it contradicts perception. Perception, through the sense of touch (*tvak-indriya*) gives us the knowledge that fire is hot and there is no doubt as to the validity of this perception,—the conditions that make a perception erroneous (technically called *doṣa*-s), like distance etc., being absent in this case. Therefore, the inference of coldness in fire is negated by the perceptual knowledge, the validity of which cannot be questioned.

Uddyotakara explains the contradiction by perception as inferring something that cannot be a probandum (*sādhya*) of any valid inference. Hotness, e.g., being perceptually proved in fire, coldness in it can never be proved by any proban. Thus, coldness in fire cannot be a probandum at all.

It may be possible to find other fallacies in such an inference. The inference under discussion, for instance, suffers also from the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*, (i.e., of the irregular proban or of the coexistence of the proban with the probandum as well as with the absence of the probandum), because, 'being effect' (the proban) coexists with coldness (the probandum) as well as with hotness (the absence of the probandum). But when a contradic-

tion with perception is already shown, it is not necessary to point to any other fallacy like this. As Udayana, in his *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*, says, it will be like 'killing the killed' (*na hi mṛto'pi māryate,* literally, the dead is never slain). In other words, it is no use trying to show any other defect in an inference already rejected because of being contradicted by perception.

Dignāga, in his *Nyāya-praveśa,* rejects the above example of inference contradicted by perception and he offers a new one, namely, "Sound is inaudible, because it is an effect, as for example a jar". His contention is that sound is perceptually proved by the auditory sense and even one who proposes to infer sound to be inaudible has at that very moment the auditory perception of his own words as well as those of his opponent. Therefore, it is palpably absurd for him to infer that sound is inaudible, his inference being at that very moment contradicted by perception.

But Uddyotakara, in his *Nyāya-vārttika*, and Kumārila, in his *Śloka-vārttika*, try to reject the example offered by Dignāga. They argue that though sound is audible its audibility (*śrāvaṇatva*) is not perceptually proved. The audibility of sound is its peculiar relation with the auditory sense and such a relation is imperceptible. Audibility being imperceptible, the inference of inaudibility of sound cannot be contradicted by perception. Dignāga's example is fallacious because of some other consideration but not because of being contradicted by perception. By contrast, hotness in fire is perceptually proved and as such the inference of the absence of hotness in it is contradicted by perception.

It may, however, be objected that there are cases where perception is rejected because of being contradicted by inference. How, then, can perception be considered sounder than inference ? Thus, e.g., the size of the moon inferred through mathematical calculations is known to be immensely greater than it is actually perceived. But it needs to be noted that because of the *doṣa* (literally, defect, but technically, conditions contributing to fallacious perception) in the form of distance, the perception of the size of the moon is not a valid one. It is only a pseudo-perception. As such, in the case under consideration a genuine perception is not really rejected by an inference. The perception is not wrong in so far as it shows that the moon has some magnitude. But it is wrong because it gives us a wrong knowledge of the magnitude of the moon. It is admitted by all that a perception becomes erroneous because of the *doṣa*-s like distance etc. The inference is here considered stronger, there being no genuine perception to contest it. As a rule, however, inference is weaker than (genuine) perception. Thus, an inference which contradicts a perception becomes fallacious or a pseudo-*nyāya.*

*Illustration of pseudo-*nyāya *contradicted by scripture.* The Kāpālikas—the name of whose sect is derived from the word *kapāla* (skull), because the skull was used by them as a drinking and eating utensil—argue : "The human skull is sacred, because it forms part of an animal body, as for example the conch-shell". Though the Kāpālikas have their own scriptures and do not accept the authority of the Vedas, still, as against the followers of Veda they argue that since the followers of Veda themselves admit the

conch-shell to be sacred in spite of its forming part of the body of a dead animal, the skull should in the same way be considered sacred. In other words, with the conch-shell as an instance, the Kāpālikas try to prove the sacredness of the human skull by inference. But since the *dharmaśāstra*-s of Manu and others, which are based on the Vedas, declare that the human skull is profane, this inference of the Kāpālikas is contradicted by the scriptures and hence is to be rejected as invalid. If the Kāpālikas argue that the inference of the sacredness of the human skull is not contradicted by their own scriptures, the answer is as follows : The sacredness of the conch-shell used as the instance of this inference is based on the sanction of the Vedas ; even the Kāpālikas themselves cannot show any other scriptural authority for the sacredness of the conch-shell. To use this instance, therefore, is to admit the validity of the Vedas. But since Veda (i.e. Manusmṛti etc. based on the Vedas) declares the human skull to be profane, the inference is contradicted by scripture, and as such is fallacious.

Another example of such a pseudo-*nyāya* is : "Wine (*surā*) is to be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa, because it is a liquid, as for example milk".

The word *scripture* (in 'inference contradicted by scripture') should mean 'verbal testimony' (*śabda-pramāṇa*). Thus understood, an inference contradicted by *upamāna* is, on the ultimate analysis, contradicted by the verbal testimony underlying it. [This will be clear in connection with the discussion of *upamāna* as an instrument of valid knowledge.]

But why does not Vātsyāyana mention any pseudo-*nyāya* in the form of 'an inference contradicted by another inference' ? Uddyotakara answers, the reason is that two contradictory inferences about the same object is an absurdity. Vācaspati Miśra, however, admits the possibility of a pseudo-*nyāya* in the form of an inference being contradicted by another. He explains the real implication of Uddyotakara's statement as follows : Two independent as well as valid inferences cannot simultaneously be possible, because in such a circumstance both the probans being equally valid as well as mutually contradictory would result in the fallacy of *sat-pratipakṣa* (i.e. the fallacy of the counteracted proban) and as such none of the probans would yield an inference. Nevertheless, when one inference presupposes another previous one, the previous one is stronger and, therefore, if the posterior inference is contradicted by the previous inference, the posterior one will be negated and this will be an example of pseudo-*nyāya* in the form of an inference contradicted by another, as for example, the inference : "God cannot be the creator". To infer the absence of creativity in God, one has to depend on a previous inference proving the existence of God. When God Himself remains unproved, there is no sense in denying creativity of Him. For, if the substance whose quality is sought to be proved is itself unreal, any effort to prove such a quality as belonging to that substance is senseless. Can a sane man propose to prove fragrance in the sky-flower ? Therefore, one wanting to prove the absence of creativity of God has got to argue like this : "I accept the existence of God ; what I seek to prove is that God is not the creator". But the inference proving the existence of God has already proved God as the

creator. As such, the inference proving the absence of creativity of God would contradict the previous inference proving the inference of God, upon which alone the later inference depends.

Bhāṣya

'Discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*) and 'debating maneuver' (*jalpa*) are useful there. But (the usefulness of) 'destructive criticism' (*vitaṇḍā*) is being examined. A *vaitaṇḍika* is one who employs mere destructive criticism. If, when questioned about its purpose, he admits such and such to be his thesis or such and such to be his doctrine, he has to surrender his role as a *vaitaṇḍika* (*vaitaṇḍikatva*). If he does not admit this, he becomes neither a lay learner (*laukika*) nor an expert (*parīkṣaka*). [That is, because of his utter purposelessness, he would be considered a lunatic.]

Elucidation

Vāda means that form of debate between the preceptor and the disciple which is not prompted by the desire of victory but has for its sole purpose the determination of truth. *Jalpa* means that form of debate in which both the parties are prompted by the desire of victory, seek to prove their own theses and disprove that of the opponent. *Vitaṇḍā* means that form of debate where one, prompted by the desire of victory, tries only to refute the thesis of the opponent without seeking to establish any thesis of his own.

Among these, the usefulness of *vāda* and *jalpa*, having as these do the purpose of establishing some positive thesis, is indisputable. But the utility of *vitaṇḍā* is under dispute.

Vitaṇḍā being mere fault-finding, is considered by some as useless. It does not seek to establish anything and the mere refutation of others cannot be considered as serving any positive purpose. That is why, to show the purposiveness of *vitaṇḍā*, too, Vātsyāyana says, "*Vitaṇḍā* is being examined". This examination means the determination of the purposiveness or otherwise of *vitaṇḍā*.

The real purpose of *vitaṇḍā*, too, is to defend a positive thesis, implicit though it may be. Only it is not sought to be defended logically and explicitly, the attitude of the *vaitaṇḍika* being that his own thesis is *ipso facto* proved by the mere refutation of the opponent. Without such an assumption, his words would be as senseless as those of a lunatic.

Bhāṣya

Again, if he (the *vaitaṇḍika*) says that his purpose is to expose the defects of the opponent—this too will be as objectionable as before. For, the *vaitaṇḍika* has to renounce his own position if he admits one who expounds, one

who learns, the means of expounding or the theme expounded. In case he does not admit (these), his contention that his purpose is to refute the position of the opponent becomes meaningless.

Propositions without any positive thesis to prove constitute *vitaṇḍā*. If these propositions are claimed to be meaningful, then that (meaning itself) constitutes his positive thesis. On the other hand, if this is not admitted, the propositions become meaningless like mere delirium and as such the essence of *vitaṇḍā* is destroyed.

Elucidation

For proving the utility of *vitaṇḍā*, Vātsyāyana refutes an ancient school of extreme sceptics. Phanibhūṣaṇa suggests that it is the same school which is referred to by Vātsyāyana (on *Nyāya-sūtra*, iv. 2. 18) as the *ānupalambhika*. The representative of this school claims to have no positive thesis of his own, mere refutation of the opponent being his only purpose. As against such a position, Vātsyāyana argues that even a sceptic like this has to admit the following four: 1) the person who communicates (*yaḥ jñāpayati*), 2) the person to whom is communicated (*yo jānāti*), 3) the means of communication (*yena jñāpyate*) and 4) the theme communicated (*yat jñāpyate*). One who admits the above has got to accept these as forming one's own thesis. Therefore, he cannot be a *vaitaṇḍika* in his own sense, namely, that he has no thesis whatsoever.

The opponent may argue that everything according to him is absolutely non-existing and everywhere there is only the illusion of the absolutely non-existing appearing as the existing. As such, the person who communicates, the person to whom is communicated, etc. are all equally illusory and hence there cannot be any question of these forming his own thesis. But such a claim cannot be consistent with the opponent's basic claim that the mere refutation of the opponent is the only purpose of his *vitaṇḍā*. For, such a refutation would be equally illusory for him and as such would not form his purpose. In short, even such a sceptic has to admit the reality of the theme he communicates (i.e. his refutation) and therefore the person who communicates, the person to whom is communicated, etc. have got to be admitted as forming his thesis. And this means that the purpose of his *vitaṇḍā* is actually to prove his own thesis.

Vātsyāyana finally concludes by saying that since meaningless propositions are but delirious, even the opponent will have to admit that his propositions are meaningful. What, then, can be the meaning of his propositions? Obviously, the fallacies (*doṣa*-s) he points to in the position he refutes. And if so, these very *doṣa*-s (fallacies) will constitute his very thesis. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that *vitaṇḍā* is without any thesis whatsoever.

Bhāṣya

(The *sūtra*) next mentions 'corroborative instance' (*dṛṣṭānta*). Corroborative instance is an object of perception—an object about which the notions (*buddhi*) of the layman (i.e. one who learns) as well as of the expert (i.e. one who expounds) are not in conflict (i.e. are unanimous). It is included, of course, in the objects of valid knowledge. Still it is mentioned separately because it is the basis of inference and 'verbal testimony' (*āgama*). It (*dṛṣṭānta*) being there, inference and testimony are possible ; without it these are not possible. It is also the basis of the application of *nyāya*. By (showing) the contradiction of the *dṛṣṭānta* the position of the opponent can be declared as refuted. By the substantiation of the *dṛṣṭānta*, one's own position is well-established. If the sceptic (*nāstika*) admits a corroborative instance, he has to surrender his scepticism. If he does not admit any, how can he silence his opponent ? Further, by previously mentioning *dṛṣṭānta* (in the present *sūtra*), Gautama is justified in subsequently saying (the two *sūtra*-s as) : "*udāharaṇa* is an instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) which being similar to the subject (*sādhya-dharmī*) possesses its characteristic (*tat-dharma-bhāvī*) [*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.36] and "because of its absence the opposite of that" [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 37]. [In these two later *sūtra*-s, Gautama defines *udāharaṇa* or exemplification, and Vātsyāyana says that since in the definition of *udāharaṇa* Gautama uses the word *dṛṣṭānta*, he is justified in introducing *dṛṣṭānta* here.] 'Proved doctrine' (*siddhānta*) means the object admitted in the form : "It exists". It is included in the objects of valid knowledge. Still, it is separately mentioned because *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are employed only when there is difference among the proved doctrines, not otherwise.

Elucidation

In the first *sūtra*, 'corroborative instance' and 'proved doctrine' are mentioned after 'incentive'. If these two are included in the objects of valid knowledge, their separate mention may appear to be redundant. Vātsyāyana therefore, proceeds to explain the necessity of separately mentioning the two. However, an objection is raised against the assumption of Vātsyāyana that the two are included in the *prameya*-s. For, Gautama (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 9) enumerates twelve *prameya*-s, in the list of which *dṛṣṭānta* and *siddhānta* do not occur. Uddyotakara answers that *dṛṣṭānta*, too, is a *prameya*, because it is an object of knowledge (*upalabdhi-viṣaya*). The implication of this is that the fifth *prameya* mentioned by Gautama being knowledge (*buddhi*), it can, in a general sense, be asserted that the objects of knowledge, too, are included in them. Of course, according to Uddyotakara, *siddhānta* means the knowledge in the specific form of 'ascertaining the true implication of a system' (*śāstrārtha-niścaya*). As such, according to him, it is to be included in a specific form of *prameya*, namely, *buddhi*. But, since according to Vātsyāyana *siddhānta* is the object admitted by a system, it is included in the *prameya*-s in the general sense, i.e. in the same sense in which *dṛṣānta* is a *prameya*.

Vātsyāyana refers to *dṛṣṭānta* as an object of perception. But a *dṛṣṭānta* is not inevitably an object of perception. For, even a super-sensuous object may be a *dṛṣṭānta.* What, then, is the real implication of Vātsyāyana ? Phanibhūṣaṇa answers, what Vātsyāyana wants to emphasise here is that just as a perception is not in need of being corroborated by an instance, a good *dṛṣṭānta*, too, does not need any further *dṛṣṭānta* and like a perception a *dṛṣṭānta* also solves a controversy. However, just after this statement, Vātsyāyana offers the actual definition of *dṛṣṭānta* (in the line of Gautama's *sūtra*) as "an object about which the notions (*buddhi*) of the layman as well as of the expert are not in conflict".

Vātsyāyana shows a number of justifications for the separate mention of *dṛṣṭānta.* First, it is an essential component of inference, both for oneself (*svārtha*) as well as for others (*parārtha*), because without it the invariable concomitance between the proban and the probandum cannot be conclusively established. Similarly, verbal testimony also depends on *dṛṣṭānta.* For, on listening to something for the first time, we do not have knowledge thereform. Knowledge due to verbal testimony presupposes the knowledge of the connection between the word and the object of which the word is a symbol. And a corroborative instance is necessary for this. Secondly, the opponent's position may be refuted by showing defect in the corroborative instance offered by him, while one's own position may be established by a proper *dṛṣṭānta.*

This shows the *prima facie* impossibility of maintaining the position of the extreme nihilist (*sarva-śūnyatā-vādī*—literally, one according to whom everything is void). For, he does not admit the reality of any object that may serve as a corroborative instance. As such, he cannot argue even for the purpose of refuting his opponent. On the other hand, if he admits the reality of the object mentioned as a corroborative instance, he has to surrender his fundamental position of extreme nihilism.

Even the Sarvāstivādī Buddhists cannot satisfactorily offer any *dṛṣṭānta*, either in defence of his own position or in refutation of his opponent. He claims everything to be momentary (*kṣaṇika*). Therefore, by the time he mentions an object as his *dṛṣṭānta*, the object itself has ceased to exist, and something which is non-existing cannot be a *dṛṣṭānta.* On the other hand, if for the sake of his *dṛṣṭānta* he admits any permanent object, he has to surrender his basic doctrine of momentariness.

Lastly, the separate mention of *dṛṣṭānta* is justified because thereby is facilitated the subsequent discussion of *udāharaṇa.*

Vātsyāyana justifies the separate mention of 'proved doctrine' (*siddhānta*) by saying that without a diversity of these there is no scope for any logical debate.

Bhāṣya

Each of the five propositions (namely *pratijñā*, etc.) with which the desired thesis is conclusively established (*siddhiḥ parisamāpyate*), is called an 'inference-

component' (*avayava*) in relation to their totality. The four *pramāṇa*-s are collectively present (i.e. underlie) in these (five). The 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*) is verbal testimony (*āgama*). The proban (*hetu*) is inference (*anumāna*). The exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is perception (*pratyakṣa*). The application (*upanaya*) is comparison (*upamāna*). The demonstration of the capability of all these to combine for the sake of (establishing) one central thesis is the conclusion (*nigamana*). Such is *nyāya par excellence*. With the help of this alone, *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* can be employed, never otherwise. The ascertainment of truth (*tattva*) is dependent on it. These inference-components being but specific forms of words (i.e. propositions)—and as such included in the objects of valid knowledge—are separately mentioned for the above reasons.

Elucidation

Nyāya means inference-for-others (*parārtha anumāna*) as well as the five components thereof, namely, the 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*), proban (*hetu*), exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). In case of an inference-for-others, the thesis is conclusively established through these five propositions. By 'being conclusively established' is meant that a specific characteristic does belong to the object of which it is sought to be proved as the specific characteristic. (Thus, e.g., in an inference, fire—i.e. the possession of fire—is sought to be proved of the hill. When, therefore, it is actually proved that the hill possesses fire, the thesis is said to be conclusively established). Each of the five propositions, like *pratijñā* etc., is called a component (*avayava*), because each is so in relation to their totality. As Vācaspati Miśra points out, the use of the word *avayava* is here in a secondary sense, its primary sense being the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*). The five components cannot obviously be the material cause of *nyāya*. But just as the component parts (i.e. the material cause) combine themselves to result in one whole, so also the five components combine themselves to prove one central theme of the inference. Being thus similar to the component parts or material cause, they are called components in a secondary sense.

The inference-components are propositions, and, therefore, are included in the fourth of the *prameya*-s as enumerated by Gautama. The fourth *prameya* is *artha*, which comprises of smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), colour (*rūpa*), touch (*sparśa*) and sound (*śabda*). The last of these include the propositions. Still, the inference-components are separately mentioned, because it is essential to have definite knowledge of these.

Vātsyāyana further says that the inference-components like *pratijñā* etc. are the four *pramāṇa*-s, like verbal testimony etc. But the real implication of this is not to equate the inference-components to the instruments of valid knowledge. What he really means is that the four inference-components like *pratijñā* etc. are based on the four instruments of valid knowledge mentioned by Gautama. As a matter of fact, the inference-components,

without being based on the instruments of valid knowledge, cannot by themselves ascertain any truth. Inference-components are actually the 'functional intermediaries' (*vyāpāra*) of the instruments of valid knowledge underlying them. The instruments of valid knowledge, acting through the mediation of the inference-components, determine the truth.

The inference-components in their totality are called by Vātsyāyana "*nyāya par excellence*". The implication is that the truth ascertained by these is beyond any scope of possible controversy, because it is ascertained jointly by all the four instruments of valid knowledge through the mediation of these inference-components.

Bhāṣya

'Hypothetical argument' (*tarka*) is not included in the four *pramāṇa*-s, nor is it a separate *pramāṇa*. It is rather an accessory (*anugrāhaka*) to the instruments of valid knowledge and it facilitates the knowledge of truth (*tattva-jñāna*). An example of such *tarka* :

"Is this birth produced by an impermanent cause or by a permanent one, or is it accidental (*ākasmika*, i.e. without any cause) ?"

In cases of such objects the real nature of which is not known, *tarka* (*ūha*) is employed by way of adducing some reasons. (Thus, e.g. :)

"If birth is produced by an impermanent cause, then, because of the destruction of the cause, the cessation of (the series of) births becomes possible. Again, if (it is produced) by a permanent cause then, because of the impossibility of the destruction of the cause, the cessation of (the series of) births becomes impossible. Again, if (it is) accidental, then birth, being accidentally produced, will never cease and there being no cause of cessation there will be no cessation of birth."

In the case of a *tarka* like this, the *pramāṇa*-s proving that birth is due to *karma* are assisted by a *tarka*.

Tarka facilitates the knowledge of truth, because it judges the plausibility or otherwise of the theme of true knowledge.

Now *tarka*, which is of this nature, along with the four *pramāṇa*-s, helps to establish one's own thesis as well as to refute that of the opponent in a debate (*vāda*) and it is for this reason that *tarka*, though included in the objects of valid knowledge, is separately mentioned.

Elucidation

Hypothetical argument (*tarka*) is neither included in the instruments of valid knowledge, nor is it itself an independent instrument of valid knowledge, because by itself it

cannot lead to the ascertainment of truth. Still, it assists the ascertainment of truth by way of helping one of the instruments of valid knowledge. In the commentary, Vātsyāyana gives an example of this.

Bhāṣya

'Final ascertainment' (*nirṇaya*) is the 'knowledge of truth' (*tattvajñāna*). It is the final result of (i.e. acquired through) the instruments of valid knowledge. 'Discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*) ends with this. 'Debating maneuver' (*jalpa*) and 'destructive criticism' (*vitaṇḍā*) are intended to nurse it (*pālanārtham*). Now, these two, namely *tarka* and *nirṇaya*, conduct 'the practical life of the people' (*lokayātrā*). This *nirṇaya*, though included in the *prameya*-s, is separately mentioned for this reason.

Elucidation

If *nirṇaya* is taken to mean any knowledge of truth then even the perceptual knowledge resulting from the sense-object contact would come under it. That is why Vātsyāyana adds that it is the final result of the instruments of valid knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra explains, by the use of the word *pramāṇa* in plural Vātsyāyana intends to refer to the five inference-components because all the *pramāṇa*-s, assisted by *tarka*, jointly operate only as underlying their collectivity. But Phaṇībhūṣaṇa comments, ascertaining a truth with the help of any of the *pramāṇa*-s assisted by *tarka* is to be called *nirṇaya*. Thus the ascertainment of truth even by perception, when assisted by *tarka*, is a case of *nirṇaya*. In short, the emphasis here should be on the assistance of *tarka*.

Jalpa and *vitaṇḍā* come to an end as soon as an opponent is silenced in a debate. But in a debate in the form of *vāda*, there is no rest before the final ascertainment. For, final ascertainment is the very aim of such a debate. *Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are necessary only for nursing *nirṇaya*. With the help of *tarka* and *nirṇaya* we carry on our normal activities because these two help us to determine what is to be desired and what to be avoided, and thereby, to act accordingly.

Though according to Vātsyāyana *nirṇaya* as a form of knowledge is included in the *prameya*-s, Uddyotakara contends that it may as well be considered an instrument of valid knowledge, because in some cases *nirṇaya* itself can produce the right knowledge of an object. As will be shown later, there are cases in which, depending upon the context, the same thing may alternatively be viewed as the instrument of valid knowledge as well as the object of valid knowledge.

Bhāṣya

'Discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*) means the arguments offered by more than one party—each trying to establish its own thesis—ending in the ascertainment of one of the positions contended. It is mentioned separately because of the need of its special knowledge. Only when specially known, the employment of *vāda* yields the knowledge of truth. *Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, which differ from it (*vāda*) in certain respects, are mentioned separately because, as is said (by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra*, iv. 2.50), these are for the protection of the knowledge of truth.

Elucidation

If the same person raises various positions in order to establish one critically, it will not be considered a case of *vāda*. According to Gautama, *vāda* means a debate entered into by more than one (*nānā*) party. In other words, *vāda* is that form of debate in which two contending parties argue in favour of their own positions. But it will be objected that *vāda* in this sense would include *vitaṇḍā*, too. That is why Vātsyāyana adds : "each trying to establish its own thesis". In the case of *vitaṇḍā*, the contestant (*prativādī*) does not try to establish any thesis of his own and as such it differs from *vāda*. But, it will be objected again, such a definition of *vāda* will not exclude the possibility of *jalpa* being included in *vāda*. Vātsyāyana, therefore, further adds : "ending in the ascertainment of one of the positions contended". In the case of *jalpa*, the only aim of the contestants being the achievement of victory over the other by any means, the debate is not continued till the positive ascertainment of any thesis.

Vātsyāyana says that *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* differ from *vāda* in certain respects. But what are these points of difference ? Uddyotakara explains that, on the one hand, in case of *jalpa* there is an additional feature, namely the employment of 'purposive distortion of the opponent' (*chala*), 'futile rejoinder based on mere similarity or dissimilarity' (*jāti*) and all the 'points of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*), while, on the other hand, in the case of *vitaṇḍā* one of the characteristic features of *vāda* is wanting and it is the zeal of the contestant to prove his own point.

Though *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* differ from *vāda* in certain respects, there are also certain similarities among them, as a result of which the three are collectively called *kathā* (probably meaning debate or argumentation in general).

Bhāṣya

The pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) are mentioned over and above 'the point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*), because these are to be employed in *vāda*, while *nigrahasthāna*-s are to be employed in *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*.

Elucidation

Gautama enumerates five types of pseudo-probans. Special knowledge of the pseudo-probans is necessary for the purpose of ascertaining truth with the help of *nyāya*. Hence is obvious the relevance of the special mention of the pseudo-probans in the Nyāya system. However, since Gautama mentions pseudo-probans at the end of his classification of the points of defeat, these are already included in the latter. As such, their separate mention may appear to be redundant. In dispelling this doubt, Vātsyāyana says that the pseudo-probans are specially mentioned because, though the points of defeat in any form can be shown in the cases of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, the pseudo-probans alone are to be pointed out in case of *vāda*. The purpose of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* is to defeat the opponet at any cost and as such fault-finding in any form is permissible in these cases. But *vāda* is a form of logical discourse between the preceptor and his disciple without the eagerness of any to defeat the other. Thus there is no anxiety in *vāda* to find fault at any cost. Nevertheless, if there is really any fallacy (pseudo-proban) in the arguments of one, the other must point it out for the sake of truth. That is why, Gautama mentions pseudo-probans over and above the points of defeat.

Bhāṣya

The separate mention of 'purposive distortion of the opponent' (*chala*), 'futile rejoinder based on mere similarity and dissimilarity' (*jāti*) and 'point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) is for the sake of acquaintance (*upalakṣaṇa*) with these. *Chala, jāti* and *nigrahasthāna,* when acquainted with, can be avoided in one's own argument and detected in those of others. Besides, it becomes easier to answer a *jāti* employed by the opponent and one may easily use it for one's own purpose.

Elucidation

Chala, jāti and *nigrahasthāna,* in spite of being included in the *prameya*-s, are separately mentioned, because without a proper acquaintance with these one cannot avoid them in one's own arguments, nor can one easily detect them when used by the opponent. Vātsyāyana adds specially about *jāti* that its knowledge facilitates answering such a futile rejoinder when employed by the opponent and moreover helps one to devise it for oneself. But how can Vātsyāyana suggest devising *jāti* for oneself when he has just said that, along with *chala* and *nigrahasthāna*, one ought to avoid *jāti* in one's own arguments ? Uddyotakara answers that there is no contradiction in these statements, because what Vātsyāyana really means by "using it for one's purpose" is simply that a proper knowledge of *jāti*, along with its varieties, helps one to expose and explain effectively the unsatisfactoriness

of such a rejoinder when used by the opponent ; there is really no question of recommending the use of *jāti* in one's own argument.

Bhāṣya

Now, this *ānvīkṣikī* which is differentiated from the other branches of knowledge by the categories like *pramāṇa*, etc., is specially mentioned in 'the enumeration of various studies' (*vidyoddeśa*) as the lamp for all branches of study (*vidyā*), the means (*upāya*) for all activities, the basis of all virtues (*dharma*).

The 'knowledge of truth' (*tattva-jñāna*) and 'the attainment of the *summum bonum*' (*niḥśreyasa-adhigama*) are to be understood in accordance with the respective branches of study. In this particular branch of study called *adhyātma-vidyā* (literally, 'study of the self') knowledge of truth means the knowledge of self (*ātman*), etc , and the attainment of *summum bonum* means liberation (*apavarga*).

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana concludes his commentary on the first *sūtra* by explaining the excellence of the Nyāya system (*nyāya-vidyā*). No intelligent person can have any purpose for which the knowledge of *nyāya* is unnecessary. In all branches of study, whatever is being proved is proved with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge, which are explained in this Nyāya system. Hence it is called the lamp for all branches of study. Besides, all forms of activity presuppose valid knowledge and therefore *nyāya-vidyā*.

But a doubt may arise here. Four branches of study are traditionally mentioned. These are : Veda (*trayī*), agro-economy (*vārtā*), state-craft (*daṇḍanīti*) and logic (*ānvīkṣikī*). Each has its own conception of *tattva-jñāna* (knowledge of truth) and *niḥśreyasa* (*summum bonum*). Veda or *trayī* conceives *tattva-jñāna* as the right knowledge of sacrifices and *niḥśreyasa* as the attainment of heaven. Agro-economy or *vārtā* conceives *tattva-jñāna* as the knowledge of soil, etc., and *niḥśreyasa* as the success in agriculture and commerce. State-craft or *daṇḍanīti* conceives *tattva-jñāna* as the knowledge of the techniques of pacifying (*sāma*), rewarding (*dāna*), fomenting conflict (*bheda*), etc., and *niḥśreyasa* as acquiring political power (*rājya-lābha*) etc.

Thus, each branch of study having its own conception of *tattva-jñāna* and *niḥśreyasa*, the question arises : How are these two conceived in logic or *ānvīkṣikī* ? Vātsyāyana calls it *adhyātma-vidyā*. But, as it also discusses *pramāṇa*-s and other allied topics, it is not to be conceived as exclusively so, like the Upaniṣad. In other words, though by discussing *pramāṇa* etc., it is helpful for the attainment of *niḥśreyasa* as conceived by all

the branches of study, and moreover, though by discussing *saṃśaya* etc., it differs from the Upaniṣad, which is exclusively an *adhyātma-vidyā*, still, this study of *nyāya* is basically aṇ *c dhyātma-vidyā*, because it is conducive to the attainment of the right knowledge of the self and is mainly devoted to the discussion of the real nature of the self. As such, it conceives *tattva-jñāna* as knowledge of the self and *niḥśreyasa* as liberation. Thus, in short, the aim of *nyāya* is primarily liberation, though secondarily, by being indispensable for all the branches of study, it also aims at the *summum bonum* conceived by the other branches.

Bhāṣya

Now, is this liberation attained immediately after knowledge of truth ? This is answered in the negative. How then ? Resulting (ultimately) from the knowledge of truth [as mentioned in the next *sūtra*].

Sūtra 2

Of suffering (*duḥkha*), birth (*janma*), activity (*pravṛtti*), evil (*doṣa*) and false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*)—when each previous one (in this series) is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one immediately following it (in this series), liberation (*apavarga*) is attained. [That is, the removal of *mithyājñāna* leads to the removal of *doṣa* ; the removal of *doṣa* leads to the removal of *pravṛtti* ; the removal of *pravṛtti* leads to the removal of *janma* and the removal of *janma* leads to the removal of *duḥkha*—and this results in *apavarga*.] //i.1.2//

Elucidation

In the first *sūtra*, Gautama briefly indicates :

i. the subject-matter of the Nyāya system, which is the discussion of the 16 categories,
ii. its aim, which is the attainment of liberation, and
iii. the relation between the two.

But this aim and the relation cannot be determined without any critical examination (*parīkṣā*). So in the second *sūtra* he proceeds to the critical examination of these. As a matter of fact, this *sūtra* states Gautama's real stand-point (*siddhānta*). But it is

not proper to state one's own standpoint without mentioning that of the opponent (*pūrvapakṣa*). Therefore, by way of introducing this *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana mentions the opponent's standpoint, which, by implication, the *sūtra* is intended to answer.

Uddyotakara explains the opponent's standpoint as follows. Does liberation result immediately after the knowledge of truth or not? But it is difficult for Gautama to assert either of these two possibilities. If liberation is said to result immediately after *tattva-jñāna*, the transmission of the *śāstra* through the line of the preceptors-and-disciples would be impossible, for the moment the preceptor realises truth and thereby attains liberation, he will cease to have any physical body and as such will be unable to communicate to his disciples the truth realised by him. If, on the other hand, it is claimed that liberation does not result immediately after *tattva-jñāna*, the latter cannot be considered the cause of liberation.

According to Uddyotakara, Gautama's answer to such an objection is that there are two forms of liberation, mediate (*para*) and immediate (*apara*). The latter is also called *jīvan-mukti* or liberation during life-time. It immediately follows *tattva-jñāna*. But even after its attainment, the physical body persists for some time to exhaust the *prārabdha-karma*, i. e., that part of the accumulated 'merits and demerits of past actions' (*karma*) which are already in the 'process of producing results' (*prārabdha*). Mediate liberation (*para apavarga*), on the other hand, follows a particular order of causal sequence and Gautama in this *sūtra* specifies this order, for *para-apavarga* is the ultimate goal of man. In short, after mentioning in the first *sūtra* that *tattva-jñāna* leads to liberation, Gautama, in the second *sūtra*, specifies the causal sequence through which *tattva-jñāna* leads to liberation. Knowledge of ultimate truth does not directly result in liberation ; it leads to liberation through the mediation of the destruction of false knowledge. As Gautama (in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 35) says, false knowledge can be dispelled only by *tattva-jñāna*. This *sūtra* of Gautama is quoted with reverence by Śaṃkara in his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, i. 1. 4.

In the present *sūtra*, therefore, Gautama shows that the *aim* of the Nyāya system is the attainment of *para-apavarga* and the *relation* between this *śāstra* and its aim is that of 'the promoter and the promoted' (*prayojya-prayojaka*).

The causal sequence through which *tattva-jñāna* ultimately leads to liberation is, according to Gautama, as follows :

tattva-jñāna leads to the removal of *mithyājñāna*,

mithyā-jñāna being the cause of *doṣa*, its removal leads to the removal of its effect, namely *doṣa*,

doṣa being the cause of *pravṛtti*, its removal leads to the removal of its effect, namely *pravṛtti*,

pravṛtti being the cause of *janma*, its removal leads to the removal of its effect, namely, *janma*,

janma being the cause of *duḥkha*, its removal leads to the removal of its effect, namely *duḥkha*.

Bhāṣya

Now, there exists many forms of 'false knowledge' (*mithyā-jñāna*) regarding the *prameya*-s, (in the list given by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra*, i. 1. 9) beginning from *ātman* and ending in *apavarga*. Regarding the self (*ātman*), (there is the false knowledge) that it exists not (or that) the not-self is the self. (Other examples of such false knowledge are :) suffering taken for pleasure, the unreal taken for the real, the non-remedy (*a-trāṇa*) taken for the remedy (*trāṇa*), the fearful (*sabhaya*) taken for the fearless (*nirbhaya*), the prohibited (*jugupsita*) taken for the prescribed (*abhimata*) and that which should be avoided (*hātavya*) taken for the desirable (*apratihātavya*). Regarding motivation (*pravṛtti*) (there is the false knowledge) that there exists nothing called *karma* nor its results. Regarding evil (*doṣa*) (there is the false knowledge) that this worldly existence (*saṃsāra*) is not due to evil. Regarding rebirth (*pretyabhāva*) (there is the false knowledge) that there exists no being nor any soul which would die and be reborn after death, (or) that birth is without a cause, (or) that the cessation of birth is without a cause and therefore, rebirth has a beginning and is endless, (or) that though rebirth has a cause, *karma* is not that cause, (or) that rebirth has no connection with any self, for it is merely the destruction as well as the recreation of the stream of body-senseorgans-consciousness-feeling. Regarding liberation (*apavarga*), (there is the false knowledge) that the cessation of all activities is terrible, (or) that in the state of liberation due to the cessation of relation with everything, even many blessings (*bhadra*) will disappear and therefore why would any intelligent person prefer such a liberation which is a destruction of all pleasure and a state of total unconsciousness ?

As a result of such forms of false knowledge occur attraction (*rāga*) for the favourable (*anukūla*) and repulsion (*dveṣa*) for the unfavourable (*pratikūla*). Under the influence of attraction and repulsion are produced evils (*doṣa*) like falsehood (*asatya*), malice (*īrṣyā*), deception (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*), etc. Driven by the evils and through the agency of the body one commits injury (*hiṃsā*), theft (*steya*) and prohibited copulation (*pratiṣiddha maithuna*). Through words (one is led to) lying (*anṛta*), rudeness (*paruṣa*), fault-finding (*sūcanā*) and incoherence (*asambaddha*). Through mind (one is led to) plotting against others (*paradroha*), desiring to grab at others' possessions (*paradravya-abhīpsā*) and heterodoxy (*nāstikya*). Motivations (*pravṛtti*) like these are malignant (*pāpātmikā*) and they result in vices (*adharma*).

Now, (the motivations) that are auspicious (*śubha*) : through (the agency of) body (one performs) charity (*dāna*), rescue (*paritrāṇa*) and service to others (*paricaraṇa*). Through words—truth (*satya*), benevolence (*hita*), attractiveness (*priya*) and the regular recital of the Veda (*svādhyāya*). Through mind—mercy (*dayā*), detachment (*aspṛhā*) and reverence (*śraddhā*). These result in virtue.

In this *sūtra*, by the word *pravṛtti* are meant virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adharma*), which are 'caused by motivation' (*pravṛtti-sādhana*), just as (the scrip-

tures say), food (*anna*) is the very life (*prāṇa*) of the living beings to mean that life is 'caused by food' (*anna-sādhana*).

Such motivations (i.e. vice and virtue) cause respectively detestable and excellent births.

By birth, again, is meant the collective origination of 'body-senseorgans-consciousness-and-feeling' (*śarīra-indriya-buddhi-vedanā*).

From it results suffering. This (suffering), again, is that which is viewed as undesirable and is (variously called) *vādhanā*, *pīḍā* and *tāpa*.

By wordly existence (*saṃsāra*) is meant the uninterrupted flow of all these elements (*dharma*), like false knowledge, etc., ultimately resulting in suffering.

When false knowledge is dispelled by knowledge of truth, the evils are removed because of the removal of false knowledge. Because of the removal of evils, motivation, too, is removed. Because of the removal of motivation, (the chain of) births comes to an end. With the cessation of births, disappears suffering. With the disappearance of suffering, is attained final (*ātyantika*) liberation or *niḥśreyasa*.

Knowledge of truth is explained as the very opposite of false knowledge. Thus, (right knowledge) regarding the self is : the self exists, the not-self is but not-self. Similarly, regarding suffering, the permanent, the remedy, the fearful, the prohibited, the detestable—each known according to its real nature. Regarding motivation—(the knowledge) that *karma* exists and so also the result thereof. Regarding evil—that this worldly existence is the result of evil. Regarding rebirth —that there exist animals (*jantu*) or living beings (*jīva*) and spirit (*sattva*) or self (*ātman*), who are reborn after death ; that birth has a cause, that the cessation of birth too has a cause and as such (the chain of) rebirths is beginningless but it ends in liberation ; that rebirths, being something caused, are caused by motivation (i.e. vice and virtue) and that rebirths having connection with the self flow on through the destruction and recreation of the stream of body-senseorgans-consciousness-and-feeling.

Regarding liberation—that liberation, which is the dissolution of all relations and the cessation of everything else, is a state of bliss (*śānta*) in which disappears the manifold sins which are intensely painful and dreadful and as such why should an intelligent person not delight in liberation, which is the cessation of all sufferings and is free from all consciousness of suffering ?

Therefore, just as poisoned food, though mixed with honey, is not desired, so is pleasure 'invariably attended' (*anuṣakta*) with pain.

Elucidation

According to Vātsyāyana knowledge of truth is the very opposite of false knowledge and as such negates the latter. But, it will be objected, false knowledge being equally

opposed to knowledge of truth may as well negate the knowledge of truth. In answer to this, Uddyotakara says that though false knowledge is generated first, it is weaker, because it is without any support. By contrast, knowledge of truth is supported by the reality of its object as well as the instruments of valid knowledge like scripture (*āgama*). Therefore, false knowledge, which is weaker, can never negate the knowledge of truth, the stronger of the two.

In explaining the nature of false knowledge mentioned in the *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana describes various forms of it regarding the twelve *prameya*-s, mentioned subsequently in *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.9, the list of which begins with *ātman* and ends in *apavarga*. The root cause of this worldly existence of the individual selves is the false knowledge of the twelve *prameya*-s in various forms. Thus, by false knowledge in the *sūtra* is to be understood those forms of it which cause worldly existence.

Though true knowledge of all the twelve *prameya*-s is essential for the attainment of liberation, only two of them, namely the self and liberation, are considered as desirable (*upādeya*), the remaining ten like body etc. being undesirable (*heya*).

[The *Bhāṣya* itself being quite clear and elaborate, we may skip over the points restated by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa in his elucidation.]

HERE ENDS THE SECTION (*prakaraṇa*) ON SUBJECT-MATTER (*abhidheya*), RELATION (*sambandha*) AND PURPOSE (*prayojana*).

Bhāṣya

This system will follow a three-fold procedure (viz.), naming (the topic) (*uddeśa*), defining (*lakṣaṇa*) and critically examining (*parīkṣā*). Of them, *uddeśa* means the act of referring to an object by name ; *lakṣaṇa* means the distinguishing characteristic (*a-tattva-vyavacchedaka-dharma*, lit. the characteristic which differentiates an object from all other objects) of the object named ; *parīkṣā* means ascertainment with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s the appropriateness of the distinguishing characteristic for the object defined. Thus just after naming and classifying, the definitions of the objects classified are stated—as in the cases of the *pramāṇa*-s and the *prameya*-s. Again, just after naming and then defining, the classification is made—as in the case of *chala*. (By way of illustrating the latter procedure, Vātsyāyana quotes *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 10 and i. 2. 11 :) "*Chala* is the distortion of the statement (of the opponent) by drawing an implication contradictory to the intended one" and "it (*chala*) is of three kinds".

Now, the classification of the named (i.e. of *pramāṇa*, which is first named in the first *sūtra*).

Sūtra 3

Pramāṇa-s are four—perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) // i. 1. 3 //

Elucidation

The first two *sūtra*-s constitute the first section (*prakaraṇa*) of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. In these, the subject-matter (*abhidheya*) of the Nyāya system, its purpose (*prayojana*) and the relation between the two (*sambandha*) are stated. This is the proper way of introducing a system.

The subject-matter of the Nyāya system consists of the 16 categories like *pramāṇa*, etc. ; Gautama mentions these serially by name in the first *sūtra*. But the mere mention of these cannot result in their true knowledge. It is further necessary to define and critically examine them—a task to which the subsequent *sūtra*-s are devoted. To emphasise this, Vātsyāyana introduces the third *sūtra* by saying that the Nyāya system follows a three-fold procedure, namely, of naming, defining and critically examining these 16 categories. But Gautama sometimes gives the classification of the items included in a category without first giving a general definition of the category itself, while in other cases he first gives the general definition of a category and then classifies the items that come under it.

Vātsyāyana uses the word *lakṣaṇa*, literally definition, as the second step in the procedure of the Nyāya system. This word, however, is to be taken in the sense of 'defining' (*lakṣaṇa-vacana*, lit. mentioning the definition). But what is its utility? Defining consists in stating the distinguishing characteristic and by using that distinguishing characteristic as the proban (*hetu*) one can infer the difference of an object from all other objects.

In the subsequent *sūtra*-s Gautama defines only four *pramāṇa*-s. But since definition helps only to differentiate an object from what it is not and cannot specify the number of the objects defined, a doubt may arise here whether according to Gautama there is any other *pramāṇa* over and above the four he defines. Uddyotakara explains that in order to dispel such a doubt, it is necessary to name specifically the classes into which it is divided,—a task which Gautama undertakes in this *sūtra*.

In the cases of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, Gautama mentions only the classification of the different forms coming under them without giving their general definitions. Therefore, Gautama's real intention is to be understood as that the *sūtra*, which mentions the classification implies also the general definition. For, without the knowledge of the general deffnition of a category, there can be no knowledge of the definition of the various forms coming under it. As Vācaspati Miśra explains, though the present *sūtra* mentions only the four forms of *pramāṇa* without giving the general definition of *pramāṇa*, such a general definition is implied by the very use of the word *pramāṇa* in the *sūtra*—the special pecularity of a *sūtra* being the combination of a manifold implication in a condensed form.

But what is the general definition of *pramāṇa* implied in the *sūtra*? It is suggested by the etymological meaning of the word itself. The word *pramāṇa* is derived by adding the suffix *lyuṭ* in the instrumental (*karaṇa*) to the root *mā* with the prefix *pra* (*pra*+*mā*+*lyuṭ*). The root *mā*, with the prefix *pra* (i.e., *pra*+*mā*) means to know rightly. The suffix

lyuṭ being in the instrumental, the word *pramāṇa* means the instrument by which something is rightly known, i.e. the instrument of valid knowledge.

Valid knowledge is of two kinds,—presentative (*anubhūti*) and representative (*smṛti* or remembrance). Are we then to consider the instrument of remembrance as a *pramāṇa*? Though the Jaina philosophers admit *smṛti* in their five-fold classification of the 'indirect instruments of valid knowledge' (*parokṣa-pramāṇa*), the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers do not subscribe to this view and remembrance or the instrument thereof is not a *pramāṇa* according to them. For, remembrance means the knowledge derived from the impression (*saṃskāra*) of an object previously known; therefore, the instrument of remembrance as a form of valid knowledge is, on the ultimate analysis, the instrument by which the object was previously known, and as such the instrument of valid remembrance is not to be accepted as an independent *pramāṇa*. Thus the root *mā* with the prefix *pra* (i.e., *pramā*) in the word *pramāṇa* is to be taken only in the sense of presentative valid knowledge. Remembrance, though a form of valid knowledge, has only a borrowed validity. In short, *pramāṇa* means the instrument of valid presentative knowledge only, as is shown by Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and others. Vātsyāyana, too, will show this presently.

The instrument (*karaṇa*) is a form of cause (*kāraṇa*). But any and every cause is not an instrument. Only the 'most efficacious' (*sādhakatama*) of the causes is called the *karaṇa*. Thus, though the knower (*pramātā*) and the object known (*prameya*), too, are causes of valid knowledge (*pramā*), these are not considered as *pramāṇa*, because these are not instruments or the most efficacious ones of the causes of valid knowledge.

To sum up: *pramāṇa* means the instruments of 'presentative valid knowledge' (*yathārtha anubhūti*) and since there are four forms of such valid knowledge, namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*) inference (*anumiti*), 'knowledge derived through the knowledge of similarity' (*upamiti*) and verbal testimony (*śābda*), their instruments, too, are accordingly four-fold, and these are enumerated by Gautama in the present *sūtra*.

[*Pratyakṣa* means both the perceptual knowledge as well as the instrument of perceptual knowledge. The inferential knowledge is called *anumiti* and its instrument *anumāna*. Knowledge derived from the knowledge of similarity is called *upamiti* and its instrument *upamāna*. Knowledge derived from verbal testimony is called *śābda* and its instrument *śabda*. Of course, like *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* is sometimes used to mean inferential knowledge as well, just as *upamāna* and *śabda* are used to mean the forms of knowledge derived from these instruments.]

Bhāṣya

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the function (*vṛtti*, i.e, *vyāpāra*) of each sense-organ (*akṣa*, i e. *indriya*) in respect of its appropriate object. Such a function is of the nature of either contact or knowledge. When the function is of the nature of contact, the result is valid knowledge in the form of perception. When it is of the

nature of knowledge, the result is either the 'knowledge that produces aversion' (*hāna-buddhi*) or the 'knowledge that produces attraction' (*upādāna-buddhi*) or the 'knowledge that produces indifference' (*upekṣā-buddhi*).

Inference (*anumāna*) is the after-knowledge (*anu*=after, *māna*=knowledge) of an object as the probandum (*liṅgī-artha*) through a proban (*liṅga*) rightly ascertained (*mita*).

Upamāna (*upa*=contiguous, *māna*=knowledge) is the knowledge of contiguity (*sāmīpya*), e.g. the *gavaya* is just like the cow. Contiguity means the 'possession of common characteristics' (*sāmānya-yoga*).

Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is so called because by it the meaning is verbally communicated.

That the *pramāṇa*-s are the instruments of knowledge (i.e. of valid presentative knowledge) is to be understood by the 'etymological analysis' (*nirvacana*) of the epithet (*samākhyā*) (i.e., *pramāṇa* itself). The word *pramāṇa* signifies the instrument, because (it is derived as) 'by this is rightly known' (*pramīyate anena*). Thus, the explanation of the specific epithets (like *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, etc.), too, is (to be understood in) similar (manner).

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana begins the explanation of the etymological meanings of the four names of the instruments of valid knowledge. The word *akṣa* in *pratyakṣa* means the sense-organ. The word *pratyakṣa* may be used to mean either of the following three: i) the perceptual knowledge produced by the sense-organs, ii) the objects of such perceptual knowledge, and iii) the instrument of valid knowledge called *pratyakṣa*. But the word *pratyakṣa* is used in the *sūtra* only in the last sense. The etymological meaning of the word given by Vātsyāyana is: the function (*vṛtti*) 'of each of the sense-organs' (*akṣasya akṣasya*) 'in respect of its appropriate object' (*prativiṣayam*). Vācaspati Miśra explains *vṛtti* here as *vyāpāra* (function). The function of sense-organ is that of the ultimate (i.e. the most proximate) cause necessary for the production of perceptual knowledge derived through the senses. The word *prati* in *pratyakṣa* means each of all the sense-organs and as such the word *pratyakṣa* implies the function of each of the sense-organs in respect of its appropriate object. But this is only the etymological meaning of the word *pratyakṣa*. Its actual definition is given by Gautama in the next *sūtra*.

But what is meant by the function of a sense-organ in respect to its own object? Vātsyāyana answers that the function is of the nature of either contact or knowledge. In other words, the specific form of a sense-object contact which immediately gives rise to the perceptual knowledge of that particular object is the first function of that particular

sense-organ. The perceptual knowledge immediately resulting from such sense-object contact is of the nature of 'mere acquaintance' (*ālocana*) with the object, which is also called indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Immediately after this arises the determinate perception or *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* of that object. Both these forms of perception are the results of the same sense-object contact, which is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge. However, to produce the first form of perception, the sense-object contact does not depend on any previous knowledge. On the other hand, to produce the subsequent perception, the sense-object contact depends on a previous knowledge, namely, the previous indeterminate perception. For determinate knowledge is the knowledge of an object as qualified by the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-viśeṣya-viṣayaka-jñāna*). Without the previous knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), there can be no 'knowledge in the form of the qualifier and the qualified' (*viśiṣṭa-buddhi*). This knowledge of the qualifier is produced by indeterminate perception. Therefore, it is necessary to admit an indeterminate perception immediately preceding the determinate one. This indeterminate perception is of the nature of bare awareness and nothing more. In the capacity of producing the knowledge of the qualifier, it becomes a subordinate cause of determinate perception by way of helping the sense-object contact, the real instrument of determinate perception.

It needs to be noted, however, that there can be no indeterminate perception of inherence (*samavāya*) and of non-existence (*abhāva*). Indeterminate perception of inherence is impossible, because the perception of inherence necessarily presupposes the perception of the relata as qualifying the relation of inherence. Thus, e.g., the perception of the inherence of the jar in its component parts is actually the perception of inherence as qualified by the jar. As such, there is no perception of bare inherence unqualified by anything. Of course, the Vaiśeṣikas consider *samavāya* to be imperceptible ; so the problem of indeterminate perception of *samavāya* does not arise for them. According to the Naiyāyikas, however, in many cases we have the perception of the relation of inherence as qualified by the relata. But there can be no unqualified perception of *samavāya* and, therefore, no indeterminate perception thereof.

Both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas admit the possibility of the perceptual knowledge of non-existence (*abhāva*). But in the perception of non-existence, the negatum (*pratiyogin*), too, will be the object of that perception in the form of the qualifier of that non-existence. Thus, e.g., when the non-existence of the jar is perceived, its negatum—i.e. the jar—is also perceived as qualifying the non-existence. There can be no perception of bare non-existence.

Thus, in the cases of inherence and non-existence the perception is invariably determinate and never indeterminate. This view is accepted also by Udayana in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* (iv. 4). In short a determinate perception is generally preceded by an indeterminate one, though the cases of inherence and non-existence are exceptions to this. But since Kumārila denies the reality of inherence and since, though admitting the reality of non-existence, he denies its perceptibility, according to him determinate perception is

necessarily preceded by indeterminate perception (*Ślokavārttika*, *pratyakṣa-sūtra*, *śloka*-s 112 & 120).

Just as the function of the sense-organ in the form of contact with its object is an instrument of valid perceptual knowledge, so also the knowledge resulting from such contact may be an instrument of another valid perception in the form of 'knowledge which produces aversion' (*hāna-buddhi*), or 'knowledge which produces attraction' (*upādāna-buddhi*) or 'knowledge which produces indifference' (*upekṣā-buddhi*). These three forms of knowledge are collectively called *hānādi-buddhi*—a term used also by Kumārila, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Hemacandra.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa next proceeds to illustrate indeterminate and determinate perceptions and also to show the process of acquiring those forms of knowledge which produce aversion, attraction and indifference.

The moment after the contact of the visual sense-organ with water, there arises the unqualified (*aviśiṣṭa*) knowledge of water and waterness. This is called indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*). The word *vikalpa* in *nirvikalpaka* means the 'relation of qualified and qualifier' (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) between two entities. In the case of perception just mentioned, we have the mere awareness of water and waterness, but not of water as qualified by waterness. Hence it is a *nirvikalpaka* perception. At the next moment, the perceptual knowledge takes the form : "It is water", i.e., in this subsequent perception water is known as qualified by waterness. Hence it is called *savikalpaka* (determinate) or *viśiṣṭa* (qualified) perception.

After the determinate perception, one may proceed to obtain the water. If one does so, one has got to admit that in between the determinate perception and the act of obtaining water there intervenes another knowledge that the water is desirable. But what is the instrument of this intervening knowledge ? Since at the stage of such a knowledge the obtainment of water is a future event, there can be no question of any 'ordinary' (*laukika*) perception determining its desirability. Therefore, it needs to be admitted that the said knowledge is inferentially obtained. However, to infer desirability in water it is necessary to have a definite knowledge of a proban invariably related to this desirability. How can the knowledge of such a proban be obtained ? In many previous cases one obtained water and found it useful, i.e. desirable. From this, one acquires the knowledge that such water is invariably desirable. On perceiving water in the present case, one recalls this knowledge of invariable relation between such water and desirability. This leads to the subsequent (determinate) perception of the present water as having the character of such water, i.e. water as invariably related to desirability. This perception is, in the present case, the instrument of the inferential knowledge that this water is desirable, just as in the case of the inferential knowledge of fire in the hill the perception of the smoke as invariably related to fire is the instrumental cause thereof. Thus in the case of the inference under consideration the proban is : 'water as possessing such a character'. And the perception of the present water as possessing such a character is called the *upādāna-buddhi* or the knowledge that produces attraction.

Similarly, in many previous cases one always avoided a particular kind of water and thus had the knowledge of such water as invariably related to undesirability. On perceiving similar water at present, one recalls this knowledge of invariable relation and subsequently perceives this present water as possessing the same character. This perception is the instrument of the inferential knowledge of the undesirability of the present water and as such is called the *hāna-buddhi* or the knowledge that produces aversion.

Similar is the process of acquiring *upekṣā-buddhi* or the knowledge that produces indifference.

The *upādāna-buddhi*, *hāna-buddhi* and *upekṣā-buddhi* are of the nature of perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa pramiti*). Therefore, the instruments thereof—i.e. the previous indeterminate and determinate perceptions of the object—are to be considered as 'instruments of valid perceptual knowledge' (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). But the said *upādāna-buddhi* etc., though of the nature of perceptual knowledge, are not themselves instruments of perceptual knowledge. For these lead to—i.e. are the instruments of—the inferential knowledge of desirability, etc.,

But there were controversies concerning the question whether a perceptual knowledge can be considered as the instrument of another valid perception. According to some, the sense-object contact alone is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge and as such a perceptual knowledge cannot be such an instrument. Uddyotakara, however, answers that just as the sense-object contact is the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge by virtue of its producing a valid and certain knowledge of an object, so is the perceptual knowledge itself resulting from such a contact, by virtue of its being instrumental in producing the subsequent valid and certain knowledge in the form of *upādāna-buddhi* etc. The sense-object contact cannot itself be considered the instrumental cause of *upādāna-buddhi*, etc., because they are but subsequent forms of knowledge and presuppose a prior, valid and definite knowledge of the object itself and this prior knowledge alone is the result of the sense-object contact. Thus, in short, the sense-object contact is the instrument only of the valid perception of the object itself and not of *upādāna-buddhi*, etc.,

But, it will be asked, how can the indeterminate perception, which is not an immediate antecedent of the *upādāna-buddhi*, etc., be considered the instrumental cause thereof? According to Kumārila and Śrīdhara, this indeterminate knowledge is the cause only of the subsequent determinate knowledge, while the subsequent determinate knowledge alone is the instrumental cause of *upādāna-buddhi*. etc. From Vātsyāyana's commentary, however, it is evident that he wants to consider both the indeterminate and the determinate perceptions as the instrumental cause of *upādāna-buddhi*, etc. Vācaspati Miśra, too, explains the commentary accordingly. But how can the indeterminate perception of the object, without being an immediate antecedent of *upādāna-buddhi*, etc., be considered an instrumental cause thereof? Vācaspati Miśra answers that the indeterminate and determinate perceptions resulting from the contact of the sense-organ with an object, say water, revives the 'reminiscent impression' (*saṃskāra*) of similar objects previously perceived; these perceptions, though not immediately preceding *upādāna-buddhi*,

etc., functioning through the mediation of the reminiscent impression, are the causes thereof. The case is analogous to sacrifices which, though not the immediate antecedent to the attainment of heaven, cause it, functioning through the mediation of accumulated merit (*adṛṣṭa* in the form of *dharma*), which results from the performances of sacrifices. But, comments Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, such an explanation cannot be accepted by all, as is evident from the other explanations of *upādāna-buddhi*, etc., offered by others. In any case, it is quite clear that according to Vātsyāyana the sense-object contact is the instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge and this perceptual knowledge, again, is the instrumental cause of *upādāna-buddhi*, etc.

But what exactly is meant by the instrumental cause or *karaṇa*? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds that the totality (*sāmagrī*) of all the causes producing the effect, rather than any one of these by itself, is to be considered as the *karaṇa*. According to this view, therefore, the totality of all the causes producing valid knowledge rather than any one of these by itself is the instrument of valid knowledge. Of course, as far as *upādāna-buddhi* etc. are concerned, Jayanta ultimately subscribes to Vātsyāyana's view that a form of knowledge can be considered as their instrumental cause, though the totality of all that produces such a form of knowledge is to be considered its *karaṇa*.

But Jayanta's view of *karaṇa* as the totality of all the causes producing the effect is rejected by others. Pāṇini defines *karaṇa* as 'the most efficient one' (*sādhakatama*) of the causes. In fact, only the 'special' (*asādhāraṇa*) cause is to be considered as the *karaṇa*. This 'speciality' (*asādhāraṇatva*) or 'being the most efficient one' (*sādhakatamatva*) consists, according to Gaṅgeśa and other representatives of Navya-nyāya, in 'the production of the effect through some functional intermediary' (*vyāpāravattva*, literally the possession of *vyāpāra* or functional intermediary). As Gadādhara explains, *karaṇa* is not a mere cause; it is only that cause which is possessed of the function (*vyāpāra*) which invariably and immediately produces the effect. Thus, e.g., an axe, though in contact (*saṃyoga*) with the wood, cannot be considered the *karaṇa* of the effect in the form of cutting the wood, so long as it is devoid of the speciality of immediately and invariably resulting in the cutting of the wood. The contact of the axe with the wood, in spite of being the 'immediate cause' (*carama kāraṇa*) is not the instrumental cause of the cutting of the wood, for this contact does not work through any functional intermediary. On the other hand, the axe is the instrumental cause, because it functions through the contact of the axe with the wood. Similarly, the sense-organ (*indriya*)—and not the sense-object contact (*indriya-artha-sannikarṣa*)—is the instrumental cause of valid perceptions, because the sense-organ itself functions through the sense-object contact, whereas the sense-object contact does not function through the mediation of anything else. This, however, is a departure from Vātsyāyana, according to whom the sense-object contact is the instrumental cause of valid perception.

Vātsyāyana next passes on to consider *anumāna* or inference. He defines *anumāna* as the after-knowledge (*anu*=after, *māna*=knowledge) of an object as the probandum (*liṅgī-artha*) through a proban (*liṅga*) rightly ascertained (*mita*). By *liṅga* is meant a mark when it is actually used as a proban of an inference. Vācaspati Miśra proposes to take the

word *liṅgī* or probandum here as referring to 'the object as characterised by such a proban'. But from Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *anumāna-sūtra* (*Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.5), it is clear that he takes *liṅgī* as the inferred characteristic which is invariably related to the *liṅga*.

The word *anu* here means after. *Anumāna* means the instrument of valid knowledge of the probandum, i.e. the characteristic inferred (e.g. being characterised by fire), after (*anu*) the proban (e g. smoke), which is invariably related to the probandum is 'rightly ascertained' (*mita*) to be existing in the particular object in which the said characteristic is inferred (e.g., the hill).

If the suffix *lyuṭ* in the word *māna* is taken mean as bringing out the meaning of the root itself (i. e. in *bhāva-vācya*), then *anumāna* will mean valid inferential knowledge. Uddyotakara takes the word *māna* in the commentary in this sense. How, then, can *anumāna* mean the instrument of valid inferential knowledge ? Uddyotakara suggests that the word *yataḥ* ('from which results') is implied here. According to him, the word *anumāna* etymologically means that from which such valid knowledge (*māna*) results later (*anu*). Such an interpretation necessitates the assumption of the implied sense of *yataḥ*. So Uddyotakara offers also an alternative explanation, namely, that inference as an instrument of valid knowledge means also the valid inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) obtained through the right ascertainment of the proban as invariably related to the probandum, because this inferential knowledge is the instrument of the knowledge of desirability (*upādāna-buddhi*), etc. Thus a valid inferential knowledge may itself also be an instrument of valid inferential knowledge.

But it is for the learned to discuss how far Uddyotakara's above explanation is acceptable. The real implication of Vātsyāyana is clearly different. He says that the suffix *lyuṭ* in the word *pramāṇa* in the *sūtra* is used in the instrumental sense (*karaṇa-vācya*) and as such means an instrument. *Pramāṇa*, thus, is to be derived as *pramīyate anena*, i.e., by this is rightly known. According to this derivation, therefore, *pramāṇa* means only the instrument of valid knowledge. Thus the specific epithets of the four forms of *pramāṇa*, too, are to be understood in similar derivative senses. That is, by *pratyakṣa* etc. are to understood the instruments of valid knowledge, like the perceptual, etc. Accordingly, *anumāna* means the instrument of valid inferential knowledge, i. e. the suffix *lyuṭ* in *māna* of the word *anumāna*, too, is to be taken in the *karaṇa-vācya* (i.e, implying the instrument) and not in the *bhāva-vācya*. Thus even when one inferential knowledge is the cause of another inferential knowledge, the instrumental cause of the first inferential knowledge is primarily signified by the word *anumāna* in the *sūtra* and, therefore, the intention of Vātsyāyana is that *anumāna* in general means an instrument of such (i.e. the afore mentioned first) inferential knowledge. Besides, on the basis of Uddyotakara's explanation that the word *anumāna* stands for *anumiti*, which is itself the instrumental cause of another inferential knowledge it is not possible to explain all cases of *anumāna* as *pramāṇa*.

Vātsyāyana next explains the etymological meanings of *upamāna* and *śabda* in the

same instrumental sense. The fuller significance of these will be seen in the subsequent discussion of these two instruments of valid knowledge.

Bhāṣya

But, then, do many instruments of valid knowledge converge (*abhisamplavante*, literally, crowd round) on the one and the same object ? Or, are they restricted (*vyavatiṣṭhante*) to their respective objects alone ? Both (alternatives) are observed.

[Examples of convergence or *abhisamplava* :] From verbal testimony (*āpta-upadeśa*) is ascertained that the self exists. The same is ascertained by inference (viz.) : "The probans for the inference of the self are desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), motivation (*prayatna*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) and knowledge (*jñāna*)" [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 10]. (The same is ascertained by) perception 'resulting from yogic meditation' (*yoga-samādhija*) of the Yogin called *Yuñjāna*. [Yogis are supposed to be of two types, called *Yukta* and *Yuñjāna*, the former having a constant communion while the latter communion only on meditation.] Thus, "The self is perceived through a 'specific form of contact' (*saṃyoga-viśeṣa*) between the self and the mind (*manas*)" [*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ix. 1. 11].

Similarly, fire is ascertained by verbal testimony like : "Here is fire", by inference from the perception of smoke while nearing it, and by perception after reaching it.

Again, (examples of) restriction (*vyavasthā*) (of *pramāṇa*-s to their respective objects alone) : "One desiring heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice". For ordinary people there is neither inference (*liṅga-darśana*, lit., the perception of a proban) nor perception of heaven.

On hearing the roar of the cloud, one infers its cause (i.e. cloud). There is neither perception of nor verbal testimony for it.

When the hand is perceptually known, there is neither inference nor verbal testimony proving it.

Preception is the foremost of such forms of valid knowledge.

One knowing the object of enquiry through verbal testimony becomes desirous of knowing it over again by inference (*liṅga-darśana*). After inferentially knowing it through perception of the proban, one becomes further desirous of knowing it through perception. And when the object is (ultimately) ascertained through perception, the enquiry comes to its final end. This is exemplified by the aforesaid fire.

Abhisamplava means the convergence (*saṃkara*, lit. mixture) for the knower of many instruments of valid knowledge on the same object of valid knowledge, while their non-convergence means restriction (*vyavasthā*).

Elucidation

'Convergence of the instruments of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa-samplava*) is not admitted by all. There were controversies about it even in the earlier times. Hence Vātsyāyana, in explaining Gautama's standpoint, says that both convergence and restriction of the instruments of knowledge are to be admitted, because there are examples of both. He illustrates both with worldly as well as other-worldly examples and concludes by explaining the process of such convergence. The knower, even after first knowing something through verbal testimony, may be desirous of having a firmer knowledge of the same object through inference and after that may be desirous of having a still firmer knowledge of the same through perception. Of these, perceptual knowledge is supreme. For, once an object is perceptually known there ceases the need of any further enquiry about it. In short, when possible the knower may know the same object successively through the different instruments of knowledge culminating in perception. And since in such cases the second or the third knowledge cannot be considered useless, the convergence of the instruments of knowledge needs certainly to be admitted.

That Gautama himself, though by implication, subscribes to *pramāṇa-samplava* can be seen from his use of the word *pramāṇataḥ* in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 29. For, grammatically *pramāṇataḥ* may mean : i) by one *pramāṇa*, ii) by two *pramāṇa*-s or iii) by many *pramāṇa*-s, and as such leaves the possibility of the same object being known by more than one *pramāṇa*. Following Gautama, Vātsyāyana, too, opens his Introduction to *Nyāya-bhāṣya* with the same word.

This doctrine of *pramāṇa-samplava* is vigorously contested by the Buddhist logicians. Though Nāgārjuna (*Upāya-hṛdayam*, GOS ed., p. 13) speaks of four *pramāṇa*-s of which perception is the foremost, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and others critically establish the view that there are only two *pramāṇa*-s, viz. perception and inference. Perception, again, is valid only in its *nirvikalpaka* form, i e. its *savikalpaka* form is invalid. Further, according to them, the objects of knowledge are only of two kinds, viz. the unique (*viśeṣa* or *svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya*). The unique alone is the object of valid—i.e. *nirvikalpaka*—perception. Thus, in the valid perception of fire, only a unique or particular fire and nothing more as fireness, etc. is perceived. The so-called universal essence of all fires, called fireness, is but a figment of imagination (*kalpanā*) and not real (*sat*), because it cannot serve any practical purpose. Therefore, these universals etc., which are the fabrications of imagination, cannot be the objects of valid perception. These can only be the objects of inference. Thus the two *pramāṇa*-s have two distinct forms of object, and as such there is no possibility of *pramāṇa-samplava*.

In refutation of the Buddhist view, Uddyotakara says that it is not permissible to assume that the objects as well as the *pramāṇa*-s are only two-fold and as such *pramāṇa-samplava* is not possible. For in fact *pramāṇa*-s are four-fold and their objects three-fold. These three-fold objects are : i) the universal (*sāmānya*), ii) the particular (*viśeṣa*), and iii) the substance (*dharmī*) characterised by the two qualities, viz. universality and

particularity. Therefore, the same substance can be rightly known through various *pramāṇa*-s. The same jar, after being known by the visual sense-organ, may be known again by the tactual sense-organ. This is an example of the convergence of the different forms of the same *pramāṇa* proving the same object. On similar considerations, Uddyotakara shows the convergence of the different forms of *pramāṇa* like verbal testimony, inference and perception proving the same object.

Another objection against *pramāṇa-samplava* is that after an object is already proved by one *pramāṇa*, any subsequent *pramāṇa* proving it over again is redundant. Uddyotakara shows the futility of such an objection. The same object is known by different *pramāṇa*-s in different ways. Even after an object is known through verbal testimony or inference, one may have the desire of ascertaining the same object by direct perception and if the conditions permitting perception are there, the perceptual knowledge must follow. It is useless to decry it as redundant, because its efficacy lies in the final cessation of all enquiries concerning the object.

But in case of restriction (*vyavasthā*), there being only one *pramāṇa* appropriate for the object, the question of enquiring about it by any other *pramāṇa* does not arise, and as such there is no apprehension of any such subsequent *pramāṇa* being redundant.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa elaborately discusses the question of *pramāṇa-samplava* and defends it by showing that even the Buddhists cannot establish the validity of inference without admitting it.

HERE ENDS THE COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST THREE SŪTRA-S (*tri-sūtrī*)

Elucidation

In the first three *sūtra*-s, the main subject-matter and purpose etc. of the Nyāya system and particularly the first category *pramāṇa*, on which rests the proof of all other categories, are discussed. Hence, these three *sūtra*-s, collectively known as *tri-sūtrī*, are to be specially studied. That is why, at the end of his commentary on the third *sūtra* Vātsyāyana says, "Here ends the commentary on the *tri-sūtrī*." Following Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Udayana also refer to the collection of these three *sūtra*-s as *tri-sūtrī*.

Bhāṣya

Next are stated the definitions of the classified (instruments of valid knowledge).

Sūtra 4

Perception is the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact (and which is) 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*). 'invariably related' [to the object] (*avyabhicāri*) and is 'of a definite character' (*vyavasāyātmaka*). //i.1.4//.

Bhāṣya

The knowledge which results from the contact of the sense with the object is called perception. (Objection :) But, then, it is not so. (It results when) the self (*ātman*) comes in contact with the mind (*manas*), the mind with the sense and the sense with the object. (Answer :) It (the *sūtra*) does not specify the cause as "it alone is the cause of perception." It rather states the special cause (of perception). That which is the special cause of perceptual knowledge is stated here, but it does not exclude the cause common to the inferential and other forms of knowledge.

(Objection :) But, then, the contact of the mind with the sense should be stated. (Answer :) This (the contact of the mind with the sense) does not differ in the different cases of perceptual knowledge and as such, being alike (i.e. being a common cause like the contact of self with mind), is not mentioned.

Elucidation

The third *sūtra* gives the classification of *pramāṇa*-s. Gautama now proceeds to state the definitions of the four *pramāṇa*-s and begins with that of perception.

The definition of perception is given first because without perception no other instrument of valid knowledge is possible. Hence perception is considered 'supreme among the *pramāṇa*-s' (*pramāṇā-jyeṣṭha*, literally 'eldest of the *pramāṇa*-s').

Definition is absolutely necessary because without it nothing can be rightly known. Definition aims at differentiating an object from all other objects belonging to the same class as well as other classes. As an instrument of valid knowledge, perception belongs to the same class to which inference etc. belong. But pseudo-*pramāṇa*, *prameya*, etc. belong to different classes. Thus the definition of perception differentiates it from inference etc., on the one hand, and from pseudo-*pramāṇa* etc. on the other.

Of the words used in the *sūtra*, 'perception' stands for the object defined and the others constitute the definition proper. These are: 1) 'knowledge', 2) 'resulting from the sense-object contact', 3) 'not due to words', 4) 'invariably related (to the object)' and 5) 'of a definite character.' The omission of any of these expressions makes the definition 'too wide' (*ati-vyāpta*). As Uddyotakara explains, these five expressions exclude respectively the possibility of applying the term perception to the following five: 1) pleasure (*sukha*), 2) inference, 3) knowledge derived through words (*śabda-jñana*), 4) illusory perception (*viparyaya*) and 5) doubtful perception (*saṃśayātmaka-pratyakṣa*). But we shall presently see, there are differences of opinion regarding the exact relevance of these five expressions.

Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and others suggest that the *sūtra* is to be understood by adding to it the word *yataḥ*, i.e. 'from which.' The *sūtra* will thus mean that perception is that from which results the form of knowledge referred to by the *sūtra*. The word *yataḥ* added to the *sūtra* will thus give the definition of the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge and not of perceptual knowledge itself. Gautama clearly designs the present *sūtra* to define the instrument of valid knowledge called perception as mentioned in the preceding *sūtra*.

Gautama begins with the statement that perception is the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact. By way of explaining this, Vātsyāyana first raises a possible objection against it. Mere sense-object contact cannot result in perception, for according to Gautama's own view, in the case of perception the self first comes in contact with the mind, next the mind comes in contact with the sense and lastly the sense concerned comes in contact with the object perceived. In the present *sūtra*, however, Gautama does not mention all these and simply says that the sense-object contact results in perceptual knowledge. Thus the present *sūtra* appears to go against Gautama's own view.

In answer to this Vātsyāyana says that Gautama here does not really mean that the sense-object contact alone is the cause of perception, the purpose of the *sūtra* being to state the definition of perception and not to enumerate all its causes. Gautama defines perception by mentioning only its 'special cause' (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*). The *sūtra* does not, therefore, exclude the contact of the self with the mind from the causes of perception. On the contrary, such a contact being a common cause of all forms of knowledge, perception cannot be defined as the knowledge derived from the contact of the self with the mind. Gautama uses the expression 'knowledge resulting from sense-object contact' to exclude inferential and other forms of knowledge from perception.

A further objection may be raised against this. If Gautama's purpose is to mention the special cause of perception, he should have also mentioned the contact of the sense with mind. In the cases of perception through an 'external sense' (*vahiḥ-indriya*), the sense itself must come in contact with mind and such a contact too is one of the special causes of (external) perception.

Such an objection has obviously no relevance for the cases of 'internal perception' (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) where the mind directly comes in contact with the object and there

is no question of any contact of the mind with the sense. But Vātsyāyana does not raise the question of internal perception here. He answers the present objection by considering only the cases of external perception, for which alone such an objection may have any relevance. His answer is : this does not differ in different cases of perceptual knowledge. To explain its implication, Vācaspati Miśra says that a perceptual knowledge is named after either its object or the sense concerned. When colour (*rūpa*) is perceived by the eyes, the perceptual knowledge is called 'knowledge of colour' (*rūpa-jñāna*) or 'visual knowledge' (*cākṣuṣa-jñāna*). A thing is often named after its special cause. Thus, though the sprout has various causes it is named after its special cause, the seed. Similarly, a perceptual knowledge is named after either the object or the sense in which inheres its special cause, namely, the sense-object contact. Though the contact of self with mind and the contact of mind with sense are causes of such perceptions, the pieces of perceptual knowledge are named neither after self nor after mind in which these contacts inhere. From this point of view the contact of self with mind is similar to that of mind with sense. That is why, like the contact of self with mind, the contact of mind with sense is not mentioned in the *sūtra*. Gautama himself discusses all these in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 21-30.

In *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 12, Gautama mentions only five senses, namely, olfactory, gustatory, visual, cutaneous and auditory, i.e. only the external senses. According to him, however, the mind also is a sense. The word sense in the present *sūtra* stands for all these six senses. From the Vaiśeṣika point of view, Praśastapāda also mentions these six senses.

The word *artha* or object in the *sūtra* is used in the sense of only perceptible objects. There is no perception without a contact between such an object and the sense. Only through the mediation of such a contact, the sense gives a perceptual knowledge. To emphasise this, Gautama uses the word contact or *sannikarṣa* in the *sūtra*. He uses the word *artha* or object to indicate that only the contact of the sense with its appropriate object results in its perceptual knowledge. The contact of the sense with empty space or *ākāśa* does not result in any perceptual knowledge, because empty space is imperceptible, i.e. is not an object appropriate for any one of the senses.

Even for perceptible objects, any and every form of sense-contact does not result in perceptual knowledge. The words 'resulting from' (*utpanna*) in the *sūtra* implies that the sense-object contact means here only that form of contact which actually results in perceptual knowledge. Thus, e.g., when the visual sense comes in contact with a wall, a cloth hanging on the other side of the wall also comes in some form of contact with the visual sense, which is called 'conjunction with the conjoined' (*saṃyukta-saṃyoga*), because the cloth is conjoined (*saṃyukta*) with the wall, which again has conjunction (*saṃyoga*) with the eye. But such a contact of the visual sense with the cloth does not result in the perceptual kuowledge of the cloth and as such is not the kind of contact mentioned in the *sūtra*.

According to Gautama, all the senses 'function after reaching the object' (*prāpyakāri*). The senses produce perceptual knowledge of the object after actually 'reaching'

(i.e. coming in contact with) the object. In *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 45ff, Gautama establishes this thesis. Thus, e.g., the visual sense, according to him, is of the nature of fire (*taijasa*) and has rays like the flame of a lamp. Like the rays of the lamp, the rays of the visual sense go out and reach an object which is unobstructed and is at a distance. But the rays of the visual sense are invisible. These are only inferentially proved. By the contact in the form of conjunction of the visual sense with the object is meant the conjunction of these rays of the visual sense with the object. This is shown by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 34. Similarly, the auditory sense gives the perceptual knowledge of sound only after coming in contact with it. The Vedantists explain the relation of the auditory sense with sound by viewing that the auditory sense itself moves out to the place of origin of the sound. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, however, the auditory sense, being of the nature of empty space, cannot move. Just as one wave gives rise to a second, the second to a third, and so on, so also sound originating somewhere gives rise to another, the second to a third, and so on. The last sound in this series originates in the empty space (*ākāśa*) enclosed in the ear-canal, which is the auditory sense. Coming thus in contact with the sense, it is perceived.

The Buddhists object that neither the visual nor the auditory sense can function after reaching the object, because there cannot be any actual contact between these and the objects perceived. A sense means the particular organ of the body where it is said to be located. There is no sense over and above that organ. The eye-ball itself is the visual sense and the ear-canal itself is the auditory sense. The medical treatment of a diseased sense means the treatment of a particular organ of the body. Besides, as the visual sense gives the perceptual knowledge of a distant object or of an object much bigger in size than the eye, the eye cannot come in actual contact with the object and as such gives us the perceptual knowledge without any contact. As a result of past actions (*karma*) living beings are endowed with senses having such peculiar power and because of *karma*, again, the power of the senses may be great or small. Without admitting all these, and even assuming that the visual sense goes out to reach the object, its capacity for giving the knowledge of the object cannot be explained. If the sense actually goes out to reach the object, one should continue to have the visual perception of an object even when one shuts the eyes after looking at it, for the alleged rays have already reached the object and continue to have contact with it.

Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Vācaspati Miśra critically refute the Buddhist view. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa does not mention here the points of refutation. He simply refers to their works and claims that the Nyāya view is adequately established by them. In short, concludes Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, without a contact of sense with the object there cannot be any perceptual knowledge and Gautama is justified in claiming that perception is knowledge resulting from sense-object contact.

According to Uddyotakara, the sense-object contact is of six kinds. These are the relations of—

1) conjunction (*saṃyoga*),

2) inherence[1] in what is conjoined (*saṃyukta-samavāya*),
3) inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*),
4) inherence (*samavāya*),
5) inherence in the inhered (*samaveta-samavāya*) and lastly the
6) adjunct-substantive relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*).

In the perception of substance (*dravya*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of conjunction. Thus, e.g., in the visual and cutaneous perceptions of a jar, the sense is conjoined with the object.

In the perception of quality (*guṇa*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of inherence in what is conjoined. When colour (*rūpa*) is perceived in the jar, the sense is conjoined with the jar in which the colour inheres. The contact here between the sense and its object, namely, colour, is due to the inherence of the colour in the jar which has come in conjunction with the sense. Conjunction itself is a quality and a quality can inhere only in a substance and never in another quality. Thus a conjunction of the sense with a quality like colour would amount to inherence of a quality in another quality, which is impossible. The sense can have conjunction only with the substance jar and the quality of colour inheres in the jar. Therefore, the contact of the sense with the quality is inherence in what is conjoined. Since movement (*karma*), like quality, inheres only in substance, the sense-object contact in its perception is of the same nature. The same is true of the perception of 'universal inhering in substance' (*dravya-gata jāti*).

In the perception of 'universal inhering in quality and in movement' (*guṇagata* and *karmagata jāti*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined. The visual perception of colourness (*rūpatva*) is due to such a contact, because colourness as a universal inheres in colour which again inheres in the jar and the jar is conjoined with the visual sense.

In the perception of sound the sense-object contact is of the nature of inherence, for sound is a quality and it inheres in the substance *ākāśa* (empty space) and the auditory sense itself is of the nature of empty space (i.e. the empty space enclosed by the ear-canal).

In the perception of the universal 'sound-ness' (*sabdatva-jāti*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of inherence in the inhered, because 'sound-ness' inheres in sound which inheres in the auditory sense.

In the perception of inherence and non-existence (*abhāva*) the sense-object contact

1. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, a relation other than conjunction is admitted and it is called *samavāya* or inherence. This relation exists between 1) the whole (*avayavī*) and its parts (*avayava*), 2) the substratum (*ādhāra*) and its quality (*guṇa*) or movement (*kriyā*) or universal (*jāti*). The relation of conjunction cannot hold in these cases, because the relata here are inseparable. Nor can the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) hold in these cases, because the relata here are proved to be completely different. If the 'relation of self-linking' (*svarūpa-sambandha*) is admitted in these cases, there will be redundance (*gaurava*), because it will involve the assumption of an infinite number of objects as the relation. On these considerations, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas admit a special form of relation called *samavāya*.

is of the nature of adjunct-substantive relation. None of the five forms of contact mentioned before is possible in the perception of these two and as such a special form of contact called *viśeṣaṇatā* or *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* is postulated here. But such a contact may have various specific forms like 'adjectival to what is conjoined with the eye' (*cakṣuḥ-saṃyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*), which holds in the visual perception of the non-existence of the jar on the ground. It is the perception of the ground as qualified by 'the absence of the jar,' which is adjectival to the ground and the ground is conjoined with the eye.

This view of the six forms of sense-object contact is later elaborated by Gaṅgeśa and others who raise various subtleties in their discussions. To sum up : there are six forms of sense-object contact and the knowledge resulting from these is perception.

But God's perception is not due to sense-object contact. As the scripture declares, "He sees without eyes and hears without ears" (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* iii. 19). God's knowledge is omnipresent. His perceptual knowledge is not due to any special cause. Therefore, the definition of perception in the *sūtra* does not cover divine perception. On this ground Gautama's definition of perception is later criticised as too narrow and Gaṅgeśa offers a different definition : Perception is 'knowledge not due to the instrumentality of another knowledge' (*jñāna-akaraṇaka-jñāna*). It covers both ordinary (or temporal) and divine (or eternal) perceptions. Neither of these forms of perception is due to the instrumentality of any other knowledge : ordinary perception is due to the instrumentality of sense and divine perception being eternal is without any cause whatsoever.

Viśvanātha tries to interpret Gautama's *sūtra* in the line of Gaṅgeśa. But Gautama defines here only the ordinary or temporal (*janya*) form of perception and his definition is not intended to cover divine perception. This is evident from his mention of perceptual knowledge first, which is something caused. There is no doubt that he takes God Himself as a *pramāṇa* (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 68). But the word *pramāṇa* is used there to mean omniscience, i.e. to imply that God *always* has the valid knowledge of *everything*. As Udayana explains, God is *pramāṇa* in the sense that His possession of valid knowledge is without any break. He adds that the sense-object contact is spoken of only in the context of ordinary perception(*Nyāya-kusumāñjali* iv. 5). Moreover, perception cannot be defined as knowledge not due to the instrumentality of any other knowledge from the point of view of Vātsyāyana and the other older Naiyāyikas, for such a definition excludes the forms of perceptual knowledge called *hānādi-buddhi* which are produced through the instrumentality of some other perceptual knowledge.

Pleasure and pain are also produced by sense-object contact. To exclude these from perceptual knowledge Gautama adds the word 'knowledge' (*jñāna*) to his definition of perception, for pleasure and pain are not of the nature of knowledge. But the Buddhists object to this. They regard pleasure and pain as but forms of knowledge. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Udayana and others critically refute such a view.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, however, offers an alternative explanation for the use of the word *jñāna* in the *sūtra*. It is not intended to exclude pleasure and pain from perception, such

a possibility being already excluded by the word *vyavasāyātmaka* (of a definite character). Gautama uses the word *jñāna* to indicate what is being qualified by the other expressions in the definition, which are all of the nature of adjectives.

The third expression used in the *sūtra* is 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*). Vātsyāyana now proceeds to explain its implication.

Bhāṣya

There are as many 'naming words' (*nāmadheya-śabda*) as there are objects (*artha*) [Every object has a word standing for it] By these (i. e. words) the objects are properly known. Usage (*vyavahāra*) depends on the proper knowledge of the object. Now, this knowledge of object resulting from sense-object contact assumes the form : "It is colour" (*rūpa*) or "It is taste" (*rasa*). The words like *rūpa* and *rasa* are names of objects. Pieces of knowledge are referred to by these, e.g., one knows that it is colour or one knows that it is taste. (Such pieces of knowledge) being referred to by words naming these, there is the apprehension of considering them as but due to words. Therefore, (i.e. to remove such an apprehension) (Gautama) says, not due to words.

Knowledge on the part of those unware of the relation between the word and its corresponding object [e.g., of the infant and dumb] is not referred to by the words naming the objects. Even if the relation between the word and the corresponding object is known, there is the knowledge that this word is the name of this object [i.e. even for those who are aware of the relation between word and its corresponding object, the knowledge of the object is not due to the word naming it]. When that object is known, the knowledge does not differ from the afore-mentioned knowledge of the object [i. e. of the infant and the dumb]. This knowledge of the object is but similar to that. But this knowledge of the object has no other word to name it, being conveyed by which (word) it can be subject to usage, because there is no usage with what is not properly known. Therefore, by adding the word *iti* to the word naming the object known, it (i.e. the knowledge of the object) is referred to as 'the knowledge that it is colour' (*rūpam-iti-jñānam*), 'the knowledge that it is taste' (*rasaḥ-iti-jñānam*). Thus the word naming the object has no efficacy in producing the knowledge of the object. But it has use only for the purpose of communication. Therefore, the knowledge of the object resulting from sense-object contact is not due to word.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana first mentions an objection. Every object has a word standing for it

and usage depends on the understanding of these words as denoting the objects. Thus the perceptual knowledge of colour or taste is referred to by the word colour or taste which is but the name of the object perceived. Since everywhere a piece of knowledge is referred to by the word standing for the object known, the word itself is also to be regarded as the object of knowledge. Knowledge as knowledge is same in all cases. But one piece of knowledge differs from another because their objects differ. Without assuming that the words (like colour or taste) are also the objects of knowledge, the differentiation of the various pieces of knowledge as 'it is colour', 'it is taste', etc. becomes impossible. These pieces of knowledge having such words as their objects are therefore to be considered as but knowledge of words. [The word *śabda* in the commentary is not be to taken as knowledge due to verbal testimony. It is to be taken as knowledge having word for their objects.]

Vātsyāyana answers that these pieces of knowledge are not due to words because the perceptual knowledge proper is due to only the sense-object contact rather than the words. Words serve only the purpose of comunication or usage.

Vācaspati Miśra, explaining the above obejection, refers to the view according to which the words standing for objects are identical with the objects themselves, because the words cow, horse, etc., are known as identical with the object as is evident from the expressions like 'this is cow', 'this is horse.' That such expressions cannot be considered erroneous is clear from the fact that these form the basis of all usages. Words being identical with objects, the knowledge of objects means the knowledge of words. In short, according to this view there is no knowledge which is not due to words. As such, indeterminate perception is impossible. How can there be an indeterminate or unqualified perception when every knowledge is qualified by a word that stands for its object ?

Vācaspati Miśra quotes two verses from the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari and says that the word *avyapadeśya* (lit, not due to words) in the present *sūtra* is intended to refute Bhartṛhari's view. This word here means "mere acquaintance" (*ālocana*), i.e. indeterminate perception. The word *vyapadeśya* signifies 'a substantive as qualified by an attribute' (*viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-viśeṣya*). The perception without a substantive-attribute relation is *avyapadeśya*. Such an unqualified perception is but the bare awareness of an object and as such is indeterminate. Thus by *avyapadeśya* Gautama here refers to indeterminate perception.

In refutation of the view that every knowledge is due to word, Vātsyāyana says, "knowledge of those persons who are unaware of the relation between the word and its corresponding object is not referred to by the word naming the object." Vācaspati Miśra explains this as follows. Word is alleged to be identical with the object. But what is meant by "word" here ? Does it mean the particular sound heard or does it mean *sphoṭa* (the significative counterpart of a word-sound) ? It is not possible to accept either of these alternatives. "Word" here cannot mean *sphoṭa*, for nobody ever realises any identity of the object with the eternal *sphoṭa*. Nor can "word" be taken by the opponent to mean the particular sound heard, for the knowledge of colour etc. on the part of the infant and the dumb is not referred to by the corresponding words colour, etc. It is

impossible to prove that the knowledge of those persons who are unaware of such words or are unable to utter them is due to words. Besides, on the assumption of the identity of words and their corresponding objects it should be possible for the blind to perceive colour by his auditory sense when he hears the word for it or for the dumb to perceive the word when he has a visual perception of the object for it. Thus it must be admitted that the infant and the dumb have indeterminate perception unqualified by word. Even for those persons who are aware of the relation between a word and its object the knowledge of the object is not due to the word standing for it. On the contrary, only after perceiving the object they come to know that such and such words denote such and such objects. In other words, on perceiving an object they recall the word naming it. But the perception of the object, which precedes, is not due to that name. The perception of the object comes first and it is the cause of the recollection of the word naming it. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a perception of the object unrelated to the word naming it and this perception is indeterminate. This indeterminate perception becomes eventually the cause of the determinate perception. But even this determinate perception is not the perception of the word standing for its object.

It may be objected that the communication of a piece of knowledge is possible only through the word standing for the object of that knowledge and as such this knowledge has the form of the object as well as the word. But unless the object perceived is assumed to be identical with the word naming it, the piece of knowledge cannot have the form of that word. Therefore, the piece of knowledge cannot be referred to by that word. So it needs to be assumed that the knowledge must be due to the word naming it.

To this Vātsyāyana answers, "But this knowledge of the object has no other word to name it." His contention is that since there is no appropriate word to denote a piece of knowledge, the knowledge is referred to by the word standing for the object known only with the addition of *iti* to it. When colour is perceived by us, for the purpose of communicating the knowledge to others we say, the knowledge that "it is colour" (*rūpam iti*). Only later on—i.e. at the time of communicating the piece of knowledge which is posterior to the knowledge itself—the word denoting the object has a meaning. The knowledge itself cannot be said to be due to the word.

From the writings of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa it is evident that there had been a great deal of controversy regarding the exact significance of Gautama's use of the expression 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*) among the earlier Naiyāyikas themselves. One of the views referred to by Jayanta is that when the knowledge is due to sense-object contact as well as sound (word), it is verbal and not perceptual ; Gautama uses the word *avyapadeśya* to exclude such forms of verbal knowledge from the perceptual. When the visual sense of a person without any previous knowledge of a cow comes in contact with a cow, he perceives the object *though not as a cow*. Eventually when an experienced person tells him that it is a cow, he perceives it *as a cow*. In spite of the role of the sense-object contact

in this eventual knowledge, it is not perceptual but verbal, for its most efficacious cause is the group of words spoken by an experienced person : "This is a cow". Gautama's use of the expression *avyapadeśya* serves to exclude such forms of verbal knowledge from perception.

Vācaspati Miśra, however, denies the possibility of any verbal knowledge due to both sense-object contact and words. In the example just cited the words of the experienced person, though accessory to the resulting knowledge, do not make the knowledge a verbal one. Being produced by the sense-object contact the knowledge is actually perceptual. Besides, the knowledge here is clear and distinct, which are characteristics of only immediate knowledge ; verbal knowledge being mediate is incapable of producing it.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa does not accept this view. He concludes his review of the various interpretations of Gautama's use of *avyapadeśya* with the remark that so many views are explained here and it is for the learned to make their own choice.

Bhāṣya

During the summer the flickering rays of the sun intermingled with the heat radiating from the surface of the earth come in contact with the eyes of a person at a distance. Due to this sense-object contact, there arises, in the rays of the sun, the knowledge : this is water. Even such a knowledge may be taken for valid perceptual knowledge. Hence (Gautama) says, 'invariably connected with the object' (*avyabhicāri*). An erroneous or *vyabhicāri* perception is the perception of an object as somthing which it is not. A right or *avyabhicāri* perception is the perception of an object as it actually is.

Perceiving with eyes an object at a distance, a person cannot decide whether it is smoke or dust. As such, an 'indecisive knowledge' (*anavadhāraṇajñāna*) resulting from sense-object contact may be taken for perceptual knowledge. Hence (Gautama) says, 'of a definite character' (*vyavasāyātmaka*). It cannot, however, be claimed that this indecisive knowledge is due only to the contact of self with mind [i e. is not due to the contact of the sense with the object]. Indecisive knowledge (like this) arises only after one sees the object with the eyes. Just as the object perceived by the senses is eventually perceived by the mind, so also an object is indecisively apprehended by the mind after being indecisively apprehended by the senses. Doubt is only the 'vacillating knowledge' (*vimarśa*) with a drive for the perception of some unique character which is apprehended by mind after being apprehended by the senses, and not the previous one [i.e. not the indecisive knowledge which is apprehended by the mind alone after the termination of the function of the senses]. In all cases of perceptioi the knower has the definite knowledge of an object through

the sense, for persons with impaired sense-organ cannot have any 'after-knowledge' (*anu-vyavasāya*) [cognising the first, i.e. the knowledge due to sense-object contact].

Elucidation

In his definition of perception Gautama next uses the expressions 'invariably related to the object' (*avyabhicāri*) i.e. non-erroneous and 'of a definite character' (*vyavasāyātmaka*).

Vātsyāyana explains the significance of the former with the example of mirage. When the rays of the sun, flickering because of the heat radiating from the surface of the earth, come in contact with the visual sense, we have the illusory perception of water in these rays. The perception is illusory only in its qualifying aspect, i.e. in so far as the rays are erroneously apprehended as being characterised by waterness. Similarly, we have illusory perceptions of a snake in a rope and of silver in the shell. To exclude such forms of illusory perceptions from the category of valid perception, the word *avyabhicāri* is used.

Vātsyāyana says that erroneous (*vyabhicāri*) perception is the perception of an object as something which it is not. This shows that the Naiyāyikas subscribe to the theory of illusion called *anyathā-khyāti*, i.e. illusion consists in perceiving something as something else. This will be discussed at length in the elucidation of *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 37.

According to this theory, illusion consists in wrongly perceiving a real object as another equally real object. The object the nature of which is superimposed on what is presented is not a non-existent (*asat*) or fictitious (*alīka*). A pure non-existent cannot be an object even of an illusory perception. The Naiyāyikas hold that when the visual sense comes in contact with the flickering rays of the sun, because of the perception of the similarity therein of water previously perceived elsewhere there is the revival of the reminiscent impression (*saṃskāra*) of the previously perceived water, which in its turn recalls the water and thus in the rays is erroneously perceived the water belonging to a different space and time. A person who has never perceived water and who has no reminiscent impression of previously perceived water cannot have such an illusion of water. Thus the immediate cause of this illusion is the recollection of water revived by the reminiscent impression of the previously perceived water. The later Naiyāyikas argue that in the cases of illusion the knowledge in the form of memory itself serves the function of the sense-object contact. Such a contact is called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*, i.e. contact of the sense with an object through the mediation of a previous knowledge. It is one of the three forms of 'extraordinary sense-object contact' (*alaukika-sannikarṣa*) recognised by the later Naiyāyikas. In other words, illusion is a form of 'extraordinary perception' (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). Since the object perceived in an illusion is not actually there, no normal or ordinary contact is possible between the sense and that object and as such there is no ordinary perception of the object.

But even an illusory perception is not wholly illusory. An illusory experience is analysable into two parts. First, the presentation of an object as barely 'this', i.e. as mere something without the knowledge of its specific character. Secondly, the characterisation of it as something specific. There is no error as regards the first part. Error lies only in the second part. Thus, e.g., in the illusion 'This is a snake', the rope is actually presented as 'this', i.e. as merely something but not as a rope. There is no error in the perception so far. Error consists in the wrong characterisation of the 'this' as the snake, which it is not. Vātsyāyana, therefore, calls illusory, perceptions *vyabhicāri* or not invariably related to the object pointed to, and these are excluded from valid perception by the use of the wortd *avyabhicāri* in the *sūtra*.

But, it will be asked, what is the need for the use of the word *avyabhicāri* in the definition to exclude illusory perception ? Perception is already considered to be a *pramāṇa* and the very word *pramāṇa* signifies the instruments of valid knowledge alone. Thus the instruments of illusory perceptions are already excluded from perception as a *pramāṇa*. Besides, if the word *avyabhicāri* is really necessary for the definition of perception why should it not on the same ground be mentioned in the definitions of the other instruments of valid knowledge like inference, etc. ? Vācaspati Miśra answers that the validity of all the other instruments of valid knowledge is derived from the validity of perception and Gautama uses the word *avyabhicāri* to indicate this speciality of perception. In support of this interpretation Vācaspati Miśra quotes the authority of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who says, "Inference is not critically discussed (*parīkṣyate*), because its validity is already well-established (*prasiddha*) by the validity of perception as well as by the strength of its own definition."[1]

Vātsyāyana next proceeds to explain the relevance of the word *vyavasāyātmaka* (of a definite character). It is meant to exclude 'perceptions in the from of doubt' (*saṃśayātmaka-pratyakṣa*), which are not excluded by the word *avyabhicāri*. Vātsyāyana says that a right or *avyabhicāri* perception is the perception of an object as it actually is. According to this interpretation doubtful perceptions also are *avyabhicāri*. On perceiving the common characteristic of dust and smoke in a distant object, one has the doubt : Is it dust or is it smoke ? If it is actually dust the perception is non-erroneous in its first part and if it is actually smoke the perception is non-erroneous in its second part. Since the object actually is either dust or smoke, the perception is in fact invariably related to the object. In short, according to Vātsyāyana only the illusory perceptions of something as definitely something else are to be considered as erroneous. Perception in the form of doubt being short of definite knowledge is not therefore excluded by the word *avyabhicāri*. Nevertheless, the instrument of such perception cannot be regarded as *pramāṇa* because definite knowledge alone is the result of *pramāṇa*. That is why Gautama

1. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that in the opening verse of the chapter on Inference in the available version of the *Ślokavārttika* the same point is expressed in a different language and that is commented upon by Pārthasārathi Miśra. Presumably the verse quoted by Vācaspati Miśra was current in some other version of the work

excludes perception in the form of doubt by using the expression 'of a definite character'.

It may be objected that doubt is an internal perception, i.e. the result of the contact of self with mind[1] and as such it is already excluded by the expression 'resulting from sense-object contact'. Vātsyāyana answers that it cannot be assumed that doubt is always the result only of the contact of self with mind and never due to any external sense. Doubt arises only after an object is perceived by an external sense. Just as an object perceived by an external sense can be internally perceived over again, so can one internally doubt the nature of an object after having doubt about it by the external sense. This is further explained by Vācaspati Miśra as follows. Doubt arises in the mind only after there is a contact of the sense with the object. There cannot be any doubt without a previous sense-object contact. The blind man cannot have any doubt as to the distant object being dust or smoke. Thus the forms of doubt under discussion are to be regarded as external perceptions, in which alone the contacts of the sense with the object as well as of mind with the sense are necessary.

Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa say that of the two forms of doubt, namely, external and internal, only the former is intended to be excluded by the word *vyavasāyātmaka* in the present *sūtra.*

A further objection may be raised against Vātsyāyana. Immediately after the perception of the jar by the external sense there is an after-knowledge of that perception in the form 'I have knowledge of the jar'. This after-knowledge is an internal perception. Even the external object jar becomes an object of internal perception. Thus we have internal perception even of external objects. Therefore, it can be argued that the cases of doubtful perceptions are cases of internal perceptions of external objects.

Vātsyāyana answers, "In all cases of perception the knower has the definite knowledge of an object through the senses, for persons with impaired sense-organs cannot have any after-knowledge." His real point is that an external object is never perceived by mind independent of the external sense. Whenever an external object like the jar is perceived, it is perceived first by an external sense like the eye and such a perception is called *vyavasāya.* This is followed by an internal perception (i.e. a perception by mind, which is the internal sense) of the previous external perception. This subsequent perception is called *anu-vyavasāya* or after-knowledge. The previous perception called *vyavasāya* must be regarded as one of its causes. A blind man, who is deprived of the visual sense, cannot have the internal after-knowledge of a visual perception because he cannot have the prior external perception or *vyavasāya* itself. Therefore, on the evidence of after-knowledge, which is internal, it cannot be asserted that doubt is exclusively internal.

1. Praśastapāda mentions two forms of doubt, external and internal. From Vātsyāyana's discussion it appears that according to some early thinkers doubt is always an internal perception. This view is elaborately refuted by Udayana in the *Tātparya-pariśuddhi* and by Vardhamāna in his commentaries on the *Tātparya-pariśuddhi* and the *Nyāyalīlāvatī.*

But, it will be asked, what is the nature of the contact of mind with the external object at the time of the after-knowledge? Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains the answer offered by Udayana and concludes that in fact the perceptual knowledge itself of the external object is the said contact. From this suggestion of Udayana the later Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśa develop the theory of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*.

Vācaspati Miśra, however, differs from Vātsyāyana with regard to the implication of the word *vyavasāyātmaka* in the *sūtra*. The word is used, according to him, not to exclude perception in the form of doubt. Doubtful perceptions being invalid are already excluded by the word *avyabhicāri* (valid). The word *vyavasāyātmaka* is used to signify determinate perception and as such shows that Gautama recognises determinate perception also as valid. According to Vācaspati Miśra's interpretation of the *sūtra*, it contains not only the definition but also the classification of perception. The words *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* indicate the two forms of perception, namely, indeterminate and determinate respectively. The rest of the *sūtra* gives the definition of perception.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa does not accept such an interpretation, for it neither agrees with the interpretations of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara nor is it justified by anything in the *sūtra*. As a matter of fact, Vācaspati's zeal to refute the Buddhist logicians who do not recognise the validity of determinate perception leads him to see in the *sūtra* the mention of the two forms of perception and this according to the suggestion of his preceptor Trilocana. As Hemacandra, in his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, points out that Trilocana and Vācaspati evolves a novel explanation of the *sūtra* disregarding the earlier commentators.

Bhāṣya

(Objection :) A separate definition of perception needs to be given (to cover the perceptions of) the self etc. and pleasure etc., because it (the perception of self or pleasure) is not due to sense-object contact. (Answer :) Though mind is a sense, it is mentioned separately from the other senses because of its different nature. The other senses are 'made of the elements' (*bhautika*) and have fixed objects (*niyata-viṣaya*). These become senses by virtue of their possessing (the respective) qualities. Mind, on the other hand, is not made of elements, has no fixed object (*sarva-viṣaya*, lit. having everything for its object) and it does not become a sense by virtue of its possessing any quality. As we shall later explain, in spite of the sense-object contact its (i.e. of mind) connection or absence of connection is the cause why a number of perceptions do not simultaneously occur. Since mind also is a sense, no separate definition (of perception) is called for. This is to be learnt from what is discussed in 'the other system' (*tantrāntara*). The viewpoint of the other, when not refuted, becomes one's own—and this is called *tantra-yukti*. Here ends the explanation of perception.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection to the definition of perception. As Gautama does not mention mind (*manas*) in his list of the senses given in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 12, according to his view mind is not a sense. Therefore, his definition of perception as knowledge due to sense-object contact cannot apply to the perception of self or of pleasure, which are due to the contact with mind. Vātsyāyana's answer is that Gautama really admits mind to be a sense. He does not mention it in the list of the external senses because mind differs from them in certain important respects. The olfactory and other external senses are made of elements, are restricted to their own appropriate objects and are characterised by the qualities like smell etc., the perceptions of which they yield. Mind, on the contrary, is not made of elements, is not restricted to any particular type of object and is capable of yielding the perception of the qualities like smell etc., without being characterised by them.

Uddyotakara, however, does not admit all the three points in which Vātsyāyana shows mind to differ from the other senses. According to him, mind differs from the other senses mainly in not being restricted to one particular type of object.

Vātsyāyana adds that though there can be no perception without the contact of mind with the senses and though the different external senses simultaneously come in contact with different objects, yet there is perception of only one object at a time because mind, being but atomic in magnitude, can come in contact only with one sense at a time. This will be elaborately discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 16 and iii. 2. 56-9.

But how are we to know that Gautama admits mind to be a sense when he does not say this in so many words ? Vātsyāyana answers this question by referring to what is called *tantra-yukti.* In other words, since Gautama does not refute the view that mind is a sense as advocated by others,the implication is that he accepts this as his own view.

In refutation of Vātsyāyana, Dignāga argues that it is futile to claim that Gautama admits mind to be a sense. As against the contention that since Gautama does not explicity refute this view he admits it by implication, Dignāga argues that in that case the explicit mention of the five senses becomes meaningless. Without mentioning Dignāga's name, Uddyotakara answers that such an objection is only an indication of the failure to see the real implication of *tantra-yukti.* When somebody does not at all mention his own view it is impossible to know what his own standpoint is and which is the standpoint of others. But when somebody expresses his own view and does not refute the view of another that does not contradict his own view, he accepts by implication the said view of the other. Such alone is a proper case of *tantra-yukti*

Though Dharmarājādhvarīndra, a later exponent of the Vedānta philosophy, tries to prove that mind is not a sense in the Vedānta view, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that it is really not so. Śaṃkara himself admits mind to be a sense (*Śārīraka-bhāṣya* ii. 4. 17) and Vācaspati Miśra explains this view in the *Bhāmatī.* Besides, the *Bhagavad-gītā* declares mind to be a sense—a view accepted also by Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes his discussion of perception with a critical review of the Buddhist view, according to which indeterminate perception alone is to be regarded as valid. The Buddhist considers every object to be momentary. It is destroyed at the very next moment of its origination and gives place to another object similar to it. Therefore, an object can be considered as the cause of perception if its perception results immediately after its origination. But the determinate perception, which occurs later, cannot have the same object as its cause, because this object is already destroyed by the time the determinate perception takes place. The object of determinate perception is thus non-existent and as such determinate perception cannot be considered valid. A perception is valid only when it is due to a real object. Thus indeterminate perception alone is valid.

Accordingly, the Buddhists define perception as 'a cognition which is directly produced by the object' (*tataḥ-artha-vijñānam*). Though Vācaspati Miśra says that this definition is offered by Vasubandhu, Dignāga, while offering an alternative definition of perception, doubts if it could have come from Vasubandhu himself. By perception Dignāga understands the knowledge in which there is no reference to name, universal, etc. A knowledge without any reference to name, universal etc., is nothing but indeterminate knowledge. Dignāga defines perception as that knowledge which is free from any 'mental construction' (*kalpanā*). By 'mental construction' is meant the attribution of name, universal, etc. For the purpose of excluding illusory perception, Dharmakīrti later adds the word 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*) to Dignāga's definition of perception.

Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Udayana, along with the Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Miśra, elaborately examine and criticise the Buddhist definition of perception and show that the validity of determinate perception cannot be rejected outright, that universal etc. cannot be considered as mere figments of imagination and that the doctrine of momentariness which inspires this definition is philosophically untenable.

Sūtra 5

Next (is discussed) inference (*anumāna*), which is preceded by it (*tat-pūrvaka*) [i.e. by perception], is of three kinds, namely, *pūrvavat* (i.e. having the antecedent as the proban), *śeṣavat* (i.e. having the consequent as the proban) and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* (i.e. where the *vyāpti* is ascertained by a general observation). // i. 1. 5 //

Elucidation

In this *sūtra*, the word inference (*anumāna*) stands for what is defined and the expression 'preceded by it' (*tat-pūrvaka*) stands for its definition. We have already seen that the word

anumāna means either the instrument of valid inferential knowledge or the knowledge itself.

The expression 'preceded by it' means preceded by perception. But though reminiscent impression is also preceded by perception, it is not an inference ; for the word *jñāna* of the previous *sūtra* is to be added to the expression 'preceded by it'. Thus the full definition of inference is 'a specific form of knowledge preceded by perception'. Vātsyāyana begins his commentary on the *sūtra* with the explanation of the expression 'preceded by it.'

Bhāṣya

By the expression 'preceded by it' is meant 'the perception of the [invariable] relation between the proban and the probandum' (*liṅga-liṅginoḥ sambandha-darśanam*) as well as 'the perception of the proban' (*liṅga-darśana*). By the perception of the [invariably] related proban and the probandum is meant the 'recollection of the proban' (*liṅga-smṛti*). Through this recollection and the perception of the proban is inferred the object which (at that time) 'is not directly perceived' (*a-pratyakṣa*).

Elucidation

If the word 'perception' in 'preceded by perception' is taken in the general sense to mean any form of perception, then the knowledge derived through verbal testimony would also come under inference, because it is preceded by the perception of sound (word). Therefore, perception is to be taken here in some specific sense. As Vātsyāyana explains, this perception is here two-fold. First, the perception of the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum. Secondly, the perception of the proban. The proban or *liṅga* means the 'real reason' (*hetu*) as actually employed in the inferential process. The probandum or *liṅgī* is the object actually inferred through the proban. Wherever there is the proban there is the probandum. The proban is the pervaded (*vyāpya*) and the probandum is its pervader (*vyāpaka*). Therefore, the relation between the proban and the probandum is the relation of 'the-pervaded-and-the-pervader' (*vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva* or simply *vyāpti*). The perception of the relation between the proban and the probandum

is a previous perception of such a relation somewhere else. As for example, smoke is the proban and fire is the probandum. There cannot be smoke in the absence of fire. Because of the causal relation between fire and smoke, the existence of fire is necessarily to be admitted in every case of smoke. Smoke being thus pervaded by fire, the relation between the two is that of the pervaded and the pervader. Without the definite knowledge of such a relation, the inference of fire is impossible in spite of the perception of smoke. Vātsyāyana refers to the ascertainment of such a relation by the expression 'perception of the relation between the proban and the probandum.'

Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana defiine *vyāpti* as an 'unconditional relation' (*svābhāvika-sambandha*, i. e. a relation free from any adventitious condition). Invariable coexistence of smoke with fire is not due to any adventitious condition. But fire coexists with smoke only when there is an extra condition, namely, the presence of wet fuel.

How is the invariable relation between proban and probandum (*vyāpti*) ascertained ? *Vyāpti* is ascertained (positively) by the knowledge of coexistence (*sahacāra*) and (negatively) by the absence of knowledge of any contrary instance of coexistence (*vyabhicāra-agraha*). Thus the invariable relation of fire and smoke is established by observing a number of cases in which the two coexist (e.g. the kitchen) and further because of not observing any instance in which smoke exists without fire. This will be elaborately discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 38.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains the inferential process as follows One first perceives smoke as invariably related to fire in a place like the kitchen. This is called 'the first perception of the proban' (*prathama-liṅga-darśana*). Such a perception results in the reminiscent impression that smoke is pervaded by fire. The subsequent perception of a similar smoke in some other place like the hill—which is called 'the second perception of the proban' (*dvitīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*)—revives this reminiscent impression, which results in the recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire. There cannot be any inference without such a recollection. But this recollection does not immediately result in the inferential knowledge. It is followed by a further perception of smoke not simply as smoke but as the smoke which is invariably related to fire and exists in the hill This last perception is called 'the third perception of the proban' (*tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*) and it immediately yields the inferential knowledge of fire. This third perception of the proban, being the immediate cause of inferential knowledge, is considered to be the instrument thereof, i e. *anumāna-pramāṇa* or inference as an instrument of valid knowledge

But all inferences do not presuppose such previous perception. The knowledge of the proban and of its invariable relation with the probandum may in some cases be derived through verbal testimony or another inference. How, then, can Vātsyāyana claim that inference must be preceded by perception ? Uddyotakara answers that the word *tat* (it) in the expression *tat-pūrvaka* (preceded by it) may grammatically be construed to mean *tāni*, lit. 'these', i. e any one of the four instruments of valid knowledge mentioned in the third *sūtra*.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that every inference is ultimately based on perception

and without a previous perception there can be no inference. That is why, Gautama defines inference as knowledge preceded by perception. Kumārila also pointedly asserts, "Even when the probandum is known through an inferred proban, the basic proban is known only through perception" (*Ślokavārttika, anumāna*, 170).

But since certain imperceptible objects are inferentially known, inference is not necessarily preceded by perception. As such, Gautama's real point should be understood as that inference is primarily based on perception, though in certain cases it can be preceded by some other form of valid knowledge derived through inference or verbal testimony.

There is controversy as to what is the exact instrument of inferential knowledge. In the early period mainly two views are expressed. According to the first, it is the recollection of the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum. According to the second, it is the 'third perception of the proban'. Uddyotakara refers to both these views and expresses his own that the totality of all the factors beginning with the first perception of the proban and ending in its final perception is to be considered as the instrument of inferential knowledge. But since the inferential knowledge immediately follows the final perception of the proban, it is to be considered as the primary instrument thereof.

According to Udayana, the proban itself forming the object of the third or final perception of the proban is the insrument of inferential knowledge, though some of the later commentators try to show that Udayana also viewed the final perception of the proban as the instrument of inference.

Gaṅgeśa, in his discourse on *parāmarśa*, argues that the real instument of inferential knowledge is the recollection of the proban as possessing the invariable relation with the probandum and the final perception of the proban is only the 'functional intermediary' (*vyāpāra*) of this recollection.

Raghunātha expresses the view that the mind of the person who infers is the instrument of inferential knowledge. Still inference is not to be confused with internal perception because inference has certain additional specific causes like the knowledge of *vyāpti* and the final perception of the proban.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa mentions the views regarding the instrument of inferential knowledge of some other philosophers like Kumārila, Prabhākara, Śrīdhara and Dharmarājādhvarīndra and argues that the final perception of the proban should be regarded as the instrument of inferential knowledge.

There are differences of opinion about the real object inferentially known. According to some, what is really inferred is some characteristic (*dharma*) as existing in the subject (*dharmī* or *pakṣa*) of the inference—e.g. fire as characterising the hill—for the proban has invariable relation only with that characteristic. According to others, since both the subject (*pakṣa*, e.g. the hill) and the characteristic (*dharma*, e.g. fire) are previously proved as existing, what is really inferred is the invariable relation between the proban and

the probandum as existing in the subject, for such a relation remained previously unproved in so far as the subject is concerned. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that according to Vātsyāyana the characteristic (e.g. fire) is the real object of inference. While illustrating *pūrvavat* inference, Vātsyāyana clearly says, *yathā dhūmena agniḥ iti*, "for example fire is inferred from smoke."

Bhāṣya

Now, *pūrvavat* : When the effect is inferred from its cause, e g. from the rising cloud (it is inferred that) it will rain. *Śeṣavat :* when the cause is inferred from its effect. On perceiving the water of the river as different from what it was before, (and further perceiving) the fullness of the river and the swiftness of the current, it is inferred that there was rain. *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* : the perception of an object at some place which was previously somewhere else is due to its movement ; so also that of the sun. Therefore (it is inferred that) though imperceptible, the sun has movement.

Elucidation

Gautama speaks of three forms of inference. Vātsyāyana proceeds to explain and illustrate these in two ways. According to his first interpretation, the word *pūrva* (lit. antecedent) means the cause and *śeṣa* (lit. consequent) the effect. The words *pūrva* and *śeṣa* are taken in these senses because the cause is antecedent to the effect. Thus *pūrvavat* means an inference 'which has for its proban the cause' (*kāraṇa-liṅgaka*) while *śeṣavat* means an inference 'which has for its proban the effect' (*kārya-liṅgaka*). Since there is the mutual relation of pervader and pervaded between the cause and the effect, the one is inferred from the other. Thus, from the cause, e.g. the rising cloud, we infer its effect, e.g. the future rain. This is *pūrvavat* inference. Again, from the effect, e.g. the fullness and swift current of the river, we infer its cause, e.g. the past rain. This is *śeṣavat* inference.

According to some Naiyāyikas, *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* means an inference having for its proban something other than the cause or the effect. For example, from the sight of the ducks at a distance one infers water though there is no cause and effect relation between the two. But this is not the interpretation of Vātsyāyana. According to him, a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is the inference of an object on the strength of an invariable relation perceived between two other objects and which invariable relation has acquired the status of generality, though the object thus inferred is normally imperceptible and as such there is no possibility of perceiving its invariable relation with any object (i.e. with any proban). Thus, e.g., the movement of the sun is normally imperceptible. So it is not

possible to perceive its invariable relation with any other object. However, it is found in many instances that it is because of its movement that an object previously seen somewhere else is seen at a different place. Such a general perception of an invariable relation leads one to infer that the sun has movement because it is seen at midday in a different place from where it was seen in the morning.

But Uddyotakara argues that the instance of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference given by Vātsyāyana is really speaking an instance of *śeṣavat* inference, for the occupation of different places by the sun is the effect of its movement.

Bhāṣya

Alternatively. *Pūrvavat*: when an object not perceived at the moment is inferred through the perception of the two objects as they were previously perceived. As for example, fire from smoke. [Two objects were previously (*pūrva*) perceived as being invariably related. An object similar to one of these is now perceived. From this is inferred an object similar to the other, though the object thus inferred is not perceived now.]

Śeṣavat means *pariśeṣa* (residual). It is the definite knowledge resting on the residual after the elimination of (certain) possible objects and because of the irrelevance in the cases of (still) other objects. As for example, by characterising sound as existent (*sat*) and non-eternal (*anitya*), which are the common characteristics of substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*), it is differentiated from universal (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). When doubt arises whether it (sound) is substance, quality or action, (we eliminate as follows). It is not substance, because it has only a single substance (as the inherent cause) and it is not action because it is the cause of a subsequent sound. Then it is what is the residual and thus sound is proved to be a quality

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa: when the relation between the proban and the probandum being imperceptible, the probandum is known from a proban having the same nature with any other object. As for example, self from desire etc. Desire etc. are qualities. Qualities reside in substances. Therefore, that which is the substratum of these (i.e. desire etc.) is the self.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana now proceeds to offer an alternative explanation of the three forms of inference and it seems that he himself subscribes to this interpretation.

According to this interpretation, *pūrvavat* inference is as follows. Two objects were

previously (*pūrva*) perceived as invariably related with each other ; later on an object exactly similar to one of these is perceived somewhere else and this leads to the inference there of another object exactly similar to the other. As for example, smoke and fire were previously perceived in the kitchen etc. as invariably related to each other ; the same kind of smoke is now perceived in the hill ; from this is inferred the same kind of fire in the hill. *Pūrvavat*, in this case, means 'as previously'.

Śeṣavat, according to this alternative interpretation, is as follows. The word *śeṣa* may mean the residual, i. e. the object which is not negated by any instrument of valid knowledge. *Śeṣavat* is that form of inference by which is inferred such a residual object. *Śeṣavat* inference is also known as *pariśeṣa* inference. Vātsyāyana illustrates this by the inference that sound is a quality. This example is taken from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* i. 1. 8., where Kaṇāda says that existence (*sattā*) and non-eternality (*anityatā*) are the characteristics of only substance, quality and action. Since sound is characterised by existence and non-eternality, it cannot belong to the categories of universal, particularity and inherence. Thus the next question is, whether sound is a substance or a quality or an action. Since no substance can have for its inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) a single substance and since sound has for its inherent cause only a single substance (viz. *ākāśa*), it cannot be a substance. Nor can it be an action because one action cannot result in another similar action whereas a sound results in a series of similar successive sounds. Thus sound belongs to the residual category, namely, quality, and there is nothing to contradict it. Therefore sound is a quality.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference, as alternatively interpreted is the opposite of the *pūrvavat* inference as just explained. In a *pūrvavat* inference the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum is directly perceived. In those cases, however, in which such an invariable relation can never be ordinarily perceived, the probandum is proved by a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference. As for example, the proban for the inference of the self (*ātman*) is the group of qualities like desire, knowledge, etc. But since the self is ordinarily imperceptible there cannot be a perception of the invariable relation of such a proban with the self. However, from many instances of ordinary perception we arrive at the knowledge that qualities in general necessarily reside in substances. From this is inferred that the qualities like desire etc. must reside in some substance, which is the self. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra argue that such an inference merely establishes that desire etc. must reside in some substance. That this substance is but the self is proved by a further *śeṣavat* (residual) inference.

Uddyotakara suggests that the three forms of inference referred to in the *sūtra* may as well be called *anvayī*, *vyatirekī* and *anvaya-vyatirekī* inferences. These will be discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 37.

Bhāṣya

From the statement of the classification it is already obvious that

inference is of three forms ; still the expression 'threefold' (*trividha*) [in the *sūtra*] is [retained], because Gautama, considering the extraordinary economy of words by way of expounding in a very brief aphorism the great and stupendous theme of inference, felt indifferent to any further economy of words. By such variety of words this practice [i. e. the disregard for economy of words] has often been adopted in this system, as in the cases of (the discussion of) *siddhānta, chala* and *śabda* etc.

Perception has for its object things present (*sat*). Inference has for its object things both present and absent (*asat*). Why ? Because of its capacity for knowing objects belonging to the three times (i. e. past, present and future). By inference are known objects belonging to the three times. We infer : it will be, it is and it was. By absent here is meant the past and the future (objects).

Next is *upamāna*.

Sūtra 6.

Comparison (*upamāna*) is the instrument of the valid knowledge of an object derived through its similarity with another well-known (*prasiddha*) object. // i. 1. 6 //

Bhāṣya

Upamāna is 'definite knowledge' (*prajñāpana*) of the 'object sought to be definitely known' (*prajñāpanīya*) through its similarity with an object already well-known. [Example :] "The *gavaya* (a wild cow without the dew-lap) is like the cow." (Objection :) What is the function here of *upamāna* as an instrument of valid knowledge ? When one perceives its similarity with the cow, one knows the object by perception itself. (Answer :) As Gautama says, the function of *upamāna* is to impart knowledge of the relation of the name (*samākhyā*) [with the corresponding object]. When the proposition conveying the comparison "The *gavaya* is like the cow" is employed, a person perceiving through the sense-object contact an object having similarity with the cow learns 'the relation between the naming word and the object denoted' (*saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha*) in the following way : This object is denoted by the word *gavaya*. After the propositions conveying the comparison "The

mudgaparṇī (a kind of herb) is like the *mudga*" and "The *māṣaparṇī* (another kind of herb) is like the *māṣa*" are employed, a person acquires the knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object denoted and he collects the herbs for preparing medicines. Thus, many other things are to be known as the objects of *upamāna* in everyday life.

Elucidation

Upamiti is the 'knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object denoted by it' (*saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha-jñāna*). Thus, e. g., there is a species of animal called the *gavaya*. It resembles the cow in other respects excepting the dew-lap. A person knows the cow well but has never seen a *gavaya* nor knows the animal denoted by the word *gavaya*. A forester, who has seen a *gavaya*, tells him that the *gavaya* resembles the cow. After this he comes across a *gavaya*. He perceives its similarity with the cow. This leads to the recollection of what he previously heard from the forester. He then *knows* that the animal before him is called *gavaya*, i. e. is denoted by the word *gavaya* This knowledge is called *upamiti* and *upamāna* is the instrument thereof. It will be elaborately discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 47-8.

Vātsyāyana gives two more examples of *upamāna*. A person wants to collect the medical herbs called *mudgaparṇī*, and *māṣaparṇī*, but he has no previous knowledge of these. He learns from an experienced person that these two herbs resemble *mudga* and *māṣa* respectively. Eventually coming across the herbs resembling *mudga* and *māṣa*, he ascertains that these are the herbs called *mudgaparṇī* and *māṣaparṇī*.

Though Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa speak of *upamiti* only through similarity (*sādharmya*), Vācaspati Miśra says that this form of knowledge may as well be derived through dis-similarity (*vaidharmya*). Thus, e.g., a person of north India tells a person of south India that the camel is an animal which is ugly, lives on hard and sharp thorns and has a very long and crooked neck. The south-Indian has never seen a camel. Afterwards, coming to the north, he sees a camel. In this animal he perceives all these characteristics which are totally dis-similar to those of all other animals previously known to him. This knowledge of dis-similarity leads him to recollect what he previously heard from the north-Indian and knows that this is the animal denoted by the name camel. Vācaspati Miśra claims that to include such forms of *upamiti* derived through the knowledge of dis-similarity, Vātsyāyana says, "Thus many other things are to be known as objects of *upamāna* in everyday life."

Viśvanātha, however, claims that the real implication of this statement of Vātsyāyana is different. Somebody is told by an authoritative person that a herb resembling

the *mudgaparṇī* is an anti-dote to poison.' He later comes across a herb that resembles the *mudgaparṇī*. This leads him to recall what he previously learnt from the authoritative person and ascertains that this herb resembling the *mudgaparṇī* is also an anti-dote to poison. Thus *upamāna* is not the instrument of only the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by it; it may as well ascertain other things. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa suggests that this is the real implication of Vātsyāyana, which becomes further evident from his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 39.

Bhāṣya

Next is verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Sūtra 7

Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is the communication (*upadeśa*) from a 'trustworthy person' (*āpta*). // i. 1. 7 //.

Bhāṣya

A trustworthy person is the speaker who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by the desire of communicating the object as directly known by him. *Āpti* means the direct knowledge of an object; an *āpta* is one who employs it. This definition (of a trustworthy person) is equally applicable to the seer (*ṛṣi*), noble (*ārya*) and barbarian (*mleccha*—persons without Vedic practices). Thus the practice of everybody is carried on.

In this way, the activities of god (*deva*), man (*manuṣya*) and animal (*tiryac*) are maintained with the help of these instruments of valid knowledge and not otherwise.

Elucidation

Vācaspati Miśra says that 'directly known' in the commentary means rightly ascertained through any of the instruments of valid knowledge. But in spite of having

such direct knowledge if one does not have the inclination to communicate or if one communicates wrongly, one will not be considered a trustworthy person. The word of a trustworthy person is 'verbal testimony as an instrument of valid knowledge' (*śabda-pramāṇa*).

Sūtra 8

That (i. e., word as an instrument of valid knowledge) is of two kinds—having perceptible and imperceptible objects. // i. 1. 8 //.

Bhāṣya

The object of which is attainable in this world is the one 'having perceptible objects' (*dṛṣṭārtha*) and the object of which is attainable in the other world (*amutra*) is the one 'having imperceptible objects' (*adṛṣṭārtha*). This is the division of words of the ordinary persons and the seers. Why is this (*sūtra*) said over again ? Let him (i. e. the heretic or *nāstika*) not think that since its object is definitely known (by perception), only the word having perceptible objects of a trustworthy person is *pramāṇa*. Since its object is ascertained by inference, the word having imperceptible object also is *pramāṇa*. Here ends the commentary on the instruments of valid knowledge.

Elucidation

Gautama says that verbal testimony is of two kinds, viz. one having perceptible objects and the other having imperceptible objects. But why does he devote a special *sūtra* to this ? Vātysāyana says that the heretic (*nāstika*) admits verbal testimony as an instrument of valid knowledge only when it has for its objects which are attainable in this world. As a result, verbal testimony in the form of scriptures (Veda, etc.), having as it does objects that are not attainable in this world, would not be *pramāṇa*. As against this, Gautama shows that verbal testimony in both these forms is to be regarded as *pramāṇa*. But since the objects referred to by the second form of verbal testimony are imperceptible, how can we accept its validity ? Vātsyāyana answers that in that case the objects are inferentially proved.

Various problems concerning verbal testimony will be discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 68 and iv. 1. 61. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa raises here the special question of intrinsic and

extrinsic validity of knowledge, which is related to the discussion of verbal testimony in the following way.

As against the Mīmāṃsakas, Gautama considers sound (word) as non-eternal. Therefore the Vedas, being but collections of words, are also non-eternal. These have as their author a Person, who is none other than God. The validity of the Vedas is derived from the trustworthiness of God ; hence it is not intrinsic but extrinsic.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, however, sound (word) is eternal. The Vedas are impersonal (*apauruṣeya*). These have no author and are not revealed by anybody. Therefore the validity of the Vedas is not due to anything external to the Vedas. In other words, the Vedas are intrinsically valid. This leads them to maintain the 'theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge' (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*). The conditions of knowledge themselves determine its validity. No further proof for the validity of knowledge is necessary. Besides, if the validity of knowledge is determined by an inference, another inference will be necessary to validate that inference itself and so on *ad infinitum*.

Udayana, in his *Nyāya kusumāñjali* (under ii. 1) elaborately refutes the Mīmāṃsā theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge and proves that the Vedas are not eternal. Vācaspati Miśra also, in his explanation of Vātsyāyana's introduction to the commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, refutes the Mīmāṃsā view and proves that the validity of the Vedas is inferentially determined. At the same time, Vācaspati Miśra says that the inference which validates knowledge, being produced by a proban free from any defect, is beyond the range of any possible doubt. No further inference is, therefore, necessary to ascertain its validity and so there is no question of any infinite regress.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON
THE INSTRUMENTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE
(*pramāṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Now, what are the objects to be rightly known by the instruments of valid knowledge ? Hence is said (in the next *sūtra*) :

Sūtra 9

The objects of valid knowledge (*prameya*) are :
Self (*ātman*),
Body (*śarīra*),
Sense (*indriya*),
Objects of the Senses (*artha*),
Knowledge (*buddhi*),
Mind (*manas*),
Motivation (*pravṛtti*)
Evil (*doṣa*),
Rebirth (*pretyabhāva*),
Result (*Phala*),
Suffering (*duḥkha*) and
Liberation (*apavarga*). //i. 1. 9 //

Bhāṣya

Of these, the **self** is the knower (*draṣṭā*) of everything (i.e. of all pleasure, pain and their causes), the enjoyer (*bhoktā*)[1] of everything, omniscient (*sarvajña*) and the perceiver of all (*sarvānubhāvī*). The **body** is the locus (*āyatana*) of its enjoyments. The **senses** are the aids (*sādhana*) to enjoyment. The **objects of the senses** are but the objects of enjoyment. **Knowledge** is but the enjoyment. The **mind** is the internal sense which has everything for its object, because the external senses are incapable of perceiving each and every object. [The external senses are restricted to their respective objects whereas the mind is not restricted to any particular object in the sense that without its participation no perception is possible]. **Motivation** and **evils** are the causes producing the body, the objects of senses, knowledge, pleasure and pain. This body in which the self abides

1. i.e. one that experiences both pleasure and pain. The word "enjoy" is taken here to mean the experience of both pleasure and pain.

is neither without a preceding one (*apūrva*) nor without a succeeding one (*anuttara*). The (series of) preceding bodies is without any beginning (*anādi*) while the succeeding ones (in the series) terminate in liberation. This (beginningless but not endless series of births and deaths) is **rebirth. Result** is the awareness of pleasure and pain along with their aids (like the body, the senses, etc.). This mention of suffering (in the *sūtra*) does not exclude the experience of pleasure which is perceived as agreeable (*anukūla-vedanīya*). What does this signify ? Here it is prescribed for meditation that this birth, though with pleasure and its aids, is only suffering, because it is permeated by suffering and is inseparable from suffering and has connections with various torments. One (desirous of liberation) deeply meditates (on this). Thus meditating one acquires indifference. The indifferent (person) becomes non-attached and the non-attached is liberated. **Liberation** is the complete annihilation of all suffering, the cessation of the stream of births and deaths.

There are also other objects of valid knowledge like substance, quality, activity, universal, particularity and inherence. These, again, have innumerable variety. Thus the objects of knowledge are in fact innumerable. But this (group of the 12 *prameya*-s of the *sūtra*) is specially mentioned, because its right knowledge leads to liberation and its false knowledge to worldly existence.

Elucidation

The word *prameya* means an object of valid knowledge. There are, as a matter of fact, innumerable varieties of it. But Gautama uses this word in a technical sense to mean only 12 such objects, because according to him, the right knowledge of these alone leads to liberation. His list of 12 objects contains suffering but not pleasure. But this does not imply that Gautama discards what is experienced as pleasure. His real point is that even what is experienced as pleasure should be meditated on as suffering, because pleasure is invariably attended with suffering and is never without it. Such a meditation results in non-attachment and, therefore, ultimately in liberation.

Bhāṣya

Of these (*prameya*-s) the self cannot be known by perception. Is it then to be known only from verbal testimony (*āpta-upadeśa*) ? The answer is in the negative. It is to be known by inference as well. How ?

Sūtra 10

The probans (*liṅga*) for the inference of the self are desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), motivation (*prayatna*), pleasure (*sukha*), suffering (*duḥkha*) and knowledge (*jñāna*). // i. 1. 10//

Bhāṣya

The self, when it comes across the kind of object a contact with which previously resulted in pleasure, desires to attain the same. Such a desire to attain (the object) becomes the proban for the inference of the self, because re-cognition (*pratisandhāna*) takes place only in the case of the same subject perceiving different objects at different times. This re-cognition is impossible for 'a mere stream of momentary consciousness' (*buddhi-bheda-mātra*), each state of it having a fixed object, as in the case of different bodies (*dehāntaravat*).

Similarly, because of re-cognition on the part of the same subject that perceives various objects at different times there is aversion for the object that causes suffering. On coming across the kind of object already known to be the cause of pleasure, one is motivated to attain objects of the same kind and such a motivation is not possible without an identical subject that perceives various objects and has re-cognition. This re-cognition is impossible for a mere stream of momentary consciousness, each state of it having its fixed object, as in the case of different bodies. Thus is also explained the repulsion (negative motivation) for objects that cause suffering.

Because of the recollection (*smṛti*) of pleasure or suffering one attains the means thereof. One is thus led to pleasure or is led to suffering and enjoys pleasure or suffering. The proban is as already mentioned. [That is, the proban is the re-cognition in the form that the same self which previously had the experiences of pleasure or suffering recollects them, attains to their means and again experiences them.]

One desirous of knowing an object has the doubt : What is it ? After the doubt one ascertains : It is such and such. Now, this knowledge becomes the proban for the inference of the self, because one knows that the subject (of this knowledge) is the same as the subject which was desirous of knowing and had the doubt. The ground is as already explained.

Next is analysed the expression 'as in the case of different bodies'. Just as even 'those who deny the self' (*anātma-vādin*) do not admit that the different states

of consciousness abiding in different bodies and restricted to their respective objects cannot have re-cognition, so also (the different states of a stream of consciousness) abiding in the same body cannot have re-cognition, there being no difierence in the two cases. It is an accepted principle for those who admit a single (i.e. permanent) self that there is recollection only of an object perceived by one's own self, not of an object perceived by some other self nor of an object previously unperceived. It is an accepted principle even for those that admit a multiplicity of selves (i.e. those that view the self as a stream of consciousness) that one cannot recollect an object perceived by somebody else. But those who deny the [permanent] self can explain neither of these principles. Thus it is proved that the self exists.

Elucidation

Viśvanātha proposes to take the word *liṅga* in the *sūtra* in the sense of definition and not of proban. According to him, the *sūtra* defines the self as the substratum of desire, etc. But Vātsyāyana takes the word in the sense of proban. According to him, the *sūtra* is designed to indicate the inferential ground for the existence of the self. Though the actual proban for the inference of the self is not the group of qualities like desire, etc., yet as the self is inferred on the evidence of these qualities they are also given the status of the proban.

Vātsyāyana has already shown that the self is proved by a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference as the substratum of the qualities like desire, etc. As against the Vijñānavādins, however, he specially argues here that the self is a permanent and eternal substance. According to the Vijñānavādins, the self is nothing more than a stream of momentary consciousness. Vātsyāyana describes them as *anātma-vādin*-s or those who deny the self, inasmuch as, according to Vātsyāyana, the denial of a permanent self amounts to the denial of the self as such.

How is the self inferred as a permanent substance from qualities like desire or aversion ? The self perceives an object and derives pleasure by attaining it. Later on, the self perceives a similar object and seeks to attain it for the sake of a similar pleasure. This proves that the self which previously perceived the object is the same as that which later seeks to attain the similar object, for the self here has the re-cognition in the form : "I, who previously enjoyed pleasure by perceiving and attaining this kind of object, am the same who, coming across a similar object, is now desiring to attain it." This re-cognition, which is an internal perception, proves the permanence of the self. Re-cognition cannot be explained on the assumption that the self is a mere stream of momentary consciousness, because no member of the stream can recollect the experience of another.

The Vijñānavādins may argue that by the self is meant the "continuous stream of momentary consciousness as a whole" (*vijñāna-santāna* or *ālaya-vijñāna*). In spite of

each 'individual member' (*santāni*) in the stream being momentary, because of the continuity of the stream as a whole re-cognition becomes possible; for the stream as a whole recalls past experiences. But, it will be asked, do the Vijñānavādins consider the stream as a whole as something more than the momentary members constituting it? If so, they will have to surrender their basic position in favour of a permanent self. If not, they cannot explain re-cognition.

Vātsyāyana argues that the Vijñānavādins themselves admit that streams of cosciousness belonging to different bodies, being different from one another, cannot have the recognition of experiences of one another. On the same ground, the states of consciousness in a stream belonging to the same body, being different from one another, cannot recollect and therefore cannot have re-cognition of the objects experienced by one another. Even the Vijñānavādins have to admit that one can recollect only such objects as one previously perceived ; it is impossible for one to recollect an object perceived by somebody else or an object totally unperceived. In short, the doctrine of the perpetually changing self is but the doctrine of different selves succeeding one another every moment. Such a doctrine has no explanation for recollection and re-cognition.

The general philosophy of the Vijñānavādins will be further discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 37.

Bhāṣya

The locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of its (i.e. of the self) enjoyment is—

Sūtra 11

Body, (which is) the substratum (*āśraya*) of action (*ceṣṭā*), senses (*indriya*), 'pleasure and suffering' (*artha*). // i. 1. 11 //

Bhāṣya

How is the body the locus of action ? Action is the effort (*samīhā*) on the part of one led by the desire of attainment or avoidance for acquiring the

means of attaining or avoiding the objects sought or shunned. Where this (effort) resides is the body.

How is it (i.e. the body) the locus of the senses ? That to the existence of which the senses owe their existence and which being destroyed the senses also perish is the substratum of the senses and that is the body. (Depending thus on the body) the senses become the receptors of their respective objects, both desirable and undesirable.

How is the body the locus of *artha* ? The abode in which the awareness of pleasure and suffering resulting from sense-object contact resides is their (i.e. of pleasure and suffering or *artha*) locus. And that is the body.

Elucidation

Body is defined here as the locus or abode of action, senses and *artha*. The word *artha* in this context does not mean the objects of the senses. It stands instead for pleasure and pain.

Bhāṣya

The means of enjoyment, again, are—

Sūtra 12

The senses, namely, the olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the cutaneous and the auditory. (These originate from) material elements (*bhūta*-s). // i. 1. 12 //

Bhāṣya

The olfactory sense (*ghrāṇa*) is that by which one smells. It is the recepter

of smell. The gustatory sense (*rasanā*) is that by which one tastes. It is the receptor of taste. The visual sense (*cakṣus*) is that by which one sees. It is the receptor of colour (*rūpa*). The cutaneous sense (*tvak*) is that which has for its locus the skin (*tvak*). This (*tvak*=skin) acquires the 'secondary sense' (*upacāra*), because of the location of the cutaneous sense in it. The auditory sense (*śrotra*) is that by which one hears. It is the receptor of sound. Thus, from these etymological analyses of the names it is evident that the senses by nature are restricted to their 'respective objects' (*sva-viṣaya*).

The expression 'originating from material elements' is used (to indicate that) the characteristic of being restricted to the respective objects is possible only if these (senses) 'originate from different elements' (*nānā-prakṛti*) and is not possible if these 'originate from a single substance' (*eka-prakṛti*). Each of the senses receive a specific type of object and this characteristic of the senses is explained only when there is 'the law of being restricted to respective objects' (*viṣaya-niyama*).

Elucidation

According to Gautama, the mind too is a sense. But the reason for not mentioning it in the present list is already discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 4.

Vātsyāyana characterises these external senses as 'means of enjoyment' (*bhoga-sādhana*). By enjoyment is meant the perception of pleasure or pain. The immediate means of such a perception is the mind and not an external sense. How, then, Vātsyāyana characterises the external senses as the means of enjoyment ? Vācaspati answers that though mind is the direct means of enjoyment, the external senses also are indirectly so.

The expression 'originating from material substances' (*bhūtebhyaḥ*) is used in the *sūtra* to indicate the difference of Gautama's standpoint from that of the Sāṃkhya system. According to the Sāṃkhya view, all the senses originate from *ahaṃkāra* (ego) alone, which, in its turn, is an evolute of *buddhi* (intellect). Gautama, however, considers the five senses as originating from the five different elements (*bhūta*) : the visual sense from fire (*tejas*), the auditory sense from empty space (*ākāśa*), the olfactory sense from earth (*kṣiti*), the guastatory sense from water (*ap*) and the cutaneous sense from air (*vāyu*). Vātsyāyana briefly refutes here the Sāṃkhya view with the argument that the law of each sense-organ being restricted to its specific object goes against it. Thus, e.g., the olfactory sense is the receptor of smell alone. If all the senses are products of the same principle, namely *ahaṃkāra*, and if, as Sāṃkhya claims, the effect is of the same nature as its cause, then all the senses should be of the same nature and, therefore, should be equally capable of being the receptors of all sorts of objects. The Sāṃkhya view will be elaborately refuted under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 32ff.

Bhāṣya

What, again, are the causes of the senses (i.e. what are the elements from which the senses originate) ?

Sūtra 13

Earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*) and empty space (*ākāśa*)—these are the elements (*bhūta*). //i. 1. 13//

Bhāṣya

The elements are separately mentioned, each by its name, because thereby the effects of the elements classified can be easily explained.

Elucidation

Uddyotakara mentions neither this *sūtra* nor Vātsyāyana's commentary on it. According to some, instead of being an independent *sūtra*, it simply forms part of Vātsyāyana's commentary on *sūtra* 12. However, Vācaspati in his *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* considers this to be a *sūtra* proper and, on the basis of this, gives the total number of Gautama's *sūtra*-s as 528.

Bhāṣya

All these (namely)—

Sūtra 14

Smell (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), colour (*rūpa*), touch (*sparśa*) and sound (*śabda*), which are respectively the qualities of earth, etc., are the objects of the senses (*artha*). //i. 1. 14//

Bhāṣya

The respective qualities of earth, etc., are the respective objects of the senses, i.e. are specifically perceived by the senses.

Elucidation

In the list of *prameya*-s, *artha* occurs as the fourth. The word *artha*, according to Kaṇāda, technically means the three categories, namely, substance, quality and action (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* viii. 2. 3). According to Gautama, however, *artha* as the forth *prameya* means the objects of the senses, or more specifically, the five qualities,—i.e. smell, taste, colour, touch and sound,—apprehended by the five senses. Kaṇāda also accepts this meaning of the word *artha* when he says that the objects of the senses are but well-known (*prasiddhāḥ indriyārthāḥ* : *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iii. 1. 1).

The five qualities, namely smell, etc., belong to the five elements in the following way : Earth has smell, taste, colour and touch. Water has taste, colour and touch. Fire has colour and touch. Air has only touch. Sound is the quality of empty space alone. In *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 62ff Gautama discusses all these further.

Vātsyāyana takes the word *tat-artha* (i.e. *indriya-artha*) of the *sūtra* to mean only the five qualities as belonging to the five elements. Uddyotakara, however, takes it in a broader sense which includes not only the three perceptible elements (viz. earth, water and fire) but also qualities that are perceptible. Anything perceptible is an 'object of the sense.' Therefore, the fourth *prameya*, namely *artha*, should not mean merely the five qualities like smell, etc. In support of this interpretation Uddyotakara cites the evidence of *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 1, where Gautama takes the word *artha* to mean any perceptible objects, like, jar etc.

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa does not accept Uddyotakara's interpretation. He argues that in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 62ff Gautama critically examines the fourth *prameya* called *artha* and discusses there only the five qualities. Hence, while enumerating *artha* in the present *sūtra*, Gautama must have had in mind only these five qualities. According to the method followed by the Naiyāyikas, only that is eventually critically discussed the general enumeration of which is given first. In the technical sense, therefore, *artha* means only the five qualities. In the *sūtra* cited by Uddyotakara, the word *artha* is not used in its strict technical sense.

Bhāṣya

Gautama says, as if for refuting the illogical views (of the Sāṃkhya)—namely that knowledge (*jñāna*) is the modification (*vṛtti*) of the 'unconscious instrumental

cause' (*acetana-karaṇa*) called *buddhi* (=*mahat* of the Sāṃkhya) and that awareness (*upalabdhi*) belongs to the conscious (*cetana*=*puruṣa*), which is but passive (*a-kartā*)—

Sūtra 15

(The terms) *buddhi*, *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* do not denote different entities. // i. 1. 15 //

Bhāṣya

Knowledge cannot belong to *buddhi*, which is an unconscious instrumental cause, for in that case it (*buddhi*) becomes itself conscious. On the contrary, that which is conscious is distinct from the complex of body-and-the-senses and it is one (in each body-sense complex).

Although this *sūtra* is (really) designed for the purpose of defining (the fifth) *prameya* (viz. *buddhi*), it expresses an 'added significance' (*anya-artha*), because of its 'logical potential' (*upapatti-sāmarthya*).

Elucidation

After discussing the first four *prameya*-s, viz. self, body, senses and objects of the senses,—Gautama takes up the fifth *prameya*, viz. *buddhi*. The primary purpose of the *sūtra* is to define *buddhi*. But Vātsyāyana claims that by implication it also rejects the Sāṃkhya view of *buddhi*. According to the Sāṃkhya, *buddhi* is the first evolute of *prakṛti* and is intrinsically unconscious. *Jñāna* (knowledge) is a modification of *buddhi* and is, therefore, a characteristic of *buddhi*. Further, according to the Sāṃkhya, by *upalabdhi* is meant the unreal connection of the *puruṣa* with this *jñāna* as charcterising *buddhi*, which results from the reflection of the *puruṣa* in *buddhi*. In short, *buddhi*, *jñāna* and *upalabdhi* are in this view basically different. According to Nyāya, however, the three terms are synonymous. Gautama elaborately refutes the Sāṃkhya in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 1ff. Vātsyāyana here briefly indicates the fallacious nature of the Sāṃkhya position.

First, *buddhi* being intrinsically unconscious, cannot be characterised by *jñāna*. If, to evade this difficulty, *buddhi* is conceived as conscious, the Sāṃkhya would be led to the absurd position of admitting two separate conscious agents within the same body. Secondly, *upalabdhi* is impossible for *puruṣa*, because *puruṣa* is absolutely aloof from everything. Therefore, the distinction between *buddhi*, *jñāna* and *upalabdhi* is untenable.

Bhāṣya

The probans for the inference of mind are recollection (*smṛti*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal knowledge (*āgama*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), intuition (*pratibhā*, i.e. a form of internal knowledge independent of any instrument of valid knowledge), dream-experience (*svapna-jñāna*), hypothetical argument (*ūha=tarka*), perceptions of pleasure, desire etc. and desire etc. These probans apart, this also [namely,]—

Sūtra 16

The absence of the occurrence of 'simultaneous cognitions' (*yugapat-jñāna*) is a proban for [the inference of] the mind. // i. 1. 16 //

Bhāṣya

Recollection etc., which are independent of the instrumentality of the (external) senses, should be due to the instrumentality of something else. In spite of the simultaneous contact of the olfactory and other senses with smell etc., the resulting cognitions do not simultaneously occur. From this is inferred that there is 'another auxiliary cause' (*sahakāri-nimittāntara*), which has contact with each of these senses and which is 'unpervading' (*avyāpi*) [i.e. atomic in magnitude and therefore without parts, and as such can have contact only with one sense at a time]. In the absence of a contact with this there is no cognition, while there is cognition in the presence of a contact with this. If independent of the contact with mind, sense-object contact alone could result in cognition, then there would have been simultaneons cognitions.

Elucidation

The Naiyāyikas conceive mind (*manas*) — the sixth *prameya*—as the 'internal sense' (*antaḥ-karaṇa* : the word *karaṇa* is here taken in the sense of an instrument of valid perceptual knowledge, i.e. a sense-organ) which is 'atomic in magnitude' (*aṇu-parimāṇa*). From this follows that it is eternal (*nitya*), for in the Nyāya view creation and destruction mean nothing but conjunction and disjunction of parts whereas the atom is partless.

According to Gautama, mind is inferred from the fact of the absence of simultaneous cognitions. The different sense-organs can come in contact with different objects at the same moment. Still, a number of different perceptual cognitions do not arise simultaneously. From this is inferred that over and above the contact with the senses, there

must be some auxiliary cause, the contact with which is necessary for the occurrence of knowledge. Such an auxiliary cause must, moreover, be partless, so that the possibility of its different parts coming in simultaneous contact with different senses is excluded. This partless or atomic auxiliary cause is the mind. Thus, though there can be simultaneous contacts of the different senses with different objects, there arises perceptual knowledge only through that sense which comes in contact with the mind—a fact which is particularly overt in the case of inattention (*vyāsaṅga*). Apparently we may have the impression of having simultaneous perceptions of different objects through different senses. According to Gautama, however, these are as a matter of fact different perceptions resulting from different contacts of the mind with the different senses taking place at different moments. They only appear to be simultaneous because of the extremely swift fluctuations of the mind, as a result of which it comes in contact with the different senses in rapid succession. This will be further discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 58.

The absence of simultaneous cognitions, on the evidence of which Gautama proves the existence of the mind, would not be acceptable to those who do not conceive mind as atomic in magnitude. Kumārila, e.g., views mind as all-pervasive (*vibhu*), which therefore can come in simultaneous contacts with different senses. That is why, while introducing the *sūtra*, Vātsyāyana mentions a number of other probans for the inference of the mind, which would be acceptable to the other philosophers as well. One of these probans is *pratibhā* or intuition, the nature of which will be discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 2. 33.

Bhāṣya

Coming next in order—

Sūtra 17

Motivation (*pravṛtti*) is the conation (*ārambha*) through speech (*vāc*), mind (*buddhi*) and body. // i. 1. 17 //

Bhāṣya

The word *buddhi* in this *sūtra* means mind. It is [called] *buddhi* because 'one understands by it' (*buddhyate anena*).

Now this conation (*ārambha*), which is through body, speech or mind and which results in virtue (*puṇya*) or vice (*pāpa*), is ten-fold. All these are already explained under the second *sūtra*.

Sūtra 18

Evils (*doṣa*) are those that have for their probans (*lakṣaṇa* : inferential ground) the [characteristic of] 'being the cause of motivation' (*pravartanā*). // i. 1. 18 //

Bhāṣya

Pravartanā means the characteristic of being the cause of motivation. Attachment (*rāga*), etc. engage the knower to virtue or vice. Where there is 'false knowledge' (*mithyā-jñāna*), there is attachment or aversion.

[Objection :] These evils are perceptible to each individual self. Why then are these referred to by their inferential ground ? [Answer :] That a person is under the influence of attachment, aversion or ignorance is known by his activities, for only a person under the influence of attachment engages himself to the activity by which he obtains pleasure or suffering. Similar is the case of one under the influence of aversion or under the influence of ignorance. All these additional significances cannot be conveyed only by saying that attachment, aversion and ignorance [are the evils].

Elucidation

Evil, the eighth *prameya*, which leads to motivation and therefore ultimately results in virtue or vice, is three-fold; these are attachment, aversion and ignorance. Of these evils, ignorance is fundamental. A person without ignorance has neither attachment nor aversion. Gautama also says this in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 6.

In the *sūtra*, the word *lakṣaṇa* has also the significance of a proban. In this sense of the word *lakṣaṇa*, the *sūtra* means that the three-fold evil is inferentially proved by the resulting motivation. As against this, Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection. The three-fold evil is internally perceived by each individual self. Since it is known by perception, its inferential proof is redundant. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa reads the following implication in Vātsyāyana's answer to this objection. Only in the case of one's own self these evils are perceptible. In the cases of others, however, these can only be ascertained inferentially. Finding a person engaged to activity that results in pleasure or pain, it is inferred that he is working under the influence of attachment, aversion or ignorance, for otherwise none can be engaged to activity.

Sūtra 19

Rebirth (*pretyabhāva*) means being born again. // i. 1. 19 //

Bhāṣya

Rebirth [the ninth *prameya*] is being born again after death for one previously born (*utpanna*) in 'any form of organism' (*kvacit-sattva-nikāya*). 'Being born' (*utpanna*) means coming into relation. The relation [referred to] is with body, sense, consciousness (*buddhi*) and feeling (*vedanā*). Being born again means being related over again to body etc. The word *punaḥ* (again) is used to signify recurrence. After abiding in an organism, when a self leaves this previously acquired body etc., it is said to depart. When it assumes other body etc., of similar or dis-similar organisms, it is said to be born. Rebirth [therefore] means the birth again after death. Now this rebirth, which is but the continuous cycle of births and deaths, is to be viewed as without a beginning but ending in liberation.

Sūtra 20

Result (*phala*) is the object (*artha*) produced by motivation and evil. // i. 1. 20 //

Bhāṣya

Result means the feeling of pleasure and suffering. Action leads to either pleasure or suffering. Such a feeling, again, is possible only when there exist body, senses, objects of knowledge and mind (? *buddhi*) and, therefore, result is intended to include also body etc. All these are thus included in result, which is an object produced by motivation and evil. This result is discarded after being accepted again and again and it is accepted after being discarded again and again. There is no limit to or end of the acceptance or rejection of this result. All the living beings are being swept by this stream of the acceptance or rejection of this result.

Elucidation

Result, the tenth *prameya*, may be primary (*mukhya*) or secondary (*gauṇa*). The primary result is the feeling of pleasure or pain. The body, senses, etc., which are the auxiliary causes of this feeling, are the secondary results. Gautama refers to both the results in the *sūtra*.

Bhāṣya

Now, all these are—

Sūtra 21

Suffering (*duḥkha*) which is of the nature of pain (*vādhanā*). // i. 1. 21 //

Bhāṣya

The word *vādhanā* is a synonym for *pīḍā* and *tāpa*. All these things, like body etc., being connected with suffering, are but sufferings. For these are permeated by or embedded in or invariably attended with suffering. One finding everything thus permeated by suffering desires to avoid suffering and finding birth to be suffering attains the 'state of indifference' (*nirveda*). The indifferent [person] becomes non-attached and the non-attached [person] is liberated,

Elucidation

Suffering—the eleventh *prameya*—is discussed immediately before the twelvth, namely *apavarga* or liberation. In the list of *prameya*-s, body occurs as the second and result as the tenth. According to Vātsyāyana, all the nine *prameya*-s from body to result are to be viewed as suffering for which he uses three synonyms, namely *vādhanā*, *pīḍā* and *tāpa*. Suffering is something well-known, because it is felt by everybody. In the *sūtra*, however, the word suffering includes all the auxiliary causes of it. These auxiliary causes like body etc. are viewed as suffering, because these are universally related to suffering.

Bhāṣya

Where there is the end and where there is the final cessation [of suffering] is this—

Sūtra 22

Liberation, which is the absolute deliverance from suffering. //i.1. 22//

Bhāṣya

The absolute deliverance from it, i.e. from suffering—and therefore from birth—is liberation. What is meant by it ? The giving up of the birth which has already taken place and the non-acceptance of another [birth]. Such a state when

continued eternally, is known as liberation to 'those who have special knowledge of liberation' (*apavarga-vit*). It is the state of fearlessness, without decay and death ; it is [what the scriptures call] *brahman* and it is the attainment of the highest good.

Elucidation

The state of 'cosmic dissolution' (*pralaya*), though without suffering, is only temporarily so, because it is followed by 'cosmic creation' (*sṛṣṭi*) and hence suffering. It is thus different from liberation which is absolute deliverance from suffering.

By characterising liberation as a state of fearlessness and as without decay and death, Vātsyāyana points to its close similarity with *brahman*, for these characteristics hold good for both liberation and *brahman*. As Vācaspati Miśra explains, liberation is freedom from the fear of worldly existence and hence it is a state of fearlessness ; *brahman* also is repeatedly characterised by the scriptures as fearless. As against those who conceive the world to be a real modification of *brahman*, Vātsyāyana uses the epithet *ajara*, i.e. without modification or decay : the eternal and unchanging *brahman* suffers no modification, and so is liberation which is a changeless state. As against those who conceive liberation as the final destruction of mind (*citta*)—just as the blowing off of the lamp—he says that liberation is *amṛtyupada*,i.e. is not the abode of death. In other words, liberation is not the annihilation of the self ; it is eternal like *brahman*.

Gautama's conception of liberation is further discussed under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 62ff.

Bhāṣya

According to some, in the state of liberation is manifested the eternal bliss of the self, like its all-pervasive magnitude, and by this manifested bliss the absolutely liberated self becomes full of bliss. This view being without proof is unacceptable. There is no perceptual, inferential or scriptural ground to prove that in the state of liberation is manifested the eternal bliss of the self, like its all-pervasive magnitude.

Elucidation

After explaining his view of liberation, Vātsyāyana mentions another view according to which just as the all-pervasive magnitude of the self remains unmanifested during the state of 'worldly existence' (*saṃsāra*), so also the eternal bliss abiding in the self remains unmanifested during this state ; in liberation both become manifest. Therefore, according to this view, from liberation onwards the self enjoys eternal bliss. Vācaspati Miśra seeks to explain this view as implicit in the scriptural text : "Brahman is consciousness

and bliss" (*vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma—Br. Up.* iii. 9. 28). 'The eternal bliss of the self' here means that the self *is* eternal bliss.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, does not accept this interpretation of Vācaspati. According to the view referred to by Vātsyāyana, the self is not itself eternal bliss ; eternal bliss is only a characteristic of the liberated self. But who held such a view ? According to some, it was held by Kumārila. According to others, it was held by an earlier Mīmāṃsaka called Tutātabhaṭṭa. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa thinks that this view of liberation was possibly maintained by a section of earlier Naiyāyikas, like Bhāsarvajña and others. Under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 64, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa will return to discuss this question elaborately.

Bhāṣya

Manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of eternal bliss is but its awareness (*samvedana*). Its cause should be mentioned. Manifestation of eternal bliss is its awareness, i.e. its knowledge ; its cause, namely that from which it originates, is to be mentioned. If [this awareness] is [said to be] eternal, like the bliss itself, then there will be no difference between the self 'in its state of worldly existence' (*saṃsārastha*) and 'in its state of liberation' (*mukta*). Just as the liberated [self] is characterised by the bliss and its awareness, which are eternally present, so must also be the self in its state of worldly existence, because both [viz. the bliss and its awareness] are eternal. [The upholders of the view that liberation is the manifestation of eternal bliss will have to postulate the cause of its awareness. To avoid this difficulty, if it is assumed that the said awareness also is eternal, and therefore is not in need of any cause, then there would be no scope to differentiate the self in liberation from that in bondage. In both the states of liberation and bondage, the self would not only be characterised by eternal bliss but also by its awareness, both being assumed as eternal.]

If even this is admitted, then there would be the coexistence or simultaneity of the results of virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adharma*). In that case, there would have been the coexistence or simultaneity of the awareness of eternal bliss with the awareness of the results of virtue and vice, namely pleasure and suffering, which are [as a matter of fact] successively experienced [by the self] in the realms of worldly existence. There can be absence neither of the bliss nor of its awareness, both being [assumed to be] eternal.

If [the awareness of the eternal bliss is assumed to be] non-eternal, its cause must be mentioned. Now, [if it is assumed] that the awareness in the state of liberation of the eternal bliss is non-eternal, then the cause from which it originates must be specified. Let this cause be the conjunction of the self with mind along with other [auxiliary] causes. If the conjunction of the self with mind is admitted to be the [main] cause, even then an auxiliary cause assisting

this conjunction is to be mentioned. [The opponent may argue that virtue (*dharma*) is the auxiliary cause. Vātsyāyana answers :] Then the cause of virtue is to be specified. If virtue is [assumed to be] the auxiliary cause, then its cause [i.e. of virtue itself] from which it originates is to be mentioned. [The opponent may argue that the cause of virtue is *yoga-samādhi*. To this Vātsyāyana answers :] The virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* being destroyed due to its incompatibility with the fulfilment of the result [produced by virtue], there would be the cessation of the awareness [of that eternal bliss]. If virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is assumed to be the auxiliary cause, then it [virtue] being destroyed [after producing its specific result], because of its incompatibility with the fulfilment of the result, the awareness also will cease to exist. If there is no awareness of it [i.e. of the bliss] then it will be hardly distinguishable from the non-existent. If the awareness ceases due to the destruction of virtue and the eternal bliss is not experienced, then there would be no inference to prove either of the alternatives, namely 'it is not perceived though existent' and 'it [is not perceived] because [it is] non-existent'.

[The upholders of the view that liberation is the manifestation of eternal bliss may admit that its awareness is non-eternal and this awareness has for its cause the conjunction of the self with mind assisted by virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi*. To this Vātsyāyana answers that this assumed auxiliary cause, namely virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi*, must come to its end with the production of its own result. At that stage, the auxiliary cause being absent, there would be no awareness of eternal bliss and in default of its awareness the assumption of its existence would be as good as admitting its non-existence.]

The indestructibility of virtue cannot be inferentially proved, because it has the characteristic of being produced. There is no inference to prove that virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is not destroyed. There is rather the inference to the contrary that whatever has the characteristic of being produced is non-eternal. Those, according to whom there is no cessation of the awareness [of the eternal bliss] [must admit] that therefore it is inferentially proved that the cause of this awareness is eternal ; but it has already been shown that in the case of it being eternal there is no distinction between the liberated self and the self in worldly bondage. Just as for the liberated self there is eternal bliss along with the cause of its awareness and there is no cessation of the awareness, its cause being eternal, so also is for the self under worldly bondage. And in that case there would have been the simultaneity of the awareness of pleasure and of suffering, which are [respectively] the results of virtue and vice.

It cannot be argued that the connection with body etc. is the cause of obstruction [of the awareness of the eternal bliss on the part of the self], because the very function of the body etc. is to facilitate enjoyment [for the self] and moreover there is no inference to the contrary [viz. that the self without being connected with a body can experience any pleasure or pain].

One may argue that for the self in worldly bondage the connection with body etc. obstructs the cause of the awareness of eternal bliss and therefore the difference between the two [viz. self in liberation and in bondage] is not denied. But this is illogical. Body, etc. are for the purpose of enjoyment and therefore it is absurd [to argue] that they obstruct enjoyment. There is moreover no inference that the bodiless self has any enjoyment.

Nor can it be argued that one is motivated by the attainment of the desirable [*iṣṭa*, viz. the bliss eternal], because [one may as well be motivated by] the avoidance of the undesirable. [The opponent may argue :] Here is my inference : The injunction for liberation is for the attainment of the desirable and hence is the motivation of those who are desirous of liberation. Therefore, neither of the two [viz. the injunction for liberation and the motivation for it] is meaningless. But this is illogical. The injunction for liberation is for the avoidance of the undesirable and hence is the motivation of those that are desirous of liberation. Nothing that is desirable is unaccompanied by the undesirable and, as a result, even the desirable amounts to the undesirable. One trying to reject the undesirable also rejects the desirable, because selective rejection is impossible.

Surpassing the palpable [*dṛṣṭa*, literally the visible] is equally applicable to the cases of body etc. [If it is argued that the self] strives for eternal pleasure after discarding the temporal and palpable one, then it will have to be further admitted that the liberated self acquires an eternal body, sense and consciousness after discarding the temporal body, sense and consciousness. Thus is better conceived the 'nature of the liberated self' (*aikātmya*).

If this [assumption of eternal body etc.] is said to be an absurdity (*upapatti-viruddha*), then equally so [is the opponent's assumption of eternal bliss]. The view that body, etc. are eternal is 'utterly illogical' (*pramāṇa-viruddha*) and therefore inconceivable. The same is true of the opponent, i.e. the view that "bliss is eternal" is utterly illogical and therefore inconceivable.

Even though there exists scriptural texts [that eternal bliss is manifested in liberation], there is no contradiction [with our view], because by bliss is meant in these [scriptural texts] the absolute non-existence of mundane suffering. There may be a scriptural text that the liberated self enjoys absolute bliss. But it can be explained that the word bliss in such a text is used in the sense of absolute non-existence of suffering. In ordinary discourse also the word pleasure is frequently found as used in the sense of the absence of suffering.

There can be no liberation without a surrender of the attachment for eternal bliss, for attachment is characterised as a bondage. If one strives after liberation being attracted by the desire for eternal bliss under the idea that eternal bliss is manifested in liberation, one can neither attain liberation nor deserve it, for attachment

is characterised as a bondage and it is not logical that one is liberated in spite of bondage.

[The opponent may argue that] the attachment for eternal bliss, which is eventually surrendered, is not detrimental to liberation. One's attachment for eternal bliss is [eventually] surrendered and if surrendered one's attachment for eternal bliss cannot be detrimental to liberation. [Vātsyāyana answers :] Even assuming this, one's attainment of liberation is beyond doubt irrespective of the alternative possibilities, namely, the liberated enjoys eternal bliss and it does not.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana refutes the view that in liberation there is manifestation of eternal bliss.

Manifestation of something eternal means its awareness. What can be the cause of the awareness of the eternal bliss for the liberated self ? It may be answered that like the bliss itself this awareness also is eternal. As such, it is not produced by any cause. But this leads to the assumption that all the selves under bondage are equally entitled to the enjoyment of the same eternal bliss. Such an assumption implies that the selves under bondage should at the same time enjoy this eternal bliss as well as the mundane pleasures or sufferings caused by virtue or vice. But the fact is that they do not simultaneously enjoy both.

Therefore, the said awareness of eternal bliss must be considered non-eternal or temporal. What, then, is its cause ? It may be answered that its cause is the conjunction of the self with mind, which operates along with the auxiliary cause in the form of virtue produced by *yoga-samādhi*. But virtue is exhausted after producing its specific result, e.g. the virtue of the performance of the Aśvamedha sacrifice is exhausted—i.e. ceases to have any further efficacy—after producing its result in the form of the enjoyment of heaven. Similarly, the virtue produced by *yoga-samādhi* must eventually be exhausted and therefore the awareness of the eternal bliss must come to its end. In such a state when there is no awareness of the bliss, there will be the doubt whether there is no awareness of the bliss in spite of its existence or whether the want of awareness is because of the non-existence of the bliss itself. There being no proof for either of the alternatives, the existence of the bliss of which one is unaware remains unproved.

Neither can it be proved that the virtue resulting from *yoga-samādhi* is never exhausted. For this virtue has an origin and everything having an origin must ultimately perish.

However, those that maintain that this awareness of eternal bliss never ceases to be will have to admit that the cause of this awareness is eternal. But assuming this cause to be eternal, one will have to admit that its effect, namely the awareness, must also be eternal. This leads to the absurd position that the self, even during the state of its bondage,

must have the awareness of the eternal bliss. In other words, there would be no difference between the self in bondage and the self in liberation.

If it is argued that in the state of bondage there is no awareness of the eternal bliss because of the obstruction created by body etc., the answer is that body etc., are the very means of enjoyment for the self and as such it is absurd to conceive them as obstructions. The self without body etc. can never enjoy.

It may be argued that the injunction for liberation and the striving after it prove the existence of eternal bliss. This injunction aims at the attainment of the desirable (*iṣṭa*) and the striving after something means striving after the desirable. Eternal bliss being the highest desirable, the striving after liberation points to the existence of something desirable in the state of liberation and such a desirable object is the eternal bliss. But this argument is futile. An injunction is not necessarily an injunction for the attainment of the desirable ; it may as well be for the avoidance of the undesirable. One who strives after liberation realises that the so-called pleasures are after all sufferings and thus one's ultimate goal is freedom from all sufferings.

The claim that one who strives after liberation renounces the temporal pleasures in favour of the eternal bliss will entail the further assumption that one seeks to renounce the temporal body in favour of an eternal one. This amounts to the assertion that the self in liberation enjoys eternal bliss with an eternal body. Such an absurdity is perhaps a shade better than the other assertion, viz. that in liberation the dis-embodied self enjoys eternal bliss.

The assumption of an eternal body, it will be argued, is absurd, there being no proof in favour of it. Vātsyāyana answers that the assumption of eternal bliss is equally so, for there is no proof for it either.

The opponent will certainly argue that there is definite proof in the form of scriptural evidence that the liberated self enjoys eternal bliss. Bhāsarvajña, towards the end of his work *Nyāyasāra*, claims that from the scripture it is known that the liberated self enjoys bliss. For the scripture declares : "This eternal bliss is 'internally realised' (*buddhi-grāhya*) and is beyond the range of external senses. Know that to be liberation. It is unattainable by the imperfect (*akṛtātman*)." Again, "Brahman is of the nature of bliss (*ānanda*) and it is manifested in liberation." Further, "Brahman is but consciousness (*vijñāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*). (*Br. Up.* iii. 9. 28)."

Though Vātsyāyana seeks to prove inferentially that eternal bliss is impossible, he himself admits that no inference contradicted by the scripture can be valid. That is why he proceeds to show that there is no contradiction between his view denying eternal bliss in liberation and the scriptural texts cited. Accordingly he argues that in these scriptural texts eternal bliss is to be taken in a secondary sense, i.e. as the total annihilation of suffering. Even in common parlance, relief from suffering is referred to as pleasure. Thus, e.g., one carrying a heavy load feels pleasure when relieved of it.

In defence of his own position, Bhāsarvajña argues that a secondary meaning (*upacāra* or *lakṣaṇā*) is to be resorted to only when the primary meaning (*mukhya-artha*) is unacceptable. In the scriptural texts quoted, however, the primary meaning of the word *ānanda* (bliss) is not unacceptable and as such it is not necessary to resort here to its secondary sense as the absence of suffering.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa proposes to defend the position of Vātsyāyana and says that it is already shown that the awareness of eternal bliss in liberation can be neither eternal nor temporal and is therefore fictitious (*alīka*). Since the scripture cannot speak of something fictitious, words like *ānanda* and *sukha* in the scripture cannot be taken in their primary senses.

Vātsyāyana finally says that one striving after liberation cannot be liberated so long as one has attachment for eternal bliss, because absolute detachment is the pre-condition for liberation.

The opponent will argue that though to begin with one may be driven by the attraction for eternal bliss, it is eventually discarded because of the extreme aversion for everything that gradually grows into one. When one thus becomes completely detached, there remains no longer any impediment to liberation. Vātsyāyana answers that this detachment amounts to indifference to eternal bliss itself and thus liberation has nothing to do with eternal bliss.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes by pointing out that though Vātsyāyana's view is generally accepted by the later Naiyāyikas, the view of Bhāsarvajña was current even in an earlier period and it remained accepted even in later times in a section of the Naiyāyikas. Hence it is sometimes referred to as 'the view of a section of Naiyāyikas' (*nyāya-ekadeśi-mata*). In defence of this view, Bhāsarvajña argues that there is nothing to prevent the acceptance of the primary meaning of the words like *sukha* or *ānanda* in the scripture quoted in favour of his view. The awareness of this bliss is as eternal as the bliss itself. Still, there is no difficulty in differentiating the liberated self from the self in bondage. During the state of bondage, though both the eternal bliss and its eternal awareness are present, there is no 'subject-object relation' (*viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva*) between the two. As for example, in spite of the visual sense and the presence of its object, the former cannot come in contact with the latter because of some obstruction like the wall ; but they come in contact when the obstruction is removed. Similarly, in spite of the eternal presence in the self of the eternal bliss and its eternal awareness, there is no subject-object relation between the two during the state of bondage, because of the obstruction in the form of vice. However, the subject-object relation between the two is established during liberation, when all obstructions to it are removed. This subject-object relation between the awareness of eternal bliss and the eternal bliss itself, though 'with an origin' (*janya*) can never be destroyed, because there is no cause for its destruction. Nor can it be argued that this relation, since it has an origin, must be eventually destroyed. There is no rule that whatever has an origin must have eventual destruction. Destruction (*dhvaṃsa*), e.g., though

having an origin is never further destroyed. Therefore, concludes Bhāsarvajña, by liberation is meant the absolute cessation of suffering and the attainment of eternal bliss.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON
THE DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

(*prameya-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Now, in accordance with the order [of the first *sūtra*], the definition of doubt (*saṃśaya*) is to be given and, therefore, it is said—

Sūtra 23

Doubt (*saṃśaya*) is the 'contradictory apprehension about the same object' (*vimarśa*), which, 'depends on the remembrance of the unique characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*). This [doubt] may be due to : 1) the 'apprehension of common characteristics' (*samāna-dharma-upapatti*), 2) the 'apprehension of the unique characteristics' (*aneka-dharma-upapatti*), 3) 'contradictory assertions about the same object' (*vipratipatti*), 4) the 'irregularity of apprehension' (*upalabdhi-avyavasthā*) and 5) the 'irregularity of non-apprehension' (*anupalabdhi-avyavasthā*). // i. 1. 23 //

Elucidation

The word *saṃśaya* in the *sūtra* stands for what is defined and the word *vimarśa* [i.e. contradictory apprehensions of the same object] gives the general definition. The word *viśeṣāpekṣa* is used to signify that, on the one hand, the perception of the specific characteristic dispels doubt, while, on the other hand, its recollection is a necessary pre-condition for doubt. The remaining words in the *sūtra* refer to the five forms of doubt, each having its special cause.

Vātsyāyana says that doubt is *anavadhāraṇa-jñāna*, i.e. indecisive cognition. It is indecisive not in so far as the cognition points to something as barely "that" (*idam*). But it is indecisive in so far as which of the alternatives (*koṭi*) stating its nature is appropriate for it. Therefore, doubt cannot be defined as knowledge other than the decisive one. Though a piece of unitary knowledge, doubt is composite in nature. It is not indecisive

in so far as it points to something as barely "that". It is indecisive in so far as the alternative characteristics of the object are concerned. Śaṃkara Miśra, in his commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ii. 2. 17 explains this and this is also indicated by the etymological analysis of the word *vimarśa* : *vi* meaning contradiction and *marśa* meaning knowledge. Thus *vimarśa*, literally contradictory knowledge, means here contradictory knowledge of the same object.

Some of the representatives of Navya-nyāya argue that in the case of doubt one of the alternatives is necessarily negative (*abhāva-koṭi*) and the other positive (*bhāva-koṭi*). One may, e.g., doubt : Is it not a pillar ? In this case the two alternatives are : 1) This is not a pillar and 2) This is a pillar. There is, thus, no doubt without both the negative and positive alternatives. According to the older Naiyāyikas, however, there are cases of doubt where all the alternatives are positive. Thus, e.g., one may doubt : Is it a pillar or a person ? The two alternatives here are : 1) This is a pillar and 2) This is a person. Both the alternatives are positive. [The said Navya-naiyāyikas would claim that in this example there are as a matter of fact four alternatives, two of which are negative and two positive. These are : 1) This is a pillar, 2) This is not a pillar, 3) This is a person and 4) This is not a person.] Phaṇibhūṣaṇa cites the example of the doubt of king Duṣyanta in *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*, where there are more than two alternatives and all the alternatives are necessarily positive. The king doubts : Is this a dream, or a magical creation or a phantom of imagination (*svapno nu māyā nu matibhramo nu*) ?

Bhāṣya

[Vātsyāyana explains the five forms of doubt mentioned in the *sūtra*. The first form of doubt is] the 'contradictory knowledge' (*vimarśa*) about the same object due to the apprehension of 'common characteristics' (*samāna-dharma*) and which 'depends on the remembrance of the special characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*). Somebody perceives the common characteristics of a pillar and a person [in an object], viz. a certain height and breadth ; he becomes desirous of ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic of each as previously perceived ; he fails to affirm definitely either of the alternatives and [has the cognition in the form] : What is it ? [That is, Is it a pillar or a person ?] Such an indecisive cognition is doubt. Such a doubt has for its cause the knowledge in the form : 'I apprehend the common characteristics of the two [viz, the pillar and the person] but do not apprehend the distinguishing characteristic of each.' Therefore, [it is concluded that doubt in its first form is] the contradictory knowledge about the same object depending on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic of each.

[The second form of doubt is] due to the apprehension of the unique characteristics of many [objects]. By many is here meant objects of similar as well as dissimilar nature. [Doubt is due to] the apprehension of the characteristics

of such manifold objects the unique characteristic being perceived in both [types of objects i.e. both similar and dissimilar]. [By the unique characteristic] the objects are differentiated from others, both similar and dissimilar.

[Vātsyāyana first illustrates what is meant by the unique characteristic differentiating an object from other objects, both similar and dissimilar.] The unique characteristic of earth [which is a substance] is smell, which differentiates it [on the one hand] from water etc. [i.e. other substances or similar objects] and [on the other hand] from quality and action (i.e. dissimilar objects). [Vātsyāyana now proceeds to illustrate the second form of doubt.] The unique characteristic of sound is 'being caused by disjunction' (*vibhāgajatva* : e.g. sound is produced when the bamboo is split into two parts). One doubts whether such a sound is a substance or a quality or an action. Because the unique characteristic is perceived in both ways [i.e. as differentiating the object from both the similar and dissimilar ones]. [One thus wavers among the alternatives :] Is it, being a substance, differentiated from quality and action ? Or, is it, being a quality, [differentiated from substance and action] ? Or, is it, being an action [differentiated from substance and quality] ? By the dependance on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic is meant the cognition [in the form] : I cannot ascertain any characteristic to establish definitely any of them. [I only perceive the characteristic of being produced by disjunction, which is a unique characteristic of sound. But in such a sound I perceive neither the characteristic of a substance nor of quality nor of action. Hence arises the doubt : Is it a substance or a quality or an action ?]

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana explains and illustrates the first two forms of doubt.

The first form of doubt is due to the perception of common characteristics. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains how such a doubt arises. In the insufficient light of the evening, the visual sense of somebody comes in contact with either a person standing still at a distance or a similar-looking post. He fails to perceive in it the distinguishing mark either of a person or of a post, but simply perceives the characteristics common to both, namely, a certain height and breadth. He, therefore, has the doubt about the object before him : Is it a person or a pillar ? The specific cause of such a doubt is the perception of the merely common characteristics of the two.

While explaining the example of the first form of doubt, Vātsyāyana adds the expression 'desirous of ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic' (*viśeṣaṃ bubhutsamānaḥ*). Vācaspati Miśra takes this as an explanation of the expression 'depending on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*) of the *sūtra*. This interpretation of Vācaspati implies that the desire for ascertaining the distinguishing characteristic of each is the cause of doubt. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa rejects this suggestion and

argues that such a desire only follows doubt and never precedes it. That is why Vātsyāyana specifically explains *viśeṣāpekṣa* as 'the knowledge in the form : I apprehend the common characteristics of the two [viz. the pillar and the person] but do not apprehend the distinguishing characteristic of each.' The real point of Vātsyāyana is that in no case of doubt there can be the perception of specific characteristic, though in all cases of doubt there must be the remembrance thereof.

Vātsyāyana next proceeds to explain the second form of doubt, which is doubt due to the apprehension of the unique 'characteristics of many objects' (*aneka-dharma*). The first question concerning it is : What is meant by 'the characteristics of many objects'? Vātsyāyana says that by this is meant the unique characteristic of an object which differentiates it from other objects, both similar and dissimilar. Thus, e.g., the unique characteristic of the substance earth is smell. By this it is distinguished from other substances like water etc., as well as from other categories like quality etc.

Explaining thus the meaning of unique characteristic, Vātsyāyana proceeds to illustrate the second form of doubt proper. The unique characteristic of sound is 'being caused by disjunction' (*vibhāgajatva*). From the perception of this unique characteristic there arises the doubt : Is sound a substance or a quality or an action ?

How is it that the unique characteristic of sound is 'being produced by disjunction'? Sound is produced at the time of splitting a bamboo or tearing a piece of cloth. The 'inherent cause' (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of this sound [as of all sounds] is empty space. The disjunction of the two parts of the bamboo along with the disjunction of the empty space from these two parts is the 'non-inherent cause' (*a-samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of the sound. The person who splits the bamboo or tears the cloth is the 'efficient cause' (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the sound. Thus, in the sense of having disjunction as the non-inherent cause, sound has the unique characteristic of being caused by disjunction. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that disjunction may as well be produced by another disjunction and as such 'being caused by disjunction' cannot be the unique characteristic of sound. But Uddyotakara argues against the possibility of disjunction being produced by another disjunction. Disjunction is always the result of movement.

But perceiving this unique characteristic of sound, namely being produced by disjunction, the doubt arises whether it is a substance or a quality or an action, for sound may possess this unique characteristic in the capacity of a substance or a quality or an action. In his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 5, Vātsyāyana has already shown how by a *śeṣavat* inference sound is ascertained to be a quality and the doubt under discussion is dispelled.

Bhāṣya

Now is explained [the third form of doubt, which is] due to contradictory statements about the same object' (*vipratipatti*). The word *vipratipatti* means

contradictory assertions [*darśana*, lit. perception, but here used in the sense of a statement] about the same object. By contradictory is meant opposition (*virodha*), i.e. the 'impossibility of coexistence' (*a-saha-bhāva*). [Thus, e.g.,] there is an assertion : the self exists. And there is the other : the self does not exist. The coexistence of existence and non-existence is impossible in the same locus. Nor is there any ground [for the listener of the two theses] proving either of the alternatives. In such a circumstance, the failure to ascertain the truth takes the form of doubt.

[Next is explained the fourth form of doubt.] [Doubt may be] also due to the irregularity of apprehension. One apprehends water in the tank etc., where it actually exists. One also apprehends water in the mirage where it does not actually exist. Therefore, after apprehending an object somewhere and in default of any proof determining the existence or non-existence of the object, one doubts whether the object apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.

[The fifth form of doubt is explained next.] [Doubt may be] also due to the irregularity of non-apprehension. Though actually existing [under the ground], the root, the peg (*kīlaka*) and water are not perceived. Again, though actually non-existing, the object which has not come into being or which is destroyed is not perceived. Therefore, after non-apprehending somewhere one doubts whether the object non-apprehended is actually existent or non-existent.

The dependance on the remembrance of the distinguishing characteristics of each is as before. The comman characteristics and the unique characteristic mentioned first belong to the objects known, while apprehension and non-apprehension belong to the knower. Because of this difference, these (i.e. the fourth and the fifth forms of doubt) are mentioned over again. Doubt (*vimarśa*) originates from the perception of the common characteristics, i.e. from the ascertainment of the common characteristics and presupposes the remembrance of the unique characteristic (of each).

Elucidation

Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana in interpreting this *sūtra* and claims that there are as a matter of fact only three forms of doubt, namely, those due to 1) the apprehension of an object with common characteristics, 2) the apprehension of an object with a unique characteristic and 3) the apprehension of contradictory statements. Gautama uses the expression 'due to the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension' (*upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthātaḥ*) to characterise all these three forms of

doubt rather than to indicate any fourth or fifth form of doubt. This expression really means the absence of any definite proof to establish or to reject any of the alternatives comprising the doubt.

Kaṇāda says, "Doubt is due to the apprehension of common characteristics, the non-apprehension of the unique characteristic and the remembrance of the unique characteristic" (*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* ii. 2. 17). Though Uddyotakara tries to explain it as inclusive of the second form of the doubt mentioned by Gautama, Śaṃkara Miśra categorically asserts that according to Kaṇāda doubt has neither three nor five forms ; it has only one form. Apart from doubt, Praśastapāda mentions a form of knowledge called *anadhyavasāya* (indefinite cognition) which is also produced by the apprehension of unique characteristics. Śaṃkara Miśra says that this corresponds to the second form of doubt mentioned by Gautama. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, comments that from Kaṇāda's *sūtra* it is clear that according to him doubt is only of one form. Further, argues Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, from the detailed examination of doubt in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 1ff, where Gauta a clearly discusses the five forms of doubt, it is obvious that according to him doubt has five forms.

Bhāṣya

The definitions [of the categories] are uniformly given according to their serial order [in the first *sūtra*].

Sūtra 24

Incentive (*prayojana*) is the object 'pursuing' (*adhikṛtya*) which one is led to activity. //i. 1. 24//

Bhāṣya

By incentive is to be understood an object for the attainment or avoidance of which one adopts the means after ascertaining it to be desirable or avoidable. Pursuit (*adhikāra*) is the ascertainment that "I shall either attain or avoid this object", because this ascertainment is the cause of activity. An object thus ascertained 'is pursued' (*adhikriyate*).

Elucidation

Incentive is two-fold, primary and secondary. When one strives after something for its own sake it is called the primary incentive, e.g., the attainment of pleasure and the

cessation of suffering. Secondary incentives are those for which one strives not for their own sake, but ultimately for the sake of the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain.

Sūtra 25

Corroborative instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) is an object in respect of which the notions of the layman (*laukika*) as well as of the expert (*parīkṣaka*) are not in conflict. // i. 1. 25 //

Bhāṣya

Laymen are those who have not surpassed the standard of ordinary men and who have not attained sharp intellect either by nature or by studying the scripture. Experts are the contrary. They are capable of examining an object with the help of 'hypothetical argument' (*tarka*) and the instruments of valid knowledge. An object is considered to be a corroborative instance when it is viewed by the expert in the same way as it is viewed by the layman. By pointing to the defect (*virodha*) in the corroborative instance, the opponents can be silenced. By establishing the soundness (*samādhi*) of the corroborative instance, one's own position can be established. Among the inference-components (*avayava*), it can be used as the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*).

Elucidation

Though Vātsyāyana says that corroborative instance is an object about which there is full concordance of the notions of the layman as well as the expert, still there are cases where the coorroborative instance offered is too technical to be comprehended by the layman. Vācaspati Miśra therefore proposes to take corroborative instance in the sense of an object proved by a *pramāṇa* (*Bhāmatī* on *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* ii. 1. 14).

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE PREREQUISITES OF NYĀYA

(*nyāya-pūrvāṅga-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Next [is discussed] 'proved doctrine' (*siddhānta*). The word *siddha* stands for objects that are proved as being such and such and having such and such nature. The establishment (*saṃsthiti*) of the *siddha* is *siddhānta*. Establishment is the determination of the exact character of an object, i.e. the 'specification of its true nature' (*dharma-niyama*) and this—

Sūtra 26

[This *sūtra* is interpreted in two ways. First interpretation :] Proved doctrine (*siddhānta*) is either 'establishment on the basis of a branch of learning' (*tantra-saṃsthiti*) or 'establishment on the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṃsthiti*) or 'establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent's thesis]' (*abhyupagama-saṃsthiti*).
[The alternative interpretation :] Proved doctrine is the establishment on the basis of the admission of objects proved by *pramāṇa*-s // i. 1. 26 //

Elucidation

In the next *sūtra* Gautama says that proved doctrine is of four kinds. But the present *sūtra* apparently neither defines proved doctrine nor gives a classification of it, as is evident from its alternative meanings. Therefore, even in earlier times, the doubt arose that either of the two *sūtra*-s was irrelevant. Uddyotakara, however, argues that it is not so. The present *sūtra* defines proved doctrine and its classification is given in the next one.

How does the present *sūtra* define proved doctrine ? Uddyotakara answers that according to the present *sūtra* proved doctrine is the determination of the true nature of the objects as admitted by a 'branch of learning' (*tantra*=*śāstra*). But Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa take the word *tantra* in the sense of *pramāṇa*. According to them, therefore, the *sūtra* defines proved doctrine as the determination of the true nature of the objects as established by the *pramāṇa*-s. Of course, the two participants in a debate have their respective *siddhānta*-s, both of which cannot be equally established by

pramāṇa-s. But each of the two is under the conviction that his own *siddhānta* is established by *pramāṇa*-s.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa understands by proved doctrine the *object itself*, which is established by the *pramāṇa*-s and possesses both general and specific characteristics. Vātsyāyana also, in his commentary on the first *sūtra*, says, "Proved doctrine means the object admitted in the form : It exists." Further, from Gautama's own *sūtra*-s (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 28f) in which are given the definitions of the different forms of proved doctrine, we find that proved doctrine is taken in the sense of the object admitted. But Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra say that the *admission of the object* is also to be considered as the proved doctrine. Thus the question is : Are we to understand by proved doctrine the object itself or its admission ? Udayana answers that it depends upon the emphasis put on either of the two. One may choose to put the emphasis on the object itself or on its admission and accordingly proved doctrine may mean either of the two.

Bhāṣya

'Establishment on the basis of a branch of learning' (*tantra-saṃsthiti*) means the 'establishment of an object as admitted by a branch of learning' (*tantra-artha-saṃsthiti*). *Tantra* is a discourse on inter-connected themes [*artha*, lit. objects], i.e. a 'branch of learning' (*śāstra*). 'Establishment on the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṃsthiti*) is the establishment of an object which 'is consequential to' (*anuṣakta*) 'another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa*). 'Establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent's thesis]' (*abhyupagama-saṃsthiti*) is the acceptance of an object not critically examined. 'Proved doctrine on the basis of a tentative assumption' (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*) is for the purpose of determining the specific nature of an object.

However, because of the 'difference of the branches of learning' (*tantra-bhedāt*)—

Sūtra 27

Because of the 'differences in the modes of establishment' (*saṃsthiti-arthāntara-bhāvāt*), it is four-fold : 1) 'establishment on the basis of the [unanimity] of all the branches of learning' (*sarva-tantra-saṃsthiti*), 2) 'establishment on the basis of one's own branch of learning' (*prati-tantra-siddhānta*), 3) 'establishment as the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-saṃsthiti*)

and 4) 'establishment on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent]' (*abhyupagama-saṃsthiti*). // i. 1. 27 //

Bhāṣya

Now, these four modes of establishment are different from one another.

Elucidation

The first form of proved doctrine mentioned in the first interpretation of the previous *sūtra*, viz. establishment on the basis of a branch of learning is sub-divided into two forms, namely establishment on the basis of the unanimity of all the branches of learning and establishment on the basis of one's own branch of learning. This is due to, as Vātsyāyana points out, 'differences among the branches of learning' (*tantra-bheda*).

Bhāṣya

Of these—

Sūtra 28

Proved doctrine on the basis of [the unanimity of] all the branches of learning is an object 'not contradicted by' (*a-viruddha*) any of the other branches of learning and admitted in one's own branch of learning. // i. 1. 28 //

Bhāṣya

As for example, 1) the senses like the olfactory etc., 2) the objects of the senses like smell etc., 3) the elements like earth etc. and 4) the obtainment of valid knowledge of an object by the *pramāṇa*-s.

Elucidation

The expression 'not contradicted by' (*aviruddha*) in the *sūtra* is used to signify that an object, though not mentioned by all the branches of learning and yet not specifically rejected by them, is to be regarded as the proved doctrine based on all the branches of

learning, if it is admitted by one's own branch of learning. Thus, e.g., the illegitimacy of the use of *chala* and *jāti* in a debate is admitted only in the Nyāya system and not specifically rejected by any other system ; thus it is a *sarva-tantra-siddhānta.*

Sūtra 29

'Proved doctrine on the basis of one's own branch of learning' is an object which is accepted in 'one's own allied branch of learning' (*samāna-tantra*) but not accepted in other branches of learning' (*prati-tantra*). // i. 1. 29 //

Bhāṣya

For example, (the *pratitantra-siddhānta*-s) of the Sāṃkhyas are : the non-existent never comes into being, nor is the existent absolutely destroyed ; the conscious [selves] are without modification ; modification occurs in body, senses and mind, in the objects and their causes [i.e. *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* and the five *tanmātra*-s]. [The *pratitantra-siddhānta*-s] of the followers of Yoga are : the creation of the material world is due to *karma* (i.e. *adṛṣṭa*); evils (*doṣa*) and motivation (*pravṛtti*) are the causes of *karma*; the conscious [selves] are characterised by their respective qualities [i.e. knowledge, desire, aversion] ; the non-existent comes into being and the existent is absolutely destroyed.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana mentions a number of theses maintained by 'the followers of Yoga' (*yogānām*). The word *yoga*, when derived by adding the suffix *ac* in the sense of 'having', means the followers of Yoga. But whom does Vātsyāyana refer to as the followers of Yoga ? They cannot obviously be the followers of the well-known Yoga system, closely allied to the Sāṃkhya, because the theses mentioned are quite contrary to the doctrines held by them. Therefore, by the followers of Yoga are to be understood here the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, who are traditionally known as the Śaiva *yogin*-s. The theses mentioned by Vātsyāyana as the *pratitantra-siddhānta* of the followers of Yoga are characteristic of both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. From a remote antiquity they had their own methods and practices of *yoga*, which came down through their line of preceptors. The Naiyāyikas were known as *yogin*-s belonging to the Śaiva and the Pāśupata sects. This is evident from the statement of the Jaina philosopher Guṇaranta (*Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*, p. 51).

In any case, the Vaiśeṣika system was known as Yoga even in ancient times and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers were accordingly characterised as the 'followers of *yoga*'. The Jaina philosopher Vidyānanda Svāmi, in his work *Patraparīkṣā*, quotes a *sūtra* of Kaṇāda (viz. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv. 1. 1.) and adds, "As it is said by the followers of *yoga*". Further, Guṇaratna opens his discussion of the Nyāya view with the words : "The Naiyāyikas, also known as the *yauga*-s". Therefore, according to the ancient tradition, Vātsyāyana mentions the theses of the Vaiśeṣikas as characteristic of the followers of *yoga*.

Praśastapāda says that Kaṇāda received insight into the Vaiśeṣika doctrines as a result of pleasing Maheśvara by the 'supernatural power' (*vibhūti*) attained through the practice of *yoga*. However, it needs to be remembered further that these Vaiśeṣika doctrines are also the doctrines of the Naiyāyikas. Uddyotakara also says that the *pratitantra-siddhānta* of the followers of *yoga* is that the senses are 'made of material elements' (*bhautika*), while that of the follwers of the Sāṃkhya is that the senses are not made of the material elements. The thesis referred to here as that of the follower of *yoga* is shared alike by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore, the theses under discussion are not exclusively those of the Vaiśeṣikas. By the followers of *yoga* are thus to be understood the followers of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa suggests that the followers of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines are called the followers of *yoga* in the following sense. The word *yoga* also means *saṃyoga* or conjunction. Both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are followers of *yoga* because both subscribe to the doctrine of creation through the conjunction of atoms.

Sūtra 30

'Proved doctrine as the basis of another proved thesis' (*adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*) is the object which, when proved, also proves certain other objects. // i. 1. 30 //

Bhāṣya

When, an object being proved, there follows [the proof of] other objects and the existence of which is not proved without the latter—the basis on which depends [the proof of these other objects] is the 'proved doctrine as the basis of another proved thesis'. For example, the knower [i.e. the self] is distinct from the senses, because the same object is perceived by the visual as well as the tactual sense [cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii 1. 1]. Here the correlated theses are : the multiplicity of the senses ; the senses have fixed objects ; the probans for the inference of the senses are the perceptions of their respective objects ; the senses are the aids to knowledge for the knower ; the substratum of quality is substance which is itself different from the

qualities like smell etc. and the conscious [selves] are not restrictcd to fixed objects. These theses are proved when the aforementioned thesis [viz. that the self is distinct from the senses] is proved. Without these, again, that cannot be established.

Elucidation

Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta is interpreted in two ways. First, it means the admission of such an object which, when proved, also proves a number of correlated objects. Secondly, it means the correlated objects themselves which are proved as a consequence of the proof of another object. The first interpretation is upheld by Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra, the second by Uddyotakara.

Sūtra 31

'Proved doctrine on the basis of a tentative assumption [of the opponent's thesis]' (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*) is the object which is accepted without proof for the purpose of examining its specific character. // i. 1. 31 //

Bhāṣya

When an object is accepted without examination [for the purpose of determining its specific character, it is called *abhyupagama-siddhānta*]. Thus, e.g., one may say : Let sound be admitted to be a substance; but is it eternal or non-eternal ? Thus, admitting it to be a substance, its specific character, namely its eternality or non-eternality, is examined. This *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is employed for demonstrating the excellence of one's own intellect and for the condemnation of other's intellect.

Elucidation

Abhyupagama-siddhānta also is explained in two ways. First, as Vātsyāyana explains, it is the tentative admission of a thesis of the opponent for further critical examination of the opponent's claim as to its specific nature. For example, according to a section of the Mīmāṃsakas [later represented by Kumārila], sound is a substance and it is eternal. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, view sound as a quality and as non-eternal. But the Naiyāyika may tentatively grant that sound is a substance ; even

admitting this he proceeds to show that it cannot be eternal. This tentative admission of the opponent's thesis is thus designed eventually to prove the superiority of his own thesis and the unacceptibility of the Mīmāṃsā view that sound is eternal.

According to Uddyotakara, however, *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is the acceptance of a thesis which is implicitly admitted, though not stated in so many words, by the discussion of the nature of the object in the basic treatise of one's own system. Thus, e.g., the *Nyāya-sūtra* does not state in so many words that mind is a sense. But from the critical discussions about the nature of mind in this treatise, it is clear that mind is admitted to be a sense. The acceptance of mind as a sense on the part of the Naiyāyika is an *abhyupagama-siddhānta.* Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana also follow this interpretation.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, argues that from the point of view of Vātsyāyana the admission of mind as a sense would be an example of *sarva-tantra-siddhānta,* because it is contradicted by no other system.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON
THE DEFINITION OF PROVED DOCTRINE BASED ON NYĀYA

(*nyāyāśraya-siddhānta-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Now are discussed the inference-components.

Sūtra 32

The inference-components (*avayava*) are : 'the preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*), the proban (*hetu*), the exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*). // i. 1. 32 //

Elucidation

This section, in which Gautama discusses the five inference- components, is known as the 'section on *nyāya*' (*nyāya-prakaraṇa*). The term *nyāya* means the statement of the five inference-components in the order as specified in this *sūtra.* Vātsyāyana has already said (on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 1), "This is *nyāya par excellence.*"

Inference is generally divided into two forms, *svārtha* and *parārtha*. By the former is meant inference for the sake of determining truth for one's own sake. The statement of the five components is not a precondition for such an inference. *Parārtha-anumāna* or an inference for the sake of others, however, presupposes the explicit statement of these components, i.e. the employment of *nyāya par excellence.*

In a debate, the two contestants offer contradictory theses. Somebody listening to both these gets perplexed as to which of the two theses is correct. For the purpose of convincing him, both the contestants explicitly state the inference-components in favour of their respective theses. Hence is the need of *nyāya*. As Gaṅgeśa says, the application of *nyāya* is a precondition for the inference for others.

The very possibility of inference for others was questioned by some. Inference means the cause of inferential knowledge or the inferential knowledge itself, while there is neither empirical nor textual ground to defend the possibility of such a cause or knowledge being for the sake of others. It may be answered that inference is said to be for the sake of others because the propositions expressing the inference are employed for the sake of others. But then propositions conveying a perceptual knowledge should as well be considered as perception for the sake of others. As against this view Śrīdhara argues that the propositions expressing the inferential process ultimately cause an inferential knowledge in others (i.e. the third party listening to the debate). That is why the inference is said to be for the sake of others.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, inference for others is nothing but the propositions conveying the inference-components in their totality. Gaṅgeśa, however, views these propositions as only causing the inference for others. Dharmakīrti, in his *Nyāyabindu*, says that the proposition expressing the proban with 'three marks' (*tri-rūpa*)[1], though actually the cause of the inferential knowledge, stands in a secondary sense also for its effect, viz. the inference for the sake of others.

As for the actual number of inference-components, there are different views. According to some there are ten such components while others admit only three. The Naiyāyikas hold the view that there are five inference-components and Uddyotakara argues that the present *sūtra* is designed to specify these. Vātsyāyana, however,only mentions and rejects the view of ten inference-components here.

Bhāṣya

'Some other Naiyāyikas' (*eke naiyāyikāḥ*) claim that the *nyāya* consists of ten components. [The additional five components are] enquiry (*jijñāsā*), doubt

1. The three marks of a valid proban are : 1) presence in the subject (*pakṣasattva*) 2) presence in an indisputable locus of the probandum (*sapakṣasattva*) and 3) absence in an indisputable locus of the absence of the probandum (*vipakṣāsattva*).

(*saṃśaya*), 'apprehension of the potency [of the *pramāṇa*-s to reveal the nature of the *prameya*-s]' (*śakya-prāpti*), incentive (*prayojana*) and 'dispelling of doubt' (*saṃśaya-vyudāsa*). [Now the question is :] Why, then, these are not mentioned ?

Enquiry is that which provokes the desire for definite knowledge of an object 'vaguely known' (*a-pratīyamāna*). Why does one enquire about an object vaguely known ? Because, after ascertaining the true nature of the object, I shall either avoid or accept or be indifferent to it. Thus, the result of ascertaining the true nature of the object is either the 'knowledge which produces aversion' (*hāna-buddhi*) or 'knowledge which produces attraction' (*upādāna-buddhi*) or 'knowledge which produces indifference' (*upekṣā-buddhi*). One is led to inquire for the sake of such a knowledge. However, such an enquiry does not prove the existence of any object [and as such, is redundant as an inference-component].

Doubt (*saṃśaya*), the basis of enquiry, is contiguous to right knowledge because it is the perception of two contradictory characteristics. Of these two contradictory characteristics, one is proved to be correct. Though separately mentioned [by Gautama], it [doubt] does not prove any object [and as such is redundant as an inference-component].

Apprehension of potency is [the determination] for the knower that the *pramāṇa*-s are capable of revealing the *pramey*-s. It is not related as a component to the 'propositions proving a thesis' (*sādhaka-vākya*—inference-component), as are the 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*), etc.

Incentive [for the application of *nyāya*] is the determination of truth (*tattva*). It is the result arrived at by the propositions proving a thesis and not a component part [of this group of propositions].

Dispelling of doubt is the demonstration of the defect in the opponent's thesis. It serves the purpose of arriving at the knowledge of truth by negating it [i e. the opponent's view]. But it is not a component part of the group of propositions proving a thesis.

In a debate, enquiry etc. are useful in so far as they help in proving the thesis under consideration. However, as having [direct] efficacy in proving a thesis, [only] *pratijñā* etc. become the divisions or parts or components of the group of propositions proving a thesis.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana refers to some ancient Naiyāyikas according to whom the inference-components are ten in number. From a passage in the *Yuktidīpikā* [a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*], it appears that a section of Sāṃkhya philosophers held such a view. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that the view held by them is not exactly the same as referred to by Vātsyāyana.

The five additional components mentioned by them are enquiry etc. Though Vātsyāyana discards the claim that these additional five are actual inference-components, he does not reject their utility as such. Uddyotakara explains their real utility in the sense that these are the pre-conditions for a debate: without enquiry etc. the question of the application of *nyāya* does not arise.

Bhāṣya

Of the five inference-components as divided in the previous *sūtra*—

Sūtra 33

'Preliminary statement of the thesis (*pratijñā*) is the 'specific mention of the probandum (*sādhya-nirdeśa*). // i. 1. 33 //

Bhāṣya

Pratijñā is the specific mention of the probandum, i. e. the proposition stating a specified subject as qualified by the characteristic sought to be proved [of it], e.g. sound is non-eternal.

Elucidation

The word *sādhya* is used in two senses, viz. 1) the probandum and 2) the subject as characterised by the probandum (*sādhya-dharmī* or *pakṣa*). Vātsyāyana takes the word as used in the present *sūtra* in the second sense.

Sūtra 34

The proban (*hetu*) is the proposition stating the 'cause of the establishment of the probadum (*sādhya-sādhana*) through the resemblance [of the subject or *pakṣa*] with the 'instance cited' (*udāharaṇa*). // i. 1. 34 //

Bhāṣya

The proban is the proposition conveying the proof for [the establishment of] the probandum [in the subject] through the resemblance [of the subject or *pakṣa*] with the instance cited. [In other words,] the proban is the specification of a characteristic as proving the probandum—a characteristic which is perceived in the subject in the same way in which it is perceived in the instance cited. For example, 'because it is something produced' [in the inference : sound is non-eternal]. It is found [in the instance of pot etc.] that whatever is produced is non-eternal.

Elucidation

Proban (*hetu*) is of two kinds—based on similarity (*sādharmya*) and based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*). The present *sūtra* defines the first kind of proban as that by virtue of the presence of which the subject resembles the instance cited. For example, in the inference "Sound is non-eternal", the subject "sound" resembles the instance cited, viz "the pot", in "being something produced." Hence "being something produced" is the proban of the inference.

A characteristic perceived either in the instance cited alone or in the subject alone cannot be a proban for an inference. As perceived in the instance cited, it gives us the knowledge of co-existence of the characteristic with the probandum. Perceived over again in the subject, it becomes the ground for the inference of the probandum in the subject.

Bhāṣya

Is this alone the definition of a proban ? The answer is in the negative. What then ?

Sūtra 35

Similarly, [the proban is the proposition stating the cause of the establishment of the probandum] through the dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) [of the subject or *pakṣa* with the instance cited]. // i. 1. 35 //

Bhāṣya

[The second kind of] proban is the proposition conveying the proof for the

establishment of the probandum [in the subject] through the dis-similarity [of the subject] with the instance cited. How ? Sound is non-eternal, because it is something produced. Whatever is not-produced is etetnal, e.g., substances like the self etc.

Elucidation

The second form of proban, viz. proban based on dis-similarity, is explained here. Just as a proban based on similarity implies an instance similar to the subject in possessing the same characteristic, so also a proban based on dis-similarity implies an instance which is dis-similar to the subject in possessing a contrary characteristic. That is why Vātsyāyana mentions for the same inference an instance with a contrary characteristic, namely the self, which is not produced.

Uddyotakara, however, says that the example given by Vātsyāyana of the proban based on dis-similarity is not acceptable. In this example, the proban remains as a matter of fact the same as that of *sādharmya-hetu* ; what is different is only the mode of expression, which difference, again, is due only to the difference of the instance cited. A proban genuinely based on dis-similarity is called for only in an inference where there is no agreed instance based on similarity. Thus, e.g., while arguing against the deniers of the self that "the living body possesses a soul, because it is characterised by vital breath", it is not possible to find an agreed instance based on similarity, because according to the deniers of the soul no living body possesses it. Failing to find an instance based on similarity, an instance dis-similar to the subject—e.g. the pot—is to be resorted to. Thus the inference would be : "The living body must possess a soul, because it is characterised by vital breath. What does not possess a soul is not characterised by vital breath, e.g. the pot." The proban "being characterised by vital breath" is based on dis-similarity, because, according to both the parties, the subject, viz. the living body, possesses the vital breath, whereas the instance cited—viz. the pot—does not possess it. Gaṅgeśa also accepts this instance cited by Uddyotakara.

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that Vātsyāyana takes the real purport of these two *sūtra*-s as that the two forms of proban differ from each other due to the difference in the instance cited. When the instance cited is similar to the subject, the proban is one based on similarity. When the instance cited is dis-similar to the subject, the proban is one based on dis-similarity. There is no rule that the proban based on dis-similarity is to be taken only when an instance based on similarity is not possible.

In explaining these two *sūtra*-s, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that the primary purpose of Gautama is to give a general definition of proban as that 'which proves the existence of the probandum in the subject' (*sādhya-sādhana*). Without such a general definition, neither the second inference-component, viz. the statement of the proban or *hetu*, nor the subsequent discussion of pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) can be legitimate. Jayanta claims

that over and above offering the general definition of proban, these two *sūtra*-s define the two forms of proban, namely 1) the proban 'having agreement in presence as well as agreement in absence' (*anvaya-vyatirekī*) with the probandum and 2) the proban having only 'agreement in absence' (*vyatirekī*) with the probandum.

Jayanta refers to another interpretation offered by others according to which these two *sūtra*-s are to be understood together as referring to only one form of proban, namely 'a proban based on both similarity and dis-similarity' (*sādharmya-vaidharmya-hetu*). According to this interpretation, therefore, every inference must have in its favour two instances, one similar and the other dis-similar to the subject.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that this other interpretation cannot be accepted. Gautama would not have felt the need of two separate *sūtra*-s if his real purpose were to define only one form of proban. Nor is the proban based on both similarity and dis-similarity the only form of proban, because there may be a proban based on similarity alone. Further, Vātsyāyana in his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 39 clearly asserts that probans have two forms according to the nature of the instances cited.

Though admitting that a general definition of proban is implied in the previous *sūtra*, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues against Jayanta's view that such a general definition is the primary purpose of the two *sūtra*-s. Gautama, as a matter of fact, designs this section to discuss the five inference-components and as such his main objective here is to mention the second inference-component, namely the 'proposition stating the proban' (*hetu-vākya*). [Moreover, the grammatical peculiarity of the previous *sūtra* goes against Jayanta's view.]

Sūtra 36

Exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is a proposition stating an instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) which being 'similar to the subject' (*sādhya-sādharmya*) 'possesses its characteristic' (*tat-dharma-bhāvī*). // i. 1. 36 //

Bhāṣya

Similarity with the subject means possessing the same characteristic [as possessed by the subject]. An object becomes an instance by virtue of possessing the characteristic of it [i.e. of the subject] because of its similarity with the subject. The expression *tat-dharma* [of the *sūtra*] means 'the characteristic of it' and 'of it' means 'of the *sādhya*'. *Sādhya*, again, is of two kinds : 1) a characteristic as belonging to a subject (*dharmin*), e.g. non-eternality as belonging to sound and 2) a subject as qualified by a characteristic, e.g., sound is non-eternal [i.e. sound as

characterised by non-eternality]. Here, by mentioning the word *tat* [*tat=sādhya* in the expression *tat-dharma-bhāvī*], the second [kind of *sādhya*] is meant. Why? Because of the separate mention of the word *dharma* [characteristic]. [The word *tat* means the *sādhya*. *Sādhya* may mean either a characteristic or a subject. In the present context, *tat* or *sādhya* means only the latter, because in the expression *tat-dharma-bhāvī*, the word *dharma* or characteristic is mentioned over again.] *Tat-dharma-bhāva* means the presence of the characteristic of the subject. The instance in which there is a presence of this characteristic is an instance which being similar to the subject possesses its characteristic. And this is known as the exemplification. It is observed that the objects like the cooking pot etc., which have the characteristic of being produced, are non-eternal.][1]

Now, whatever is produced is said to have the characteristic of being produced. Again, it [i.e. the object with the characteristic of being produced] does not come into being as already existing [i.e. 'being produced' means 'being previously non-existing']. It discards its intrinsic nature [at the time of its destruction] and is completely destroyed. Thus it [i.e., whatever has the characteristic of being produced] is non-eternal. In this way, the characteristic of being produced is the proban and non-eternality is the probandum. This 'proban-probandum relation' (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*) between two characteristics is found to exist somewhere [i.e. in some object], because of similarity [i.e. the similarity between the instance cited and the subject of inference]. Perceiving this proban-probandum relation in an instance, one infers it also in the case of sound. [Thus :] Sound is also non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced, e.g. the cooking pot etc. It is called exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), because by this is exemplified (*udāhriyate*) the proban-probandum relation.

Elucidation

The third inference-component is exemplification. It is of two kinds, based on similarity (*sādharmya-udāharaṇa*) and based on dis-similarity (*vaidharmya-udāharaṇa*). In this *sūtra* Gautama explains the former. Since, however, a general definition of exemplification is called for, Vātsyāyana adds it in the concluding sentences of his commentary by the etymological analysis of the word *udāharaṇa* itself. Thus, exemplification

1. Though not found in the available texts of the *bhāṣya*, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa adds within brackets this sentence to the *bhāṣya* under the impression that from Uddyotakara's explanation it appears that such a sentence might have originally belonged to the text of the *bhāṣya* and moreover, a sentence like this appears to be quite appropriate for the context.

is an instance by which is exemplified the proban probandum relation between two characteristics.

Vātsyāyana explains as follows the first form of exemplification, namely that based on similarity. In the inference, "Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced", the cooking pot may be taken as the *udāharaṇa*. The characteristic of being produced exists in the cooking pot, and therefore it is non-eternal. It was non-existent before its production and it will be non-existent after its destruction. The same characteristic of being produced exists in sound also. The subject of the inference, viz. sound, and the instance cited, viz. the cooking pot, are thus similar. In the *udāharaṇa*, the two characteristics, viz. being produced and being non-eternal, are found to co-exist. This establishes the proban-probandum relation between these two. From the perception of this proban-probandum relation it is inferred that sound, which possesses the characteristic of being produced, also possesses the characteristic of being non-eternal.

As is evident fro Vātsyāyana's illustration, the propositions stating the *udāharaṇa* should mention not only the proban-probandum relation but also a concrete instance in which the relation can be perceived. In the case of the inference under discussion, the proposition conveying the *udāharaṇa* is : Whatever possesses the characteristic of being produced has the characteristic of being non-eternal, e.g. the cooking pot. However, Gaṅgeśa thinks that the mention of a concrete instance in the proposition conveying the *udāharaṇa*, being casual, is not universally necessary. According to him, therefore, the *udāharaṇa-vākya* may simply be : Whatever possesses the characteristic of being produced has the characteristic of being non-eternal.

Sūtra 37

[Exemplification is also a proposition stating an instance which] 'being opposite in character to that' (*tat-viparyayāt*) [i.e. being dis-similar to the subject or *sādhya-dharmī*] is 'opposite in nature' (*viparīta*) [i.e. does not possess the characteristic of the subject.] // i. 1. 37 //

Bhāṣya

The expression that 'exemplification is an instance' [of the previous *sūtra*] is to be read along with the expressions of the present *sūtra*. Exemplification is also a proposition stating an instance which 'being dis-similar to the subject' (*sādhya-vaidharmyāt*) 'does not possess the characteristic' (*a-tat-dharma-bhāvī*) of the subject. Sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced;

whatever is not-produced is eternal, e g. the self etc. Now, the instance like that of the self, is dis-similar to the subject, because it has the characteristic of being not-produced; and hence it does not possess the characteristic of the subject. In other words, the characteristic of being non-eternal, which exists in the subject, is not present in it [i.e. in the instance]. Finding in the instance like that of the self, that being not-produced it cannot be eternal, one infers the contrary in sound. Having the characteristic of being produced, sound is non-eternal.

For a proban based on similarity, the exemplification is a proposition stating an instance which, being similar to the subject, possesses its characteristic. For a proban based on dis-similarity, the exemplification is a proposition stating an instance which, being dis-similar to the subject, does not possess the characteristic of the subject. One, finding the two characteristics as having proban-probandum relation in the instance mentioned first, also infers their proban-probandum relation in the subject. One, finding that of the two characteristics the absence of one is accompanied by the absence of the other in the instance mentioned second, infers in the subject the existence of one from the existence of the other. Now the pseudo-probans are not probans at all, because this [proban-probandum relation indicated by the instance cited] does not exist in the case of the pseudo-proban.

This potentiality of the proban and the exemplification, being extremely subtle and understood only with great difficulty, can be realised only by the accomplished.

Elucidation

The proban-probandum relation in the case of an 'exemplification based on dis-similarity' is the relation of the absence of one characteristic with that of another. Thus, e.g., in the instance of the self we find the absence of being not-produced as related to the absence of being non-eternal. Such an invariable relation between two cases of absence is known as *vyatireka-vyāpti*, for *vyatireka* means absence or *abhāva*. However, the form of the *vyatireka-vyāpti* incorporated in the illustration of exemplification based on dis-similarity as given by Vātsyāyana is characterised as illogical by Vācaspati Miśra. The proper form of the *vyatireka-vyāpti* is : Wherever there is the 'absence of the probandum' (*sādhya-abhāva*), there is the 'absence of the proban' (*hetu-abhāva*). But Vātsyāyana reverses the order and gives the form as : Wherever there is the absence of the proban, there is the absence of the probandum. Thus, the form of the *vyatireka-vyāpti* incorporated in the example given by Vātsyāyana is : Wherever there is the 'absence of being produced' there is the 'absence of being non-eternal'. But its proper form should have been : Wherever there is the 'absence

of being non-eternal', there is the 'absence of being produced'. Though in certain cases, the form of *vyatireka-vyāpti* given by Vātsyāyana may not create serious logical difficulty, in certain other cases it is clearly untenable. Thus, e.g., in the case of the inference of fire from smoke, the *vyatireka-vyāpti* cannot have the form : Wherever there is the absence of smoke, there is the absence of fire. Because in the case of the red-hot iron-ball, there is no smoke though there is fire. The correct form here, therefore, is : Wherever there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke. Accordingly, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also interprets the *sūtra* in a different way. The expression *tat-viparyayāt* means 'from the absence of the probandum' and the expression *viparītam* means 'the absence of the proban.' In other words, Jayanta interprets the *sūtra* as meaning : the case for the exemplification based on dis-similarity would be a case where the absence of the proban is inferred from the absence of the probandum.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that there are, as a matter of fact, two types of *vyāpti*, called *sama-vyāpti* and *viṣama-vyāpti*. The universal relation between the proban and the probandum, in other words, is of two kinds, viz convertible and non-convertible. In the former case, the relative position of the proban and the probandum can be interchanged, whereas in the latter this cannot be done. The example mentioned by Vātsyāyana is a case of *sama-vyāpti*, where the position of the proban and the probandum can be interchanged. Only in case of *viṣama-vyāpti*, the form given by Vācaspati Miśra and others needs to be strictly maintained.

While explaining exemplification based on similarity, Vātsyāyana says, "One finding two characteristics as having proban-probandum relation in the instance...also infers their proban-probandum relation in the subject". Thus, Vātsyāyana's view amounts to this : While perceiving smoke and fire in the kitchen, one perceives the coexistence of that particular smoke with that particular fire. Afterwards, on perceiving smoke in the hill one perceives that this particular smoke is similar to the smoke perceived in the kitchen. From this one infers that this smoke also coexists with a particular fire, viz. the fire in the hill. Thus, in Vātsyāyana's view, the coexistence between smoke and fire perceived in the instance cited is but the coexistence of a particular smoke and a particular fire. Such a relatien is generally called *viśeṣa-vyāpti* or an invariable relation between two particulars. From this is inferred the relation between smoke and fire in the hill.

But Vācaspati Miśra does not subscribe to such a view. Gaṅgeśa also argues that while perceiving smoke and fire in the kitchen, one perceives the coexistence of smoke in general with fire in general, because, while perceiving smoke and fire in the kitchen, one also perceives all cases of smoke and fire through an extraordinary sense-object contact called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* : a perception of smoke is also a perception of smokeness inhering in the smoke and this smokeness establishes an extra-ordinary contact with all cases of smoke with the sense concerned. Similar is the case of the perception of fire. This perception of the coexistence of all smoke with all fire leaves behind a reminiscent impression, which is revived when one perceives later

the smoke in the hill. One thus recalls that all cases of smoke are cases of fire and hence infers that this case of smoke in the hill is also a case of fire.

The problem of inference will be discussed further under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 37ff.

Sūtra 38

Application (*upanaya*) is the proposition which characterises the subject as 'this is similar' (*tathā*) [to the instance cited] or as 'this is not similar' (*na tathā*) [to the instance cited] 'according to the nature of the instance cited' (*udāharaṇāpekṣa*). // i. 1. 38 //

Bhāṣya

The expression *udāharaṇāpekṣa* means 'being determined by the instance cited' or 'being dependant on the nature of the instance cited' (*udāharaṇa-vaśa*). The expression 'being dependant on' (*vaśaḥ*) means potency. In the instance having similarity with the subject, it is found that the objects like the cooking pot, which have the characteristic of being produced, are non-eternal. [This leads to] the assertion of the characteristic of being produced regarding the subject [of the inference, viz.] sound : like the cooking pot sound has the characteristic of being produced. Again, in the instance having dis-similarity with the subject, it is found that the objects like the self, which have the characteristic of being not-produced, are eternal. [This leads to] the assertion of the characterisation of sound as being something produced, through the assertion which negates the characteristic of being not-produced in respect of sound : unlike the self, sound does not have the charactcristic of being not-produced. These two forms of assertion result from the two forms of instance cited. This is called assertion (*upasaṃhāra*) because by this is asserted [the subject as characterised by the proban having an invariable relation with the probandum].

Elucidation

In the present *sūtra*, Gautama gives the general definition of application (*upanaya*) as 'the proposition which characterises the subject according to the nature of the instance cited'. Its two specific forms are mentioned by him by the expressions : 1) *tathā* or 'this is similar to the instance cited' and 2) *na tathā* or 'this is not simllar to the igstance cited.'

Vātsyāyana illustrates the first form of application thus : One ascertains that sound has the characteristic of being produced, which is perceived in the instance of the cooking pot as invariably related to the characteristic of being non-eternal. This assertion, based on the instance of similarity, of the subject as possessing the proban which is invariably related to the probandum is the first form of application.

The second form of application is illustrated thus : One ascertains that sound does not possess the characteristic of being not-produced, which characteristic is perceived in the instance of the self as invariably related to the characteristic of being eternal. This assertion, based on the instance of dis-similarity of the subject as possessing the proban [i.e. the absence of the characteristic of being not-produced=the presence of the characteristic of being produced] which is invariably related to the probandum [i.e. the absence of the characteristic of being eternal=the characteristic of being non-eternal] is the second form of application.

Application in both these forms contains the *vyāpti* or the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum. In the first form of application the *vyāpti* is *anvayī*, i.e. based on the agreement in presence. In the second form of application the *vyāpti* is *vyatirekī*, i e. based on the agreement in absence.

Gaṅgeśa defines application as a proposition which leads to the form of perception technically called 'the third perception of the proban' (*tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*) [See under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 5].

Bhāṣya

In spite of the proban being of two forms, the exemplification being of two forms and, consequently, the application being of two forms, that which remains the same is—

Sūtra 39

The conclusion (*nigamana*) which is the restatement (*punaḥ-vacana*) of the 'preliminary statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*) 'along with the statement of the proban' (*hetu-apadeśāt*). // i. 1. 39 //

Bhāṣya

After the statement of the proban based on similarity or dis-similarity in accordance with the nature of the instance cited, it is finally concluded : Therefore,

sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced. It is called *nigamana*, because by it the four propositions, viz. *pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa* and *upanaya* are made to 'converge into' (*nigamyante*) a single coherent meaning. By 'convergence into' is meant 'becoming efficacious' (*samarthyante*), i.e. 'being interrelated' (*sambadhyante*).

When the proban is based on similarity, the inference (*vākya*, i.e. *nyāya-vākya*) is the group of the five propositions, viz.

1) The preliminary statement of the thesis is : Sound is non-eternal.

2) The proban is : Because of having the characteristic of being produced.

3) The exemplification is : Objects like the cooking pot having the characteristic of being produced are non-eternal.

4) The application is : Similarly, sound also has the characteristic of being produced.

5) The conclusion is : Therefore, sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced.

When, again, the proban is based on dis-similarity :

1) Sound is non-eternal.

2) Because of having the characteristic of being produced.[1]

3) Objects like the self, not having the characteristic of being produced, are found to be eternal.

4) But sound does not have the characteristic of being not-produced.

5) Therefore, sound is non-eternal, because it has the characteristic of being produced.

Elucidation

Vācaspati Miśra points out that the conclusion is not a mere repetition of the preliminary statement of the thesis. At the stage of the preliminary statement of the thesis, it is merely a tentative assertion and remains yet to be proved. At the stage of the conclusion, however, it is re-stated as already proved.

Bhāṣya

The instruments of valid knowledge [underlying the inference-components], which converge in such an inference consisting of the group of these components,

1. Though this proban seems to be identical with the proban based on similarity, in Vātsyāyana's view the real difference between the two probans is due to the difference between the two instances cited for them.

establish the thesis, being related with one another. This convergence is [as follows].

The preliminary statement of the thesis is based on verbal testimony. Because the 'communication of a trustworthy person' (*āpta-upadeśa*) is 'established more firmly' (*pratisandhāna*) and because the trustworthiness of persons other than the seers [regarding super-empirical subjects or *alaukika-viṣaya*[1]] is not accepted. The proban is inference, because by perceiving [the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum] in the instance cited true knowledge [of the proban] is arrived at. This is explained in the commentary on exemplification [i.e. on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 36-7]. Exemplification is based on perception, because what is not perceived is proved by the perceived. Application is comparison (*upamāna*), because the assertion is in the form: 'This is similar' (*tathā iti*). Further, because even in the case of the assertion having the form 'this is not similar' (*na tathā iti*), the presence of an opposite characteristic [in the subject] is verbally ascertained by negating the characteristic of the similar. The demonstration of the capability of all these [instruments of valid knowledge] to combine for the sake of establishing the central thesis is conclusion. Their [i.e. of the inference-components] interdependence is as follows. Without the preliminary statement of the thesis, the proban etc. become irrelevant and as such would have been useless. Without the proban 1) what is there to be taken as the ground [for establishing the thesis], 2) what is to be ascertained in the instance cited as well as the subject and 3) what is to be taken as that by stating which the preliminary statement of the thesis can be re-stated in the form of the conclusion ? Without the exemplification, 1) the similarity or dis-similarity with which could be taken as the ground for establishing the probandum and 2) the similarity with which could make application possible ? Without the application, the characteristic mentioned as the ground being not definitely ascertained as existing in the subject, cannot establish the probandum. Without the conclusion, what can lead to the knowledge of the convergence for the sake of a single thesis of *pratijñā* etc., for otherwise their inter-relation would have remained unknown.

Elucidation

After explaining the five inference-components, Vātsyāyana proceeds to show how these conclusively establish a thesis with the help of the four instruements of valid knowledge underlying them. This is already mentioned by him in the commentary on the first *sūtra*.

Vātsyāyana says that *pratijñā* is based on verbal testimony. In a debate the two

1. This is added by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa in his translation of the commentary presumably for reconciling the present statement of Vātsyāyana with those contained in his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.7.

contesting parties state their own theses, which are already established through verbal testimony in the form of their respective authoritative works. Their purpose is to establish beyond all doubt their respective theses with the help of inference, and, when possible, finally with the help of perception.

Vātsyāyana says that proban is inference as an instrument of valid knowledge. In case of an inference, the 'proban is perceived for the first time' (*prathama-liṅga-darśana*) in an instance as invariably related with the probandum. The 'proban is perceived for the second time' (*dvitīya-liṅga-darśana*) as existing in the subject. This second perception of the proban leads to the recollection of its 'invariable relation with the probandum' (*vyāpti*) previously perceived in the instance, and hence the second perception of the proban becomes indirectly an instrument of valid inferential knowledge. The second inference-component, viz. the proban, is based on an inference in this sense of the second perception of the proban.

The exemplification, says Vātsyāyana, is based on perception. The significance of this is that without an ultimate or basic perceptual knowledge there can be no inference, for the knowledge of the invariable relation of the proban and the probandum, which is crucial for inference, must be perceptual in nature and this invariable relation is perceived in the instance cited.

The application, says Vātsyāyana, is based on comparison. In the case of comparison there must be a statement of an authoritative person pointing to the similarity between two objects, e.g., the *gavaya* is like the cow. The application resembles such a statement, because it also points to the similarity between two objects, e.g. between sound and the cooking pot [in so far as both are produced].

[Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that in the present context *upamāna* or comparison as an instrument of valid knowledge is not taken in its usually accepted sense in the Nyāya philosophy, viz. that which leads to the valid knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by it. Vātsyāyana's justification for taking *upamāna* in a special sense in the present context seems to be that according to him *upamāna* may also have other objects though its primary object is the 'knowledge of the relation bewteen a word and the object denoted by it' (*saṃjñā-saṃjñi-sambandha*).]

The special significance of *nigamana* or conclusion is that though the inference-components are separately mentioned, yet they form a coherent whole and converge to prove a central thesis.

Vātsyāyana lastly shows the special relevance of each of the inference-components in an inferential process.

Bhāṣya

Next [is mentioned] the special purpose of [employing] each of the inference-components. The purpose of *pratijñā* is to state the subject as having the

characteristic sought to be proved of it. The purpose of *hetu* is to state how an object, by virtue of its similarity or dis-similarity with the instance cited, proves the characteristic sought to be proved. The purpose of *udāharaṇa* is to state the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics in the same locus. The purpose of *upanaya* is to indicate the coexistence [in the subject] of the two characteristics, which are the proban and the probandum. The purpose of *nigamana* is to exclude the contrary possibility of the absence of the probandum [i.e., the characteristic sought to be proved] in the subject, after the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics perceived in an instance is ascertained.

When *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* are thus correctly stated, the possibility of a multiplicity of *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, resulting from a diversity of defects indicated on the basis of similarity and dis-similarity, is excluded. Because one resorting to *jāti* points to defects ignoring the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics perceived in an instance. When the proban-probandum relation between two characteristics is properly established and when it is perceived in the instance cited, the characteristic actually proving the probandum rather than mere similarity or dis-similarity will be taken as the proban,

Elucidation

When the *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* are accurate, it is not possible for the opponent to point to defects in an argument by posing *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* against it. *Jāti* cannot be posed against an argument with an accurate *hetu* ; it can be posed against an argument only when superficial similarity or dis-similarity is taken as the proban.

Different views regarding the number of inference-components : The Mīmāṃsakas claim that there are only three components of an inference. These are either *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* or *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. In the first of these two alternatives, the purpose of *upanaya* is served by *hetu* and the purpose of *nigamana* by *pratijñā*. In the second alternative, the purpose of *hetu* is served by *upanaya* and that of *pratijñā* by *nigamana*.

As against this view, Gaṅgeśa argues that without *upanaya* there can be no 'third perception of the proban' (*tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*), the immediate cause of inferential knowledge. It may be objected that the third perception of the proban is redundant. Nevertheless, it must be admitted by all that the definite knowledge of the subject *as possessing the characteristic or proban invariably related to the probandum* is essential for an inference. *Upanaya* has special relevance by way of giving such a knowledge, which cannot be obtained from *hetu*, because *hetu* is the bare statement of the ground of the inference. Therefore, *upanaya* is as necessary as *hetu*. [Secondly, neither *pratijñā* nor *nigamana* can be considered redundant, for *pratijñā* represents the thesis as yet to be proved while *nigamana* represents it as already proved.]

After the statement of the proban (*hetu*) it is necessary to state the instance

(*udāharaṇa*), which shows the proban-probandum relation between the two characteristics, viz. the one sought to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*) and the other cited as the ground (*hetu*). According to the Jainas, however, the *udāharaṇa* is redundant. *Vyāpti* or the universal relation between the proban and the probandum may be of two kinds, called *antar-vyāpti* and *vahir-vyāpti*. The universal relation *as existing in the subject of an inference* between two characteristics is *antar-vyāpti*, while the same universal relation *as existing elsewhere* is *vahir-vyāpti*. Thus, in the case of inferring fire from smoke in the hill, the universal relation between smoke and fire as existing in the hill is *antar-vyāpti*, while the same universal relation existing elsewhere—e.g. in the kitchen—is *vahir-vyāpti*. The Jainas argue that if inference is at all possible, it can be so only on the strength of *antar-vyāpti* and thus *vahir-vyāpti* is unnecessary. Hence, *udāharaṇa*—which is but a statement of *vahir-vyāpti*—is-redundant. Moreover, the purpoes of *upanaya* and *nigamana* is already served by *pratijñā* and *hetu*. As such, *pratijñā* and *hetu* are the only two necessary components of an inference.

Some of the Buddhists, again, though defining *pratijñā*, do not consider it to be a necessary inference-component on the ground that it has no relevance for establishing the ultimate thesis. They further claim that *upanaya* serves the purpose of *hetu* and *nigamana* is just superfluous. According to them, therefore, there are only two inference-components, namely *upanaya* and *udāharaṇa*.

But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that the alleged *antar-vyāpti* is nothing but an application of *vyāpti* in general (or *sāmānya-vyāpti*) to a particular case and *udāharaṇa* points to this *vyāpti* in general. Thus, the relation between all smoke and all fire is *sāmānya-vyāpti*, while the alleged *antar-vyāpti* is nothing but an application of it, viz. the relation between the smoke as existing in the hill and the fire as existing in the hill. Thus, as a statement of the *sāmānya-vyāpti*, *udāharaṇa* cannot be redundant.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes by showing that *nigamana* is necessary over and above *pratijñā* because of two major considerations. First, it shows that the first four inference-components converge in establishing a central thesis. Secondly, it establishes the central thesis conclusively by way of negating the possibility of any contrary alternative.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON NYĀYA

(*nyāya-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Next shonld be stated the definition of *tarka*. Hence is said the following.

Sūtra 40

'Hypothetical argmuent' (*tarka*) is a form of deliberation (*ūha*) for determining the specific nature of 'an object whose real nature is yet to be known' (*a-vijñāta-tattve arthe*) by pointing out the real grounds [for it]. // i. 1. 40 //

Elucidation

The word *tarka* is used in various senses. According to some—e.g. the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists—it is a form of inference. However, as one of the sixteen categories enumerated by Gautama, it carries a technical sense. It means a form of deliberation (*ūha*) which acts as an accessary to a *pramāṇa*, without itself being a *pramāṇa*. The purpose of such a deliberation is the attainment of 'the right knowledge of an object' (*tattva-jñāna*). How can it lead to such a knowledge ? Because it points to the real grounds or proofs in favour of the knowledge. But what is the nature of the object for which such a deliberation is appropriate ? It has relevance for an object which is known in general but whose specific nature is not yet known. The question of such a deliberation does not arise in case of an object which is completely unknown or the specific nature of which is already determined.

Bhāṣya

Regarding an object the specific nature of which is not yet known, there arises an enquiry in the form : "I should like to know it [i.e. its specific nature]." In respect of the object thus enquired, one separately considers [the possibility of] two contradictory characteristics [as belonging to it] : "Is this its specific nature ?" *or* "Is its specific nature not this ?" The enquirer ultimately ascertains one of the two characteristics thus doubted by way of providing proof [in its favour], i.e. because there is ground or proof or justification in favour of this alternative. As there is definite proof in favour of this alternative, the object must be of such nature and not otherwise. Here is an example.

The enquiry takes the form : "I should like to know the exact nature of the knower that cognises the various objects known". The doubt takes the form : "Is this [knower] of the nature of something produced or of something not produced ?" One then asserts the specific characteristic in favour of which one finds definite ground in respect of the object [the specific nature of which is] doubted and the specific nature of which is unknown. [The assertion takes the following form :] Only when the knower is of the nature of something not produced [i.e. is eternal], it can enjoy the fruits of its own actions [i.e. can enjoy the pleasure or pain resulting from the actions of its previous births]. [Further], of suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge—each of the succeeding one causes the preceding one and on the removal of each succeeding one is removed the immediately preceding one, thus ultimately resulting in liberation. In this way, there can be worldly existence and liberation [only on the assumption that the knower is of the the nature of something not produced]. On the assumption that the knower is of the nature of something produced, there can be [no explanation of] worldly existence and liberation. [If the knower is viewed as something produced, it will have to be considered as] being conjoined with body, senses, mind and awareness [only] at the moment it is produced and hence this [connection with body etc.] will not be the result of its own previous action. When something is produced, it is produced not as something previously existing and hence there can be no enjoyment of the fruits of the knower's own actions which are non-existing or completely destroyed. On the same ground, the same knower cannot have connections with various bodies [in its different births] nor can it have absolute cessation of connection with body [during liberation]. The alternative, for which no adequate ground is ascertained, is not asserted. Deliberation of this nature is known as *tarka*.

Why is it (*tarka*) considered an accessary to [the attainment of] right knowledge and not right knowledge as such ? Because it does not [by itself] establish [one of the alternatives] definitely. It simply asserts one of the characteristics by pointing to the real grounds but does not [by itself] ascertain or establish or demonstrate in the form : "The object *must be* of such nature."

How, then, can it be an accessary to true knowledge ? It can be an accessary to true knowledge because such a deliberation, by asserting the grounds in favour of true knowledge [i.e. in favour of the correct alternative], strengthens the efficacy of the instrument of valid knowledge [and from this enhanced efficacy] results right knowledge.

Tarka, which thus is an accessary to the instruments of valid knowledge, is mentioned in the *sūtra* defining *vāda* (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 42) conjointly with *pramāṇa*, because it lends support to *pramāṇa*.

In the expression 'an object whose real nature is yet to be known' (*avijñāta-tattve arthe*), 'real nature' (*tattva*) means the identity of the object as it is rather than its contrary, i.e. its absolute sameness.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana begins with a reference to the situation that calls for *tarka*. First, there arises an enquiry into the exact nature of an object. This is followed by a doubt provoked by the possibility of contradictory alternatives as to its real nature. *Tarka* dispels this doubt by way of pointing to the ground in favour of one of these alternatives.

Vācaspati, however, points out that generally speaking an enquiry into the exact nature of an object takes place after there is a doubt as to its exact nature, though there are cases of doubt following the enquiry, in which cases alone *tarka* has its efficacy. Accordingly, Vātsyāyana says that enquiry is followed by doubt, which is settled by *tarka*.

Vātsyāyana next explains and illustrates how *tarka* dispels the doubt and helps the attainment of right knowledge. Though *tarka* by itself does not produce certain knowledge, it enhances the efficacy of the instruments of valid knowledge and by way of dispelling the possibility of doubt helps the instrument of valid knowledge to have unfettered efficacy in ascertaining the true nature of an object.

However, Udayana—and following him Varadarāja—define *tarka* as *aniṣṭa-prasaṅga*, literally [a form of argument which imposes on the opponent] an admission of 'the illogical' (*aniṣṭa*). The illogical or *aniṣṭa* may be either the rejection of what is well-proved or the acceptance of the unproved. Thus, e.g., if one asserts that water cannot quench thirst, it will be objected that no thirsty person should drink water. But this will be an admission of the illogical, because the quenching of thirst by water is well-proved. Again, if one asserts that water causes internal burning, it will be objected that by drinking water I should also suffer from internal burning. But this will be an admission of the illogical, because the possibility of water producing internal burning is unproved.

The followers of Navya-nyāya explain *tarka* in strict inferential terminology. *Tarka*, according to them, is the wrong attribution of the pervader (*vyāpaka*) resulting from the wrong attribution of the pervaded (*vyāpya*) in an object where the absence of the pervader is already established. Thus, e.g., in the fire-smoke relation, fire is pervader and smoke is pervaded and it is well-established that fire does not exist in water. If, however, somebody wrongly attributes smoke to water, the following *tarka* could be posed against him : If the water contains smoke, it should as well contain fire. The function of such a *tarka* is two-fold. First, it helps to 'ascertain the right nature of an object' (*viṣaya-pariśodhaka*),—e g. the absence of smoke in water. Secondly, it helps to 'ascertain the invariable relation between two terms' (*vyāpti-grāhaka*) by negating the possibility of any doubt about it, e.g. the possible doubt about the universal relation existing between smoke and fire is dispelled by the *tarka* that if there is no such universal relation between the two, then there should be between them no causal connection either.

Udayana classifies *tarka* under five heads, viz. 1) *ātmāśraya* or self-dependence, 2) *anyonyāśraya* or reciporcal dependence, 3) *cakrakāśraya* or vicious circle, 4) *anavasthā*

or infinite regress and 5) *aniṣṭa-prasaṅga* or the acceptance of the illogical. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that the essential nature of *tarka* is the acceptance of the illogical, though Udayana mentions all these forms for the sake of a detailed and comprehensive understanding of it.

As Udayana, Varadarāja, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (Mīmāṃsaka author of *Mānameyodaya*) and others show, *tarka* is an accessary not only to inference but also to the other instruments of valid knowledge and thus it helps the attainment of right knowledge.

Bhāṣya

In the context of such *tarka*,

Sūtra 41

'Final ascertainment' (*nirṇaya*) is the determination (*avadhāraṇa*) of [the right nature of] an object (*artha*) 'after having an initial doubt' (*vimṛśya*) [about it] through [the establishment] of the thesis (*pakṣa*) and [the refutation of] the anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*). // i. 1. 41. //

Bhāṣya

Sādhana means 'establishing [one's own thesis]' (*sthāpanā*) and *upālambha* means 'refuting [the opponent's thesis]' (*pratiṣedha*). These—*sādhana* and *upālambha*—are referred to by [the words] thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) [in the *sūtra*], because these two depend on and are related to the thesis and anti-thesis and are employed for ultimately establishing one of the alternatives [i.e. the thesis]. One of these two must ultimately be rejected and the other established. Thus, final ascertainment is the determination of the contention of that which is established.

[Objection :] This determination of the right nature of an object is not possible through thesis and anti-thesis. [Of the two contestants in a debate] the first establishes his intended thesis by showing the grounds for it and refutes the objections raised by the other against it. The other [contestant] refutes the grounds offered [by the first] for establishing the position of the first and recovers the objections [raised against the position of the first] by refuting the replies [offered by the first against these objections]. This process [of argumentation eventually

leads to a stage where the grounds and objections raised by one of the contestants] come to an end. After [the grounds and objections of] one come to an end, those [grounds and objections] which remain [unrefuted] lead to the determination of the right nature of an object, which is the final ascertainment. [Thus the main point of the objection is that final ascertainment is not due to both thesis and anti-thesis ; it is due only to the grounds etc. offered by one of the contestants, i.e. by one who becomes finally victorious].

[Answer : This is not so. As Gautama] says, the determination of the right nature of an object is due to both. On what ground ? The legitimacy of one [i e. of the grounds offered by the contestant who becomes finally victorious] and the illegitimacy of the other [i.e. of the objections raised against these by the other contestant]—these legitimacy and illegitimacy conjointly dispel the doubt. But the doubt is not dispelled in the case of the legitimacy of both or of the illegitimacy of both.

The word *vimṛśya* [in the *sūtra*] means 'after having an initial doubt'. This doubt is mentioned here becaause, by clearly posing the thesis and anti-thesis, it [i.e. doubt] necessitates the application of *nyāya*. But by this [doubt] is to be understood the knowledge of two contradictory characteristics about the same object. Where, however, two opposite characteristics can be logically attributed to the 'subject taken in its general aspect' (*dharmi-sāmānya*), it will be a case of juxtaposition (*samuccaya*), because the subject is logically found to be of such nature.

Thus, e.g., in the definition [of a substance given by Kaṇāda in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* i. 1. 15], namely substance is the substratum of action,—that substance which can be proved as having relation to action is the substratum of action [e g., the body which moves], while that which cannot be proved to be so is not the substratum of action [e g. the self which does not move]. [Here, the form of juxtaposition is the knowledge : "Substance in general both is and is not a substratum of action"].

[The knowledge of] two opposite characteristics in the same subject not simultaneously subsisting is 'temporal contrariety' (*kāla-vikalpa*). The same substance is the substratum of action so long as there is actual movement in it, while so long as movement is not produced in it or the movement [previously produced in it] has ceased to be, it is not the substratum of movement.

There is no general rule that in all cases of final ascertainment there will be the determination of the right nature of an object through thesis and anti-thesis after having an initial doubt. [That is, doubt is not an essential pre-condition for final ascertainment] Thus, in perception resulting from sense-object contact final ascertainment is [merely, i.e. without any initial doubt] the determination of the right nature of an object. Only in the case of a debate (*parīkṣā*), final ascertainment is the determination of the right nature of an object through thesis and anti-thesis

after having an initial doubt. Final ascertainment through *vāda* [see the next *sūtra*] and 'textual study' (*śāstra*) is without any initial doubt.

HERE ENDS THE FIRST ĀHNIKA (lit. discourse of a day) OF THE FIRST CHAPTER OF VĀTSYĀYANA'S COMMENTARY ON THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA

Elucidation

After discussing 'hypothetical argument' (*tarka*), Gautama passes on to explain the nature of 'final ascertainment' (*nirṇaya*) and with this he concludes the first *āhnika* of the first chapter of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. This is done because final ascertainment is the culmination of *nyāya* and is usually preceded by *tarka*. *Tarka* generally presupposes doubt. But how can one, while listening to a debate, overcome this doubt and have the final ascertainment ? Gautama answers that this is done through thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*prati-pakṣa*). But *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* literally mean two contradictory characteristics alleged by the two contestants in a debate as belonging to the same object. Thus, e.g., in a debate one contestant claims that sound is eternal, while the other claims that sound is non-eternal. Here eternality and non-eternality as characterising sound are the *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa*. Obviously, however, the right nature of the object cannot be determined by two such contradictory characteristics. Hence *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* cannot be taken here in their literal or primary senses. Vātsyāyana, therefore, explains the secondary senses in which these two are to be taken in the present context. These secondary senses are *sādhana* and *upālambha* respectively. By *sādhana* is meant the arguments which establish one's own thesis and *upālambha* means the refutation of the arguments advanced in support of the opponent's thesis. But, then, the question is : Why does Gautama use the words *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* when he actually means *sādhana* and *upālambha* ? In answer it is said that final ascertainment results only after both the contestants have offered their *sādhana* and *upālambha* for their respective positions, namely, the *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa*. The mere use of the words *sādhana* and *upālambha* could not have conveyed this implication. Of course, the debate can culminate in final ascertainment only when the *sādhana* and *upālambha* offered by one of the contestants are finally rejected in favour of those offered by the other. Therefore, by *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* are meant in the *sūtra* the *sādhana* and *upālambha* offered by the two contestants in a debate, of which the *sādhana* and *upālambha* of one are ultimately established.

It may be objected that final ascertainment is due not to the *sādhana* and *upālambha* of both the contestants but to those of only one, i.e. of the contestant who becomes finally victorious. Hence the statement that final ascertainment is due to both *pakṣa* and *prati-pakṣa* cannot be accepted. Vātsyāyana answers that final ascertainment is achieved

through the *sādhana* and *upālambha* of both the contestants. How is it so ? One of the two contestants will have to defend his own *sādhana* and demolish the *upālambha* of the other. Final ascertainment is reached only after this and as such it cannot be due to the mere *sādhana* and *upālambha* of one of the contestants.

Gautama uses the word *vimṛśya* to indicate an initial doubt, which is usually a pre-condition for the eventual attainment of final ascertainmet. Though both the contestants are convinced of the validity of their respective positions, yet one listening to the contradictory claims of the two contestants has a doubt as to the right nature of an object. In other words, such a doubt is but the presentation of the two contradictory alternatives about the same object and final ascertainment results only when one of these two alternatives is rejected in favour of the other. This doubt, as Vātsyāyana shows, is to be differentiated from juxtaposition (*samuccaya* : the knowledge of two opposite characteristics which can be logically attributed to a subject taken in its general aspect) and 'temporal contrariety' (*kāla-vikalpa* : the knowledge of two opposite characteristics not simultaneously subsisting in the same subject).

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF NYĀYA

(*nyāya-uttarāṅga-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

THE FIRST AHNIKA OF THE FIRST CHAPTER ENDS

Adhyāya i *Āhnika 2*

Bhāṣya

Debate (*kathā*) is of three forms : 'discussion for the final ascertainment' (*vāda*), 'debating maneuver' (*jalpa*) and 'destructive criticism' (*vitaṇḍā*). Of these—

Sūtra 1

Vāda is [the form of debate in which the two contestants] 'uphold the thesis and anti-thesis' (*pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraha*) by substantiation (*sādhana*) and refutation (*upālambha*) with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*, 'without being contradicted by proved doctrine' (*siddhānta-aviruddha*) and 'employing the five inference-components' (*pañca-avayava-upapanna*). // i.2.1//

Elucidation

The first three *sūtra*-s of the second *āhnika* discuss debate (*kathā*) in three forms. These constitute the 'section on debate' (*kathā-prakaraṇa*). Though there are various meanings of the word *kathā*, it is used by Vātsyāyana in the technical sense of debate, which is done also by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 19 and v. 2. 23. Gautama defines the three forms of debate, but does not offer any general definition of it. Later Naiyāyikas, therefore, found it necessary to find a general definition of debate. According to Vācaspati Miśra and Varadarāja, debate consists in the statements and counter-statements on the part of more than one contestants relating to a central theme. Viśvanātha adds that these statements and counter-statements should moreover be in accordance with the principles of logic and should have for their end either the attainment of right knowledge or victory over the opponent.

Of these three forms of debate, though *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* may in rare cases lead to the 'attainment of right knowledge' (*tattva-nirṇaya*), their primary purpose is 'victory over the opponent' (*vijaya*). By contrast, *vāda* has for its primary purpose the attainment of right knowledge. *Vāda par excellance* is the discussion between the perceptor and disciple leading to right knowledge.

Bhāṣya

Two contradictory characteristics attributed to the same subject [by the two contestants], because of their mutual exclusion, constitute the thesis (*pakṣa*) and anti-thesis (*prati-pakṣa*), e.g , [one claims that] the self exists, [while the other contends that] the self does not exist. [Thus, the thesis is the attribution of existence to self, while the anti-thesis is the attribution of non-existence to self.]

Two contradictory characteristics attributed to different subjects do not constitute thesis and anti-thesis, e.g. "The self is eternal" and "Knowledge is non-eternal".

Upholding (*parigraha*) means regulation (*vyavasthā*) regarding adherence [to a thesis].

Vāda is the upholding of such thesis and anti-thesis. It is qualified [in the *sūtra*] by the adjective *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambha*, which is to be understood as 'substantiation with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*' (*pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana*) as well as 'refutation with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*' (*pramāṇa-tarka-upālambha*). [In other words] in the case of *vāda*, both substantiation and refutation are done with the help of *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*. *Sādhana* means substantiating [one's own thesis] and *upālambha* means refuting [the opponent's thesis]. These, *sādhana* and *upālambha*, are 'related to' (*vyatiṣakta*) both the contestants [i e. both offer their *sādhana* and *upālambha*] and are adhered to (*anubaddha*), i.e. [are offered] so long as [the claim] of one is finally silenced and that of the other finally remains. That which is silenced is refuted and that which remains is established.

The application of 'the point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*), [being mentioned] in the case of *jalpa* [it follows that] it is not to be applied in the case of *vāda*. Though [in the case of *vāda*, the application of *nigrahasthāna* is] forbidden, the expression 'without being contradicted by proved doctrine' (*siddhānta-aviruddha*) is used [in the *sūtra*] to indicate [the legitimacy of] the application of a few forms [of *nigrahasthāna* even in the case of *vāda*]. In the case of *vāda*, the legitimacy of the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) in the form of pseudo-proban (*hetvābhāsa*) is admitted, because [Gautama says,] "[The pseudo-proban called] *viruddha* means [a proban which] is in contradiction with it, i.e. one's own accepted thesis" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 6). [The word *viruddha* in the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* of the *sūtra*, is taken by Vātsyāyana to mean pseudo-proban. Hence he argues that though, generally speaking, the use of *nigrahasthāna* is forbidden in the case of *vāda*, the use of pseudo-probans are not so, in spite of pseudo-probans being *nigrahasthāna*.]

The expression 'employing the five inference-components' (*pañca-avayava-upapanna*) [in the *sūtra*] is used to indicate the legitimacy of [the application of *nigrahasthāna*] in the forms of 'the deficient' (*nyūna*), which consists in the omission of any of the five inference-components (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 12) and 'the redundant'

(*adhika*), which consists in the mention of more than one proban and more than one instance cited (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 13).

Though the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka* are already included in the inference-components, *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are also separately mentioned [in the *sūtra*] to indicate the relation of substantiation (*sādhana*) and refutation (*upālambha*) with both the contestants. Otherwise, if [in a debate] both the contestants are motivated by the arguments for substantiation alone, [even such cases] would be called *vāda*. [That is, it will not be a case of *vāda* so long as both the contestants try merely to substantiate their own theses without also refuting each other.] The use of the words *pramāṇa* and *tarka* further implies that in a *vāda* substantiation and refutation may alternatively be effected with the help of those alone [i e. only *pramāṇa* and *tarka*] without employing the inference-components, because it is found that the *pramāṇa*-s can prove a thesis without being connected with any inference-component. [Lastly] *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are separately mentioned to indicate that since it has been said that *jalpa* is a debate in which substantiation and refutation are made with the help of *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, it is not to be understood that *jalpa* is without those forms of *nigrahasthāna* [which are legitimately employed in a *vāda*]. In other words, it should not be understood that in *jalpa* substantiation and refutation are effected exclusively through *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*, while in *vāda* substantiation and refutation are effected through the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*.

Elucidation

Vāda is differentiated from *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* by the expression *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambha*, i.e. in which substantiation and refutation are effected with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*. This implies that in the case of *vāda*, one should not use *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* for substantiation and refutation, while *chala*, etc. are freely used in *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*.

But *tarka* is not a *pramāṇa*. How, then, can it be used for substantiation and refutation ? Uddyotakara answers that *tarka* enhances the efficacy of *pramāṇa* and thereby helps substantiation and refutation.

Since Gautama himself says that *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* are to be employed for substantiation and refutation in the case of *jalpa*, it follows that *nigrahasthāna* is not to be used in the case of *vāda*. Nevertheless, he recommends the use of certain specific forms of *nigrahasthāna* even in the case of *vāda*. Thus, the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* of the *sūtra* implies that *nigrahasthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban (*hetvābhāsa*) is to be used in *vāda* while the expression *pañca-avayava-upapanna* of the *sūtra* shows that Gautama recommends *nigrahasthāna* in the form of *nyūna* and *adhika* even in the case of *vāda*. But Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana in interpreting the implications of these

two expressions of the *sūtra*. He admits that the use of *nigrahasthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban is recommended in a *vāda* by Gautama ; but this is done by the expression *pañca-avayava-upapanna* rather than by *siddhānta-aviruddha*. Employing the five inference-components means employing these in their correct form while the use of a pseudo-proban is but an incorrect use of an inference-component, i.e. the use of a pseudo-*avayava*. What, then, according to Uddyotakara, is the implication of the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* ? It is the recommendation in *vāda* of the *nigrahasthāna* in the form of 'vicious conclusion' (*apasiddhānta*), i.e. the acceptance of the conclusion which goes against one's own position (*Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 23).

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, argues that it is not the intention of Vātsyāyana to exclude the recommendation in *vāda* of the *nigrahasthāna* in the form of *apasiddhānta*. Still Vātsyāyana is justified in reading the implication of *siddhānta-aviruddha* as the recommendation of *nigrahasthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban, inasmuch as the employment of the five inference-components is not an essential feature of all cases of *vāda*, whereas the use of *nigrahasthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban is essential for *vāda*. Therefore, it is better to take the expression *siddhānta-aviruddha* as implying the use of *nigrahasthāna* in the form of pseudo-proban so that pseudo-probans are pointed out in all cases of *vāda* irrespective of their use of the five inference-components.

The primary implication of the expression *pramāṇa-tarka-sādhana-upālambha* is to differentiate *vāda* from *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*, where, over and above *pramāṇa* and *tarka*, *chala* etc. are employed for substantiation and refutation. However, this expression has also certain secondary implications, which are : 1) each of the participants is to use *pramāṇa* and *tarka* for substantiating his own position and refuting that of his opponent, 2) there may be cases of *vāda* even without the employment of the five inference-components and 3) *pramāṇa* and *tarka* are employed even in the case of *jalpa*.

Sūtra 2

Jalpa is [a form of debate] 'characterised by all the features as previously said' (*yathokta-upapanna*) [i.e. by all the features mentioned in the previous *sūtra* defining *vāda*] 'where substantiation and refutation are effected through *chala*, *jāti* and [all the forms of] *nigrahasthāna*' (*chala-jāti-nigrahasthāna-sādhana-upālambha*) [over and above]. // i. 2. 2 //

Bhāṣya

By the expression *yathokta-upapanna* is to be understood [the following] :

1) 'where substantiation and refutation are effected through *pramāṇa*-s and *tarka*', 2) 'not being contradicted by proved doctrine', 3) 'employing the five inference-components' and 4) 'upholding of the thesis and anti-thesis'. The expression *chala-jāti-nigrahasthāna-sādhana-upālambha* means that in it [i.e. *jalpa*] substantiation and refutation are effected through *chala*, *jāti* and [all the forms of] *nigrahasthāna* [over and above]. [A debate] characterised by all these features is *jalpa*.

[Objection :] Substantiation of a thesis by *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* is not possible. These are found to be 'merely destructive in nature' (*pratiṣedhārthatā*) [in the *sūtra*-s] giving their general as well as specific definitions. Thus, e g., [as in the case of the definitions] "*Chala* is the rebuttal of the words [or arguments] of the opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 10) ; "*Jāti* is a futile rejoinder based on superficial similarity and dis-similarity" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 18) ; "*Nigrahasthāna* means [the demonstration] of contradictory knowledge or ignorance [of any of the contestants]" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 19). And in the cases of specific definitions as well [is found their same essential destructive character]. Nor can it be argued that these substantiate one's own thesis because of their destructive nature [i.e. because these destroy the arguments of the opponent], for this could have been conveyed simply by saying that *jalpa* [is a form of debate] where refutation (*upālambha*) is effected through *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*. [In other words, in that case the word *sādhana* or substantiation would have been superfluous in the *sūtra*.]

[Answer :] *Chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* act as the auxiliaries in the cases of substantiation and refutation effected with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s, because these defend one's own position [by negating the counter-arguments of the opponent] : by themselves, however, these have no efficacy in substantiating [any thesis]. [In other words, when a thesis is substantiated with the help of *pramāṇa*-s, these *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* have the function of auxiliaries as these defend one's own thesis—when employed, these defend one's own position by demolishing that of the opponent. As is said [by Gautama,] "*Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are [employed] for the purpose of defending the knowledge well-ascertained, just as the fence of thorny branches is for the protection of the sprout." (*Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 50). Further, when there is the refutation of the opponent with the help of the *pramāṇa*-s, these *chala* etc. being employed have the function of auxiliaries, because these demolish the refutation [advanced by the opponent].

In *jalpa*, these *chala* etc. are employed in the capacity of auxiliaries and these have no independent efficacy [in substantiating a thesis]. In case of refutation, however, they have independent efficacy.

Elucidation

Though Vātsyāyana claims that *chala* etc., in spite of being merely destructive in

nature, are ultimately conducive to the substantiation of a thesis, Uddyotakara does not agree to this. *Chala* etc. are but vicious tricks in argumentation and are used for silencing the opponent at any cost. As such, these can never positively establish anything. Being unable to refute an opponent properly, one employs these to silence him being prompted by the desire for victory in the debate. But even if the opponent is thus silenced, *chala* etc. can never establish one's thesis.

In defence of Vātsyāyana, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that from Gautama's own statement (*Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2. 50) it is clear that though *chala* etc. cannot directly substantiate any thesis, these can act as auxiliaries to the *pramāṇa*-s which substantiate a thesis. At the same time, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes by pointing to the essential characteristic of *vāda, jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* : *vāda* is a debate prompted by the desire for the attainment of right knowledge, *jalpa* is a debate prompted by the desire for victory and *vitaṇḍā* is a debate prompted by the desire for victory where the opponent has no care for establishing any thesis of his own.

Sūtra 3

> This [i.e. *jalpa* mentioned in the previous *sūtra*] becomes *vitaṇḍā* when the 'opponent has no care for establishing any thesis of his own' (*pratipakṣa-sthāpanā-hīna*). // i. 2. 3 //

Bhāṣya

This *jalpa* becomes *vitaṇḍā*. But being characterised by what? Being without any care for establishing a counter-thesis by the opponent. One who employs *vitaṇḍā* does not bother to establish either of the two contradictory characteristics called thesis and anti-thesis, which are alleged [by the contestants] to characterise the same object. [Instead of this, one employing *vitaṇḍā*] proceeds simply by refuting the position of the other. [Objection :] But, then, why not define *vitaṇḍā* as that [i.e. *jalpa*] which is 'without any anti-thesis' (*pratipakṣa-hīna*) ? [Answer : This cannot be so defined, because] the propositions put forward for the refutation of the other's position constitute the anti-thesis of the person employing *vitaṇḍā*. But he does not substantiate any thesis after declaring it to be his position. Therefore, the wording of the *sūtra* should be left as it is.

Elucidation

Though the words *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are generally used in a derogatory sense, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa shows that even these two forms of debate were not lawless altercations.

There were definite rules governing even these. These rules related to the two contestants, a jury to whom the contestants explained their arguments and a presiding head who, on the verdict of the jury, declared one of the contestants as being finally victorious.

The Jaina philosopher Hemacandra refuses to admit *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as forms of debate and claims that debate or *kathā* has only one form, namely, *vāda.* Vādidevasūri, however, admits that *vāda* may be motivated by the desire for attaining either victory or right knowledge. The Buddhist philosopher Vasuvandhu also recognises debate only in one form, namely *vāda,* though, according to him, it may be prompted by the desire for the attainment either of right knowledge or of material gain. But the Naiyāyikas clearly differentiate between the three forms of debate according to the desires motivating these.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON DEBATE

(*kathā-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Those which are not real probans because of not possessing the real characteristics of a proban, but which appear as probans because of their similarity with the proban, are—

Sūtra 4

The pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*), namely 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*), 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*), 'the counter-acted' (*prakaraṇasama*), 'the unproved' (*sādhyasama*) and 'the mistimed' (*kālātīta*). // i. 2. 4 //

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana shows that the general definition of *hetvābhāsa* (pseudo-proban) is suggested by its very etymology and as such Gautama does not offer any general definition of it. The pseudo-proban resembles the proban in possessing certain characteristics of the proban but not all the characteristics thereof. What, then, are the real characteristics of a proban ? Already in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 34, Gautama, by defining *hetu* as that which proves the probandum (or the characteristic sought to be proved in the subject), has indicated that the proban is a mark which can 'prove the existence of the characteristic sought to be proved in a subject' (*sādhya-sādhana*). But when does a mark prove the probandum ? By enumerating the five-fold pseudo-proban, Gautama indicates that to be a real proban a mark must possess five characteristics in default of any of which it becomes a pseudo-proban. These five characteristics, as clearly explained by the later Naiyāyikas, are :

1) 'presence in the subject' (*pakṣa-sattva*),
2) 'presence in an indisputable locus of the probandum' (*sapakṣa-sattva*),
3) 'absence in an indisputable locus of the absence of the probandum' (*vipakṣa-asattva*),
4) 'having no counter-argument' (*a-satpratipakṣitatva*), and
5) 'being uncontradicted' (*a-vādhitatva*).

By *pakṣa* is meant something where the presence of the probandum is yet to be proved. Presence in such a subject is *pakṣa-sattva*.

By *sapakṣa* is meant something where the presence of the probandum is already proved. Presence in such an indisputable locus is *sapakṣa-sattva*.

By *vipakṣa* is meant something where the absence of the probandum is already proved. Absence in such an indisputable locus is *vipakṣa-asattva*.

Thus, e.g.. in the inference of fire from smoke in the hill, the hill is the *pakṣa*, the kitchen *sapakṣa* and water *vipakṣa*. The mark, namely smoke, being present in the hill as well as in the kitchen and being absent in water, has the first three characteristics of a valid proban, viz. *pakṣa-sattva*, *sapakṣa-sattva* and *vipakṣa-asattva*. Further, as there is no counter-mark equally powerful and as the absence of fire in the hill is not already proved by any stronger ground, this mark, namely smoke, has also the characteristics of *a-satpratipakṣitatva* and *a-vādhitatva* respectively. Thus, in short, smoke becomes a real mark for the inference of fire in the hill as it possesses all the five required characteristics of a proban.

The lack of any one of these five characteristics makes a mark a pseudo-proban. Thus :

1) The absence of the first characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the unproved' (*sādhyasama*).

2) The absence of the second characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*).

3) The absence of the third characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*).

4) The absence of the fourth characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the counter-acted' (*prakaraṇasama*).

5) The absence of the fifth characteristic results in the pseudo-proban called 'the mistimed (*kālātīta*).

Bhāṣya

Of these—

Sūtra 5

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*) [is a mark] which is 'not [exclusively] concomitant with any one [i.e. not exclusively concomitant with the presence of the probandum]' (*anaikāntika*) // i. 2. 5 //

Bhāṣya

Vyabhicāra means 'not being restricted to one' (*ekatra avyavasthiti*). *Sa-vyabhicāra* means 'being characterised by such *vyabhicāra*'. Example—"Sound is eternal, as it does not possess the quality of touch. The jar, which has the quality of touch, is found to be non-eternal. But sound is not similarly characterised by touch. Therefore, sound, because of not having the quality of touch, is eternal." In the instance [of the jar] cited for this inference, the two characteristics, viz. 'having the quality of touch' and 'being non-eternal' cannot be accepted as having proban-probandum relation, because the atom, in spite of having the quality of touch,[1] is eternal. Even in the instances of the self etc., the mark 'not having the quality of touch'—which is taken as the proban according to the *sūtra* : "The proban is the cause of the establishment of the probandum through the resemblance of the subject or *pakṣa* with the instance cited" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 34),—is irregularly connected with eternality, [because] knowledge, in spite of not having the quality of touch, is non-eternal. Thus, there being irregular connection in both the instances cited, there is no proban-probandum relation [between 'not having the quality of touch' and 'being eternal']. Therefore, [the characteristic 'not having the

1. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, the atoms of earth, water, fire and air possess the quality of touch (*sparśa-guṇa*).

quality of touch'] is a pseudo-proban, because it does not possess the characteristic of a real proban. There is eternality on the one end (*anta*) and there is non-eternality on the other end. *Anaikāntika*, as the opposite of this, is that which is irregularly related to both the ends.

Elucidation

The first form of pseudo-proban, called 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*), is also known as the *anaikāntika* (or *anekānta*). Gautama uses the word *anaikāntika* to define *savyabhicāra* and Vātsyāyana shows that the two words have identical significance. *Vyabhicāra* means irregular connection and a mark is called *savyabhicāra* (i.e. characterised by *vyabhicāra*) when it has irregular connection with both *sapakṣa* (i.e. an indisputable locus of the probandum) and *vipakṣa* (i.e. an indisputable locus of the absence of the probandum). *Sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, being conceived as the two ends (*anta*), *anaikāntika* (literally, not exclusively connected with any *anta*) also means a mark irregularly connected with both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*.

Vātsyāyana illustrates 'the irregular' with the following inference :

"Sound is eternal, because it does not possess the quality of touch."

In this inference, 'absence of the quality of touch' is alleged to be the proban and 'eternality' the probandum. Thus, the proban-probandum relation (*vyāpti*) is here :

Positively : 'The absence of the quality of touch' is invariably relaled to eternality, as in the instance of soul. Here, soul is the instance based on similarity or *sādharmya*.

Negatively : The absence of 'the absence of the quality of touch' (i.e. the presence of touch) is invariably related to the absence of 'eternality', i.e. the presence of non-eternality, as in the instance of the jar. Here jar is the instance based on dis-similarity or *vaidharmya*.

But this *vyāpti*, in both the forms, is untenable because the alleged proban is irregularly connected with the probandum, its absence being found as related to the presence of the probandum and its presence being found as related to the absence of the probandum. Thus—

1) The atom, though possessing the quality of touch, i.e. thovgh related to the absence of 'the absence of the quality of touch', is eternal.

2) Knowledge, though not possessing the quality of touch, i.e. though related to the presence of 'the absence of the quality of touch', is non-eternal.

According to the later Naiyāyikas, the pseudo-proban called 'the irregular' is of three forms, viz. *sādhāraṇa* (ordinary), *asādhāraṇa* (extra-ordinary) and *anupasaṃhārī* (inconclusive). Vātsyāyana's interpretation of 'the irregular' corresponds to the first of these.

'The irregular', in the form of *asādhāraṇa*, is a mark which is present neither in the *sapakṣa* nor in the *vipakṣa* ; it is present only in the *pakṣa* (subject). Thus, e.g. "Sound is eternal, because it possesses sound-ness". Sound-ness (*śabdatva*) exists only in sound

(which is the *pakṣa*) and is found neither in anything eternal (i.e. *sapakṣa*) nor in anything non-eternal (i.e. *vipakṣa*).

'The irregular', in the form of *anupasaṃhārī*, occurs when there is no instance based either on similarity or on dis-similarity for the inference. Thus, e.g., "Everything is knowable, because of being objects of valid knowledge". No instance can be cited for this inference, for anything cited as an instance would be included in the subject viz. 'everything'. But the subject or *pakṣa* cannot be cited as an instance, because the presence of the probandum is yet to be proved in the *pakṣa* whereas an instance cited is something in which the presence of the probandum is already proved.

Sūtra 6

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*) means [a mark which] 'is in contradiction with it' (*tat-virodhī*), [i.e. with] 'one's own accepted thesis' (*siddhānta*). // i. 2. 6 //

Bhāṣya

The expression *tat-virodhī* means that which contradicts it. [In other words] it contradicts the thesis accepted. Thus, e. g., [as claimed in the Sāṃkhya philosophy] " 'the transformed' (*vikāra*, viz. the 23 Sāṃkhya principles like *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra*, the five *tanmātra*-s, etc.) ceases to have manifestation (*vyakti*), because of the absence of eternality, i.e. the transformed as eternal is not logical. But though not manifested, the transformed remains, because of the absence of destruction."

Now, this proban, viz. 'because of the absence of eternality' comes in contradiction with the accepted conclusion [of the Sāṃkhyas], namely, though not manifested the transformed remains.

How ? Manifestation (*vyakti*) means 'the attainment of the specific nature' (*ātma-lābha*) [i.e. on the part of the transformed]. Cessation (*apāya*) means 'the surrender of the specific nature' (*pracyuti*). If [it is claimed] that the transformed persists in spite of the surrender of the specific nature attained, it is not logical to deny their eternality, because eternality is but the existence of the transformed even after the surrender of the specific nature. [On the other hand,] the denial of eternality amounts to the surrender by the transformed of the specific nature attained. That which surrenders its specific nature attained is found to be non-

eternal and that which exists does not surrender its specific nature attained. The two contradictory characteristics, namely existence and the surrender of the specific nature attained, cannot co-exist. Thus, the proban contradicts the very thesis on the basis of which it is advanced.

Elucidation

The pseudo-proban called 'the contradictory' is a mark which contradicts one's own established thesis. Vātsyāyana illustrates this with a Sāṃkhya thesis.

According to Sāṃkhya, the 23 principles like *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra*, etc., called 'the transformed' (*vikāra*), are conceived as non-eternal. At the same time, according to the established thesis of Sāṃkhya, these exist in *prakṛti* even before attaining the transformed form. This amounts to the admission that they *always* exist, whether as transformed or not, i.e. are eternal. Thus, when Sāṃkhya conceives the transformed as non-eternal, it contradicts its own established thesis.

The Sāṃkhyas, subscribing as they do to the theory of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause (*satkārya-vāda*), deny total destruction and as such the 23 principles are non-eternal in the sense that these are sometimes manifested and sometimes latent within *prakṛti*. Thus, these 23 principles are non-eternal only in their aspect of being manifested ; but these can be conceived also as eternal, for in the unmanifested state these are identical with *prakṛti*. From the Sāṃkhya point of view, therefore, there is no contradiction in conceiving these principles as both eternal and non-eternal.

From the point of view of the theory of the absence of the effect in the cause (*asat-kārya-vāda*), the Naiyāyikas claim that destruction means total annihilation. As such, there is no sense in saying that the 23 principles remain latent even after destruction. Therefore, attributing to these both eternality and non-eternality is a case of flat contradiction.

Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana in interpreting this *sūtra*. According to him all forms of pseudo-proban are essentially 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*), because no pseudo-proban can prove the thesis it intends to prove,—i.e. all pseudo-probans result in contradicting the thesis intended. Incidentally, it may be noted that Vātsyāyana, while interpreting *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 1, quotes the definition of *viruddha* given in this *sūtra* as referring to pseudo-probans in general.

Later Naiyāyikas, however, define the pseudo-proban called 'the contradictory' (*viruddha*) as a mark invariably related to the absence of the probandum. E.g., "Sound is eternal, because it is something caused". This mark, namely 'being something caused', is invariably related to 'being non-eternal', i.e. to the absence of the *sādaya* or the probandum of the inference. Viśvanātha deduces this definition of 'the contradictory' by interpreting the word *siddhānta* in the present *sūtra* to mean 'the characteristic sought to be proved', i.e. the probandum.

Sūtra 7

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the counteracted' (*prakaraṇasama*) is a mark which, 'when employed for final ascertainment' (*nirṇayārtham apadiṣṭa*), gives rise to the suggestion (*cintā*) of 'doubtful alternative possibilities' (*prakaraṇa*). // i. 2. 7 //

Bhāṣya

Prakaraṇa means both thesis and counter-thesis, which are equally doubtful and equally unascertained. The suggestion (*cintā*) of such *prakaraṇa* is the consideration beginning with doubt and continuing to the stage prior to final ascertainment. That [i.e. the mark] which gives rise to such a suggestion, when employed for the purpose of final ascertainment, becomes *prakaraṇasama*, because 'being equally possible in the cases of both the alternatives' (*ubhaya-pakṣa-sāmyāt*), it fails to overcome either the thesis or the counter-thesis [i.e. the *prakaraṇa*] and thus it can never lead to final ascertainment.

Its example is like this : "Sound is non-eternal, because the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything eternal is found to be non-eternal, like the cooking pot, etc."

When a similar characteristic, which causes doubt, is used as a proban, it 'leads to a state of indecision' (*saṃśaya-sama*) and is a case of 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra*). But the 'dependence on the remembrance of the unique characteristic' (*viśeṣāpekṣitā*) and the want of the perception of the unique characteristic in either of the alternatives, lead to thesis and counter-thesis [i.e. to *prakaraṇa*]. As for example, the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in sound and so also [is not perceived] the characteristic of anything non-eternal. The want of the perception of the unique characteristic in either of these alternatives leads to the suggestion of the thesis and counter-thesis. How ? Otherwise, [i.e. in case of the unique characteristic of either of the alternatives being perceived], there is the cessation of the *prakaraṇa* [i.e., the rejection of either the thesis or the counter-thesis]. If, e.g., the characteristic of something eternal is specifically perceived in sound, there can no longer be both the thesis and counter-thesis. If, on the other hand, the characteristic of something non-eternal is specifically perceived in sound then also there can no longer be both the thesis and counter-thesis. Thus the proban

under consideration, leading as it does to two alternatives, cannot finally establish either.

Elucidation

Vâtsyāyana defines *prakaraṇa* as the pair of thesis and counter-thesis. A mark becomes a pseudo-proban called *prakaraṇasama* ('the counteracted') when it results in an 'unsettled enquiry' (*jijñāsā*) concerning the alternative possibilities of both thesis and counter-thesis, without being able to establish either definitely.

The example of this pseudo-proban found in the present version of Vātsyāyana's commentary is : "Sound is non-eternal, because the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything eternal is found to be non-eternal, like the cooking pot, etc."

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that the example of this pseudo-proban, with the addition of an explicit mention of the counter-thesis suggested—as found in some other available versions of the commentary—is more appropriate. It is : "Sound is non-eternal, because the characteristic of anything eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything eternal is found to be non-eternal, like the cooking pot, etc. At the same time, sound is eternal, because the characteristic of anything non-eternal is not perceived in it ; whatever is perceived as without the characteristic of anything not-eternal is found to be eternal, like 'empty space' (*ākāśa*), etc."

Thus, if the Naiyāyikas, with their view of the non-eternality of sound, propose to prove their thesis by the mark 'absence of the perception of the characteristic of anything eternal' in sound, it will leave scope for the Mīmāṃsakas to argue for their counter-thesis, viz. sound is eternal, by the mark 'absence of the perception of the characteristic of anything non-eternal' in sound. In other words, the first mark leaves scope for an equally strong alternative mark proving the counter-thesis and as such is a pseudo-proban in the form of 'the counteracted'. In such a case, neither the thesis nor the counter-thesis is definitely established and the listener to the debate is left only in the stage of an unsettled enquiry.

Vātsyāyana also shows how *prakaraṇasama* differs from *savyabhicāra* : the former leads to an unsettled enquiry whereas the latter results in a doubt.

[It may be pointed out that in the case of *savyabhicāra*, the same mark, being irregularly connected with both the probandum as well as the absence of the probandum, results only in the doubt concerning the presence or absence of the probandum in the subject. In the case of *prakaraṇasama*, however, the mark leaves scope for an equally strong alternative mark proving the absence of the probandum in the subject and as such the two alternative marks give rise to an unsettled enquiry concerning two contradictory possibilities, viz. the thesis and counter-thesis, i.e. the presence or absence of the probandum in the subject.]

Different writers express different views on the nature of *prakaraṇasama* and some of them are inclined to call it a form of *savyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika* resulting only in a doubt. In later Nyāya *prakaraṇasama* is better known as *sat-pratipakṣa*, i.e. a pseudo-proban having a counter-proban.

Sūtra 8

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the unproved' (*sādhya-sama*) [is the mark which] 'being yet to be properly established' (*sādhyatvāt*) is 'not different' (*a-viśiṣṭa*) from 'the characteristic sought to be proved' (*sādhya* or probandum).
// i. 2. 8 //

Bhāṣya

In the inference, "Shadow is a substance", the proban, "being characterised by movement" is [a pseudo-proban in the form of] 'the unproved', because, it [i.e. the alleged movement of the shadow] being yet to be proved, has no difference [in logical status] from the characteristic sought to be proved. [The movement characterising the shadow is *as unproved as* the substantiality of shadow.] This proban also, being not yet proved, remains to be established like the probandum itself. What needs to be proved here is : Does the shadow move like the person ? Or, is it only the series of the absences of light due to the series of obstructions [of light] caused when the object obstructing it moves ?

The continuous series of the absence of those parts of light which are obstructed by a moving substance is perceived [as the moving shadow]. Obstruction means blocking of the connection.

Elucidation

A proban, to be genuine, must itself be something already proved. Therefore, when something itself unproved is used as a mark, it will be a pseudo-proban. Such a pseudo-proban is called *sādhya-sama*, literally 'similar (in logical status) to the *sādhya* or the characteristic sought to be proved'. In other words, the *sādhya* is something yet to be proved and if the mark also is equally unproved it has the same status as that of

the *sādhya*. Thus, e.g., when one argues, "shadow is a substance, because it moves", the mark, viz. the alleged movement of the shadow, will be a pseudo-proban called *sādhya-sama*, because it is as unproved as the probandum, viz. the substantiality of the shadow. Vātsyāyana gives this example because, though the Mīmāṃsakas consider shadow to be a substance, the Naiyāyikas consider it to be nothing but the absence of light and the apparent movement of the shadow is only because of the movement of the object obstructing light.

Later Naiyāyikas generally use the name *asiddha* for this pseudo-proban and they mention several varieties of it. According to Uddyotakara, it has three forms, namely—

1) *svarūpa-asiddha* or the intrinsically unproved: E.g., the movement of the shadow (in the above inference) is itself an absurdity.

2) *āśraya-asiddha* or having an unproved substratum. E g., it may be argued, "Shadow is characterised by movement, because it is perceived to occupy different spaces." This will be a case of 'having an unproved substratum', because 'being perceived as occupying different spaces' proves movement only when this characterises a substance, whereas in the case of shadow the said perception does not characterise a substance, because shadow as a substance remains unproved.

3) *anyathā-asiddha* or being otherwise unproved. E g., it may be argued, "Shadow is a substance, because it is perceived to occupy different spaces." This will be a case of 'being otherwise unproved', because shadow, though otherwise known not to be a substance, is perceived as occupying different spaces.

Udayana mentions an additional variety of the *āśraya-asiddha*, called the *siddha-sādhana*, i.e. proving the well-proved. When the subject of an inference is already well-proved as having some specific characteristic, any mark used to prove it over again as possessing the same characteristic, would be a form of this pseudo-proban. [E g. even after perceiving an elephant as an elephant, one infers: "It is an elephant, because it has a trunk."]

From Gaṅgeśa onwards, the Neo-naiyāyikas mention three forms of 'the unproved', viz.

1) *āśryāsiddha* or having an unproved subject (*pakṣa*). E.g., "The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it belongs to the class of lotus." The subject of this inference, viz. the sky-lotus, is something unreal.

2) *svarūpāsiddha* or a mark not related to the subject. ["Sound is non-eternal because it is visible." Here visibility is never related to sound, the subject of the inference.]

3) *vyāpyatvāsiddha* or a mark having no proved concomitant with the probandum. E.g. "The hill contains fire, because it contains black smoke.". Here, "black smoke" is a pseudo-proban, because there is already a universal concomitance between smoke and fire and as such the addition of "black" to "smoke" is redundant.

According to some, this defect (*doṣa*) called *vyāpyatvāsiddhi* may occur in two ways. First, when there is a 'redundant adjective' (*vyartha-viśeṣaṇa*) added either to the proban

(e.g. in the instance just cited) or to the probandum (e.g. "The hill contains *golden* fire, because it contains smoke"). Secondly, when the concomitance of the proban with the probandum 'depends upon some extraneous condition' (*sopādhika*). E.g. "The hill contains smoke, because it contains fire". Here, the proban, viz. "fire", is concomitant with the probandum, viz. "smoke", only when there is the 'extraneous condition' (*upādhi*), viz. "the presence of wet fuel". Other Naiyāyikas, however, consider this second form, i.e. *sopādhika*, as but a form of 'the irregular' (*savyabhicāra* or *anaikāntika*).

According to the Vaiśeṣika view as interpreted by Praśastapāda, 'the unproved' (*asiddha*) has four forms, viz.

1) *ubhayāsiddha*, i.e. the mark whose absence in the subject is admitted by both the contestants, E. g. "Sound is eternal, because it is visible". Both the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, arguing for and against the eternality of sound, admit that visibility does not belong to sound.

2) *anyatarāsiddha*, i.e. a mark which is claimed as proved by only one of the contestants while considered as unproved by the other. E.g.. "Shadow is a substance, because it has movement". Here, the mark, viz. the movement of the shadow, is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas as real, because they consider shadow to be a substance. To the Naiyāyikas, however, this movement is only apparent, because they consider shadow to be merely the absence of light.

3) *tadbhāvāsiddha*, i.e. a mal-observed mark. E.g., fog wrongly perceived as smoke and taken as a mark for the inference of the presence of fire.

4) *anumeyāsiddha*, i.e. where the subject of inference is unreal. E.g. "The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus." This corresponds to what is described above as *āśrayāsiddha*.

[In this connection, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa elaborately discusses the different theories in Indian philosophy regarding the ontological status of shadow and darkness].

Sūtra 9

[The pseudo-proban called] 'the mis-timed' (*kālātīta*) is a mark characterised by a peculiarity which is vitiated by 'the lapse of time' (*kālātyaya*). // i. 2. 9 //

Bhāṣya

When a mark, a peculiarity of which is separated by the lapse of time, is

used as a proban [and thus] becomes vitiated by the lapse of time, it is called 'the mis-timed' (*kālātīta*). Example : "Sound is eternal, because it is manifested through conjunction, just as the colour". The colour, which exists both before and after being perceived, is manifested through the conjunction between the lamp and the jar. Sound also, similarly existing [i.e. before and after being perceived] is manifested through the conjunction between the drum and the beating stick, or through the conjunction between the wood and the axe. Therefore, sound is eternal, because it is manifested through conjunction. This mark, [viz. 'being manifested through conjunctin'], is a pseudo-proban, because it is vitiated by the lapse of time. The perception of the colour manifested [through conjunction] does not outlast [i.e. remains synchronised with] the time of the conjunction. [In other words, in the case of the colour, its perception and the conjunction through which it is manifested are simultaneous]. So long as the conjunction of the lamp [with the jar] persists there is perception of colour. As soon as the conjunction ceases, there is no perception of colour. But when the conjunction between the wood and the axe no longer exists, sound is perceived by a person at a distance even at the time of disjunction. Now, this perception of sound is not caused by the conjunction, because it outlasts the time of conjunction. Why not ? Because, in the absence of the cause there is the absence of the effect. [Conjunction is not the cause of the perception of sound, because the perception persists even after the conjunction ceases to be.] Thus, this mark [viz. being manifested through conjunction], because of the absence of similarity with the instance cited [i.e. colour] is incapable of proving the probandum and as such is only a pseudo-proban.

The violation of the order of mentioning the inference-components is not meant by the *sūtra* [i.e. the *sūtra* does not define *kālātīta* as a mark mentioned in violation of the proper order of mentioning the inference-components, or more specifically a proban mentioned after the exemplification]. Why ?

> That which is connected by import with something else remains so
> connected in spite of being separated by time.
> In spite of being mentioned in immediate succession, however, those
> unconnected by import do not convey any sense.

Because of such a precept, a proban, even when mentioned in violation of the proper order does not surrender its nature of a real proban, viz. the characteristic of proving the probandum through similarity or dis-similarity with the instance cited. Since it does not surrender its nature of a real proban, it is not a pseudo-proban. [Further, in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 11] it is said : "The 'point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) called *aprāptakāla* is the mention of the inference-components in violation of their proper order". Therefore, this [viz. the mention of the inference-components in violation of the proper order] is not the real meaning of the present

sūtra [defining *kālātīta*], since that makes the other *sūtra* [i.e. *Nyāya-sūtra* v.2.11] redundant.

Elucidation

After explaining the definition and an example of 'the mistimed', Vātsyāyana passes on to criticise an alternative definition of this pseudo-proban, viz. a proban mentioned in violation of the proper order of mentioning the inference-components, or more specifically, a proban mentioned after the exemplification. From this it is clear that such an alternative definition was in circulation before Vātsyāyana's time. Vācaspati says that this alternative definition was offered by some Buddhist logicians. Vātsyāyana argues that this definition is untenable because of two considerations. First, a genuine proban does not cease to be genuine only because of being mentioned in an irregular order. Secondly, as Gautama himself says, the mention of the inference-components in an irregular order is a form of 'the point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) rather than of pseudo-proban.

As against Vātsyāyana, the Buddhist logician Śāntarakṣita argues that an independent form of pseudo-proban called *kālātīta* is unacceptable. The example of it, as cited by Vātsyāyana, is, as a matter of fact, only a case of 'the unproved' (*asiddha*), because in this example is actually proved that the mark, "being manifested through conjunction", does not exist in the subject of the inference, viz. "sound". [In other words, it corresponds to what is already discussed as *svarūpāsiddha.*]

Even later Naiyāyikas, like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspati Miśra, do not accept the example of the *kālātīta* given by Vātsyāyana. According to Vācaspati Miśra, when the absence of the characteristic sought to be proved is already well-established by any other stronger *pramāṇa,* there is no longer any doubt about the presence of the probandum in the subject and as such no longer any scope for any proban to prove it. In other words, the time for employing any proban to prove the probandum has elapsed and any proban mentioned after such a lapse of the appropriate time is a case of *kālātīta* or 'the mis-timed'. Thus, in short, *kālātīta* means a mark used to prove a probandum, the absence of which is already well-proved in the subject. Later Naiyāyikas, therefore, use for this pseudo-proban the name *vādhita,* i.e. contradicted by a stronger *pramāṇa.*

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes the discussion of pseudo-probans by reviewing the different views regarding the actual number of pseudo-probans. Of these, two trends are particularly prominent. First, as the Naiyāyikas generally claim, there are five forms of the pseudo-proban. Secondly, as claimed by the Buddhists and others, there are only three forms of the pseudo-proban,viz. *asiddha*, *viruddha* and *savyabhicāra* (or *anaikāntika*).

According to the second trend, it is not necessary to admit the *satpratipakṣa* (or *prakaraṇasama*) and *kālātīta* (or *vādhita*) as independent forms of the pseudo-proban.

As against the admission of *satpratipakṣa,* it is argued that, as a matter of fact,

in no case can both the probans advanced for the thesis and counter-thesis be equally strong. Granting such a possibility, the doubt can never be dispelled and final ascertainment cannot be reached. Therefore, one of the two probans must, in fact, be comparatively weak and as such there is no proper case of a *satpratipakṣa.*

To this it is answered that though one of the two probans is in fact weaker than the other, the persons listening to the debate may, for the time being, be unaware which of the two is actually so. During this time, therefore, both the probans may appear to them to be equally strong, i.e. these probans would be but pseudo-probans contradicting each other.

As against the admission of the *kālātīta* (or *vādhita*) as a separate form of pseudo-proban, it is argued that in all the cases cited as examples of this, the proban is already vitiated by some other defect, i.e. is already proved to be a pseudo-proban on some other ground. Thus, in the example, "Fire is cold, because it is a substance, just like water",—the mark is already a pseudo-proban in the form of *savyabhicāra,* because "being a substance" coexists with "coldness" as well as "the absence of coldness."

In answer to this it is pointed out that though in such examples there may be other defects as well, when the absence of the probandum in the subject is already proved by a stronger *pramāṇa,* this constitutes the most palpable defect of the mark used, as a result of which it is desirable to call the mark primarily a pseudo-proban in the form of the *vādhita* (or *kālātīta*). Besides, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that there may be examples of marks having exclusively the defect of being *kālātīta* or *vādhita.* Thus, e.g., " 'The hill in its peak region' (*śikharāvacchinna-parvata*) contains fire, because it contains smoke." In this example, the proban has no other defect except that it is already proved that fire exists not in the peak of the hill but somewhere else below.

Thus, concludes Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, Gautama's view of five-fold pseudo-proban is to be accepted.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF PSEUDO-PROBANS

(*hatvābhāsa-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bhāṣya

Next is discussed 'purposive distortion [of the opponent]' (*chala*).

Sūtra 10

Chala is the rebuttal of the words [or arguments] of the opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended. // i. 2. 10 //

Bhāṣya

It is not possible to cite an example of *chala* taking it in its general definition. The examples [will be cited when it is] classified under different forms. The classification is—

Sūtra 11

It [*chala*] is threefold ; 1) 'purposive distortion by resorting to ambiguity' (*vāk-chala*), 2) 'purposive distortion by resorting to similarity' (*sāmānya-chala*) and 3) 'purposive distortion of the secondary sense' (*upacāra-chala*). // i. 2. 11 //

Bhāṣya

Of these—

Sūtra 12

'Purposive distortion by resorting to ambiguity' (*vāk-chala*) is inventing a meaning opposite to what is intended by the speaker when [the speaker] employs ambiguous expressions. // i. 2. 12 //

Bhāṣya

It is asserted [by someone], "This boy is *nava-kambala.*" Here, the intention of the speaker is to mean, "This boy has a 'new' (*nava*) 'blanket' (*kambala*)." The expression [viz. *nava-kambala*], though same in its compounded form, acquires different forms when expounded. Here, somebody wanting to employ *chala*, invents a meaning different from the one intended by the speaker, thus [he accuses the speaker by saying :] "You have said that this boy has 'nine' (*nava*) 'blankets' (*kambala*)." Thus inventing [an opposite meaning] he refutes [the speaker] by pointing to an absurdity, [namely] : "He has only one blanket. Where do you find the nine blankets ?" This [is an example of] *vāk-chala*, because here distortion [is effected] by resorting to an ambiguous expression.

Its refutation is as follows. Since an ambiguous expression has various meanings, specific grounds need to be shown for the selection of any particular [meaning of it]. The expression *nava-kambala* has different implications, viz. "He has a new blanket" and "He has nine blankets." When this expression is used [by the speaker], the selection of the meaning, viz. "He has nine blankets", has been made by you [without mentioning any specific ground for your selection]. This is not permissible, for you have got to mention the specific ground for the selection of this particular meaning—a ground which restricts the expression to the specific [meaning], i.e. [which] determines that this particular meaning is intended by this expression. There is no such specific ground [mentioned by you] and as such it is only a false accusation.

The relation between a word and its meaning,—i.e. the rule regulating the use of a specific word for implying a specific sense—is well-established among the people. "This word expresses this meaning"—[such a relation between the word and the meaning] is a common one in the case of the same word having different meanings but is a different one in the case of a word having one specific sense. These words are used to indicate the meanings after these had previously been similarly used and not when previously unused. The employment of the words is for the purpose of understanding their meanings and practical activities proceed from this understanding of their meanings. Thus, words being employed for the understanding of meanings, there is restriction regarding the use of a word having different meanings, according to the capacity [of its conveying a specific meaning]. E.g., "Take goat to the village", "Collect butter", "Feed *brāhmaṇa*"—here [the words goat, butter and *brāhmaṇa*], though having different meanings [i.e., though meaning either the class or the individuals referred to by these words] are used to signify specific meanings [i.e., certain individuals rather than the classes] according to feasibility. They [i.e. the words goat, butter and *brāhmaṇa*] are employed in the sense in which the carrying out of the orders is possible. They [i.e. these words]

are not used in their generic senses [i.e. as meaning the classes], because otherwise the carrying out of the orders becomes impossible.

Similarly, the ambiguous expression *nava-kambala* is used to mean [only] what is plausible, viz. "He has a new blanket", but it is not used to mean what is not plausible, viz. "He has nine blankets." Thus, the refutation of the opponent's contention based on the invention of an illogical meaning is not possible.

Elucidation

After explaining, with an example, the nature of *vāk-chala*, Vātsyāyana shows how to expose it as a mere trickery of argument. The same word or expression may have a number of different meanings and the selection of a particular meaning is proper only when it is regulated by the nature of the context in which it is used and by long-standing usage. One deliberately distorting the position of the opponent disregards the regulation and selects a meaning at random. Therefore, objections raised on the basis of such deliberate distortions are futile.

Sūtra 13

'Purposive distortion by resorting to similarity' (*sāmānya-chala*) is 'inventing an absurd meaning' (*a-sambhūta-artha-kalpanā*) regarding the intended object by [taking advantage of] 'general characteristic being present in objects other than the one intended [by the speaker]' (*atisāmānya-yoga*). // i. 2. 13 //

Bhāṣya

On listening to the assertion [of somebody], viz. "This *brāhmaṇa* has the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned", someone else comments : "The accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is but natural for a *brāhmaṇa*". This [second] is refuted [by one employing *sāmānya-chala*] with the invention of a meaning opposite to the one intended,

i.e. by inventing an absurd meaning. Thus : "If the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is natural for *brāhmaṇa*, then this should be so even for a *vrātya* [i.e. a degraded *brāhmaṇa*] ; in other words, a *vrātya* also is a *brāhmaṇa* and [as such] he should also have the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned".

By *atisāmānya* [in the *sūtra*] is meant a characteristic which is present in the object intended as well as in other objects. Thus, e.g., the characteristic of being a *brāhmaṇa* sometimes coexists and sometimes does not with the accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned. This is called *sāmānya-chala*, because it is due to 'general characteristic' (*sāmānya*).

Its refutation is as follows : [This second assertion, viz. "The accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is but natural for a *brāhmaṇa*"] is but a repetition of the theme [asserted first] with a view to praise only, and not for indicating a causal connection [between 'being a *brāhmaṇa*' and 'having the accomplishment']. Therefore, there is no scope for inventing the absurd meaning [viz. the causal connection alleged]. For example, [the statement] "In this field the *śāli* crop grows abundantly", does not negate the growth of the crop from seeds nor is it intended [to convey that the crop grows in this field after the sowing of the seed] ; on the contrary, it is intended to be simply a praise of the field under discussion. It is but mentioning over again [something about] the field and not an injunction that the *śāli* crop should be cultivated in this field. Though it is a fact that the *śāli* crop grows from the seeds, [the statement under discussion] is not intended to point to this. Similarly, the statement, viz. "The accomplishment of behaving according to the norm of the learned is natural for a *brāhmaṇa*", indicates that 'being a *brāhmaṇa*' is related to the accomplishment and not that it is the cause of the accomplishment. The cause is not meant here. It is only a case of restatement, because it is simply intended to be a praise, viz. the possession of the accomplishment is appropriate in the case of being a *brāhmaṇa*. A statement intended to be in praise of something does not negate the production of the effect in accordance with its cause. Hence, refutation of a statement by inventing an absurd meaning is not tenable.

Sūtra 14

'Purposive distortion of the secondary sense' (*upacāra-chala*) is refuting [the opponent] by taking resort to the primary sense 'when the secondary sense is intended' (*dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe*). // i. 2. 14 //

Bhāṣya

Dharma [in the *sūtra*] means the use of a word in its proper sense [i.e. in the primary sense]. *Dharma-vikalpa* means the use of the word in a sense different from the one in which it is generally found [i.e. *dharma-vikalpa* means the use of a word in its secondary sense]. Thus, the expression *dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe* means "when a word is used in a secondary sense". E.g., the statement, viz. "The platform calls" (*mañcāḥ krośanti*), is refuted by taking the primary sense [of the word "platform"] thus : "The persons on the platform call and the platform does not call".

Where, in such a case, is the invention of the opposite meaning ? [The invention consists in] the attribution of a different meaning to a word used in some other sense,—that is, the attribution of the primary sense [when the word is actually] used in the secondary sense. It is called *upacāra-chala*, because it rests on *upacāra*. *Upacāra* means the figurative sense. [As explained in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 62], *upacāra* is conveying [by a word] a meaning in which it is not [primarily] used, because of the conditions like contiguity (*sahacaraṇa*) etc. [The conditions like contiguity etc. which make a secondary sense admissible are explained in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 62].

The solution here is this : In the cases of well-known expressions, the admission or rejection of words and their meanings should be in accordance with the implications intended by the speaker and not whimsically. The use of words in their primary senses as well as in their secondary senses is admitted by both [the contestants] as sanctioned by usage. In the cases of such sanctioned use, the words and their meanings are to be accepted or rejected in accordance with the intention of the speaker and not whimsically. If the speaker uses a word in its primary sense, it is to be accepted or rejected as it is [i.e. only in its primary sense] and not whimsically. If [a word is used in] a secondary sense [it is to be accepted or rejected] as expressing the secondary sense [alone]. When the speaker uses a word in its secondary sense and the other refutes it by taking up the primary sense, it results only in a refutation subjectively imagined and not in a proper refutation of the opponent.

Sūtra 15

[Objection :] The *upacāra-chala* is nothing but *vāk-chala*, because there is no difference [of this, viz. *upacāra-chala*] with it [viz. *vāk-chala*]. // i. 2. 15 //

Bhāṣya

Upacāra-chala does not differ from *vāk-chala*, because it has no difference [from *vāk-chala* both being] the invention of a meaning other than what is intended. Here [i.e. in the example of *upacāra-chala*, viz. "The platform calls"] also the refutation is effected by twisting the word [i.e. the word "platform"] used in its secondary sense, viz. "those on the platform", to imply the primary sense, viz. "the platform itself."

Sūtra 16

[Answer :] No. Because there is difference in the nature of the invention of meaning [in the two cases of *chala*]. // i. 2. 16 //

Bhāṣya

Upacāra-chala is not the same as *vāk-chala*, because its way of refutation with the help of the primary sense is different. From what ? From the simple invention of a different [but equally primary] meaning [in the case of *vāk-chala*]. It is one thing to invent a different meaning and it is something else to refute with the help of the primary sense. [In other words, while employing *vāk-chala* one simply invents an alternative primary meaning ; on the other hand, while employing *upacāra-chala* one replaces the intended secondary sense by the primary sense unintended].

Sūtra 17

[Further, if it is claimed] there is no difference between the two [viz. *vāk-chala* and *upacāra-chala*], then on the ground of partial similarity [among all the forms of *chala*], there is the possibility of the undue admission of only one form of *chala*. // i. 2. 17 //

Bhāṣya

Admitting *chala* to be two-fold, it is denied [by the opponent] on the ground of partial similarity [between *upacāra-chala* and *vāk-chala*] that *chala* is three-fold. This ground which rejects the view that *chala* is three-fold also rejects the view accepted by you [i.e. by the opponent] that *chala* is two-fold. Because, partial similarity also exists between the two forms of *chala* [admitted by the opponent]. Therefore, if claimed [by the opponent] that [the view], viz. *chala* is two-fold, is not negated on the ground of partial similarity, then the view that it is three-fold cannot also be negated [on the same ground of partial similarity].

Elucidation

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (*vimāna-sthāna*, *adhyāya* viii) refers to a view according to which there are only two forms of *chala*, viz. *vāk-chala* and *sāmānya-chala*. From this it is evident that such a view was current in ancient time and Gautama, in these three *sūtra*-s, refutes it in favour of his own view of three-fold *chala*. As Vātsyāyana explains, it is necessary to admit *upacāra-chala* as distinct from *vāk-chala*, because there is a significant difference between the two. In the case of *vāk-chala*, the meanings intended as well as invented are both primary, whereas in *upacāra-chala* the meaning intended is secondary while the meaning invented is primary.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DEFINITION OF PURPOSIVE DISTORTION

(*chala-lakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

Bkāṣya

After the definition of *chala* [is mentioned the definition of *jāti*].

Sūtra 18

'Futile rejoinder' (*jāti*) is refuting the opponent by [pointing to] superficial similarity and dis-similarity. // i. 2. 18 //

Bhāṣya

Jāti [literally] means an opportunity [for one of the contestants] born out of employment of a proban [by the other]. This opportunity is nothing but the refutation or rejection or demolition by pointing to superficial similarity or dis-similarity. The refutation of 'the proban which proves the probandum through similarity with the instance cited' (*sādharmya-hetu* : *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 34) is to be effected by pointing to the dis-similarity with the instance cited. The refutation of 'the proban which proves the probandum through dis-similarity with the instance cited' (*vaidharmya-hetu* : *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 35) is to be effected by pointing to the similarity with the instance cited. Because there is mutual contradiction [between similarity and dis-similarity]. *Jāti* is 'that which is born' (*jāyamāna*), i.e. the resulting refutation.

Elucidation

The different forms of *jāti*, along with their examples, will be discussed in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 1. 1ff.

Sūtra 19

'Point of defeat' (*nigrahasthāna*) means [the demonstration] of 'contradictory knowledge' (*vipratipatti*) or ignorance (*apratipatti*) [on the part of any of the contestants]. // i. 2. 19 //

Bhāṣya

'Contradictary knowledge' means either 'erroneous' (*viparīta*) or 'crude' (*kutsita*) knowledge. One with such contradictory knowledge becomes defeated *Nigrahasthāna* means nothing but this point of defeat.

Ignorance (*apratipatti*), on the other hand, is the failure to play one's own part [in a debate], i.e. [one suffering from ignorance] does not refute the position advanced by the opponent nor refutes the charges advanced against one's own position.

Because of the absence of a compounded form [in the *sūtra* of the words *vipratipatti* and *apratipatti*] it is to be understood that these two are not the only forms of *nigrahasthāna*.

But, then, do *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna* have single form, as in the case of exemplification, or do they have different forms like [the different forms of] 'the proved doctrine'? So is said,

Sūtra 20

Jāti and *nigrahasthāna* are of various forms, because of the manifold (*vikalpa*) forms [of refutation by pointing to superficial similarity and dis-similarity and, again, because of the manifold forms of contradictory knowledge and ignorance]. // i. 2. 20 //

Bhāṣya

Jāti is of various forms because of the manifold forms of refutation by pointing to superficial similarity and dis-similarity. *Nigrahasthāna* is of various forms because of the manifold forms of contradictory knowledge and ignorance. The word *vikalpa* means 'various forms' (*nānā-kalpa*) or 'multiplicity of forms' (*vividha-kalpa*).

[Of the twentytwo forms of *nigrahasthāna* mentioned by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* v. 2. 1], the following six,—called 1) *ananubhāṣaṇa* 2) *ajñāna* 3) *apratibhā* 4) *vikṣepa* 5) *matānujñā* and 6) *paryanuyojya-upekṣaṇa*,—belong to the class of *nigrahasthāna* known as ignorance (*apratipatti*) and the rest to the class called 'contradictory knowledge' (*vipratipatti*).

These sixteen categories, called *pramāṇa* etc., are first mentioned each by name. Each of these is defined next in the order in which these are mentioned.

These will be critically examined [in the subsequent chapters] according to their definitions. Thus is followed the three-fold procedure by the present system.

HERE ENDS THE FIRST CHAPTER OF VĀTSYĀYANA'S COMMENTARY ON NYĀYA-SŪTRA

Elucidation

The section consisting of the last three *sūtra*-s is known as the *puruṣa-aśakti-liṅga-doṣa-sāmānyalakṣaṇa-prakaraṇa*, because here is given the 'general definition' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of the defects (*doṣa*) which are 'indicative of' (*liṅga*) the disability (*aśakti*) of the contestants (*puruṣa*) in a debate.

HERE ENDS THE FIRST CHAPTER (consisting of 2 *āhnika*-s, 11 *prakaraṇa*-s and 61 *sūtra*-s) OF THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA